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The	   nature	   of	   institutional	   change	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   understanding	  
China’s	   extraordinary	   transformation	   of	   the	   past	   30	   years.	   This	   thesis	  
adopts	   an	   historical	   institutionalist	   approach,	   emphasising	   dynamic	  
and	   path	   dependent	   processes,	   in	   examining	   Zhongguancun	   (ZGC),	  
China’s	  premier	  science,	  technology	  and	  innovation	  zone	  in	  Beijing.	  The	  
analytical	   framework	   deals	   with	   many	   of	   the	   critical	   issues	   of	  
institutional	   analysis	   of	   large-­‐scale	   economic	   development	   and	   social	  
change:	   the	   Chinese	   experience	   as	   radical	   or	   gradual	   change;	  
institutional	   convergence	   or	   divergence;	   formal	   and	   informal	  
institutions;	   top-­‐down	   design	   and	   bottom-­‐up,	   spontaneous	  
development.	   ZGC	   illustrates	   the	   ongoing	   importance	   of	  
experimentation	   in	   Chinese	   policy	   as	   various	   institutional	   innovations	  
have	  emerged	  from	  the	  zone,	  both	  spontaneously	  and	  through	  state-­‐led	  
trial	   schemes.	   However,	   increasing	   preponderance	   from	   the	   Chinese	  
leadership	   and	   the	   highest	   state-­‐level	   institutions	   may	   ultimately	  
thwart	  attempts	  to	  turn	  ZGC	  into	  a	  world-­‐class	  innovation	  hub.	  
	  	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
1.	   Introduction	  .............................................................................................	  1	  
2.	   Chinese	  economic	  reform	  .........................................................................	  3	  Gradualism	  ........................................................................................................................................	  4	  Experimentalism	  ............................................................................................................................	  7	  
3.	   Institutions	  .............................................................................................	  15	  The	  concept	  and	  importance	  of	  institutions	  ....................................................................	  15	  Chinese	  institutions—convergence	  or	  divergence,	  a	  puzzle	  or	  not	  ......................	  17	  Institutional	  change	  and	  reform	  ...........................................................................................	  21	  
4.	   Innovation	  theories	  and	  innovation	  zones	  ..............................................	  25	  National	  innovation	  system	  framework	  ............................................................................	  25	  Innovation	  zones—definition	  ................................................................................................	  26	  Innovation	  zones—rationale	  ..................................................................................................	  28	  Innovation	  zones—effectiveness	  .........................................................................................	  32	  
5.	   Zhongguancun	  –	  development	  and	  evolution	  .........................................	  36	  The	  context—China’s	  transitional	  system	  .......................................................................	  36	  ZGC—Pre-­‐reform	  era	  .................................................................................................................	  39	  ZGC—Embryonic	  stages	  of	  the	  zone,	  1980–1988	  .........................................................	  39	  ZGC—Formal	  establishment	  of	  experimental	  zone,	  1988–1999	  ............................	  41	  ZGC—Science	  and	  Technology	  Park,	  1999–2009	  ..........................................................	  45	  ZGC—National	  Innovation	  Demonstration	  Zone,	  2009–	  ...........................................	  50	  
6.	   Discussion	  ...............................................................................................	  53	  Zhongguancun	  and	  Chinese	  institutions	  ...........................................................................	  53	  Innovation	  zones:	  Chinese	  convergence?	  .........................................................................	  58	  
7.	   Conclusion	  ..............................................................................................	  61	  
Bibliography	  ..................................................................................................	  64	  Non-­‐Chinese	  language	  ...............................................................................................................	  64	  Chinese-­‐language	  ........................................................................................................................	  78	  
	  
	  Page 1	  
1. Introduction	  
This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  nature	  of	  Chinese	  institutions	  and	  how	  they	  develop	  and	  evolve,	  by	  taking	  the	  case	  of	  Zhongguancun	  (ZGC),	  China’s	  first	  national-­‐level	  high-­‐tech	   industrial	   zone	   and	   now	   a	   national	   innovation	   demonstration	   zone	   to	   the	  world.	  The	  thesis	  addresses	  the	  following	  questions:	  “What	  does	  the	  development	  and	   evolution	   of	   ZGC	   tell	   us	   about	   how	   institutions	   are	   constructed	   in	  China	   and	  about	   policy	   experimentation	   in	   China?	   How	   unique	   or	   novel	   is	   ZGC	   when	  compared	  to	  other	  innovation	  zones	  in	  East	  Asia	  and	  OECD	  economies?”	  
ZGC	  serves	  as	  a	  useful	  case	  study	  in	  understanding	  the	  development	  and	  evolution	  of	   Chinese	   institutions	   as	   well	   as	   the	   use	   of	   experimentation	   in	   Chinese	   policy	  making.	   First,	   the	   formal	   institutions,	   including	   the	   regulations	   issued	   by	  government	   authorities,	   governing	   the	   zone	   have	   changed	   periodically.	   Second,	  ZGC	   is	   an	   example	   of	   a	   Chinese	   policy	   experiment,	   akin	   to	   the	   special	   economic	  zones	  of	  Guangdong.	  The	  zone	  was	   first	   formally	  established	  as	  an	   “experimental	  zone”	   for	   high-­‐tech	   industries	   and	   its	   role	   in	   institutional	   innovation	   for	   broader	  reform	   in	   China	   continues	   to	   this	   day	   as	   the	   State	   Council	   encourages	   “daring	  reform.”	   Third,	   ZGC	   is	   highly	   topical	   and	   has	   received	   much	   limelight	   in	   China,	  being	   touted	   as	   equal	   to	   Shenzhen	   in	   the	  1980s	   and	  Pudong	   in	   the	  1990s.	   It	   is	   a	  central	   plank	   of	   China’s	   plans	   to	   become	   a	   high-­‐value,	   innovative	   economy	   and	  world	  science	  leader.	  
The	   findings	   and	   conclusions	   of	   this	   thesis	   lend	   weight	   to	   the	   historical	  institutionalist	   approach,	   which	   emphasises	   dynamic	   and	   path	   dependent	  processes	   in	   institutional	   formation	   and	   development.	   The	   thesis	   begins	   by	  examining	   China’s	   reform,	   which	   has	   been	   characterised	   by	   two	   key	   features:	  gradualism	   and	   experimentalism.	   Combined,	   these	   two	   features	   have	   generated	  pareto-­‐improving	   institutional	   change	   in	   China.	   A	   discussion	   on	   Chinese	  institutions	  then	  follows.	  Chinese	  leaders	  have	  adopted	  certain	  prescriptions	  from	  standard	   policy	   prescriptions,	   which	   have	   been	   formulated	   based	   on	   Western	  experience.	   However,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   they	   have	   created,	   or	   allowed	   for	   the	  creation	   of,	   unique	   institutions	   suitable	   to	   the	   specific	   Chinese	   context	   and	   the	  transition	   economy.	   A	   syncretic	   approach	   and	   high	   path	   dependency	   mark	   the	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development	  of	  Chinese	   institutions,	  as	  opposed	   to	  big-­‐bang	   institutional	   reforms	  attempted	  elsewhere	  in	  former	  command	  economies.	  	  
Theories	  of	  innovation	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  informal	  institutions,	  knowledge	  flows	   and	   interactions.	   In	   developing	   countries,	   including	   China,	   informal	  institutions	   often	   play	   particularly	   important	   roles	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   formal	  institutions.	  Yet	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ZGC,	  informal	  institutions,	  trust	  and	  collaboration	  do	  not	   appear	   to	   be	   particularly	  well	   developed,	   limiting	   the	   zone’s	   effectiveness	   in	  producing	   innovation.	   A	   lack	   of	   formal	   institutions,	   such	   as	   a	   well-­‐functioning	  intellectual	  property	   regime,	  well-­‐developed	  capital	  markets	  and	  clear	  ownership	  laws,	  appears	  to	  be	  hindering	  the	  development	  of	  networks	  and	  collaboration.	  
Finally,	  the	  thesis	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  lack	  of	  clarity	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  innovation	  areas	  and	  science	  and	   technology	  parks,	  which	  means	   that	   there	   is	  no	  particular	   institutional	   setting	   to	   which	   ZGC	   or	   Chinese	   parks	   could	   converge.	  However,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   experimental	   role	   played	   by	   ZGC	   is	   unique.	   Its	   very	  establishment	  was	  an	  experiment,	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  trials	  have	  resulted	  in	  changes	  to	  the	  corporate	  governance	  of	  Chinese	  high-­‐tech	  firms.	  Top-­‐down	  pilot	  schemes	  have	  gained	  momentum	   in	   the	   last	   two	   years	   with	   a	   number	   of	   government	   agencies	  using	   ZGC	   to	   experiment	   with	   innovation	   policies.	   The	   State	   Council’s	   role	   is	  growing	  and	  it	  exercises	  its	  power	  through	  non-­‐legal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  speeches	  and	   directives.	   Whether	   or	   not	   ZGC	   comes	   to	   the	   fore	   and	   drives	   innovation	   in	  China	   through	   modelling	   an	   innovation-­‐inducing	   institutional	   framework	   will	  depend	   significantly	   on	   the	   institutional	   changes	   dictated	   from	   the	   top,	   in	  particular	  whether	  they	  support	  the	  development	  of	  informal	  institutions.	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2. Chinese	  economic	  reform	  
In	  1978,	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  was	  the	  world’s	  tenth	  largest	  economy.	  Today,	  only	  the	  United	  States	   economy	   is	   larger.1	  Half	   a	  billion	  people	  have	  been	   lifted	  out	  of	  poverty.2	  Personal	   choice	   has	   expanded,	   greater	   volumes	   of	   goods	   are	   available,	  connections	  with	  the	  outside	  world	  have	  increased,	  and	  education	  outcomes	  have	  improved. 3 	  This	   impressive	   record	   has,	   however,	   been	   accompanied	   by	  deteriorating	   income	   inequality, 4 	  continued	   corruption	   and	   extensive	  environmental	  degradation.	  
This	   record	   stems	   from	   fundamental	   and	   ongoing	   reform,	   which	   has	   focused	   on	  incentives,	   mobility,	   price	   flexibility,	   competition	   and	   openness. 5 	  The	   Chinese	  Communist	   Party	   has	   abandoned	   its	   former	   autarkic	   policies	   in	   favour	   of	   deep	  engagement	  with	  world	  markets.	  The	  open-­‐door	  policy	  has	  allowed	  China	  to	  move	  towards	   labour-­‐intensive	   production,	   away	   from	   the	   previous	   Soviet-­‐type	  economic	   strategy	   which	   favoured	   investment	   in	   capital-­‐intensive	   heavy	  industries.6	  The	   Chinese	   economy	   is	   now	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   global	   trade7	  and	  foreign	  technology	  and	  knowledge.	  	  
As	   a	   first	   approximation,	   China’s	   economy	   could	   now	   be	   treated	   as	   a	   market	  economy.8	  China	  is	  generating	  a	  form	  of	  capitalism	  as	  private	  capital	  accumulation	  rises.9	  However,	   the	   Chinese	   economy	   is	   “difficult	   to	   pigeonhole	   because	   it	   is	  simultaneously	  an	  intensely	  competitive	  market	  economy	  and	  an	  economy	  subject	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  World	  Bank	  (2012a).	  No	  country	  other	  than	  China	  has	  maintained	  annual	  growth	  of	  nine	  percent	  for	  more	  than	  three	  decades	  (Lin	  2012).	  2	  World	  Bank	  and	  Development	  Research	  Center	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  (2012).	  3	  Literacy	  rates	  rose	  from	  66	  percent	  in	  1982	  to	  91	  percent	  in	  2000	  (UNESCO	  Institute	  for	  Statistics).	  4	  Naughton	  (2007);	  World	  Bank	  and	  Development	  Research	  Center	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  (2012).	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  “economic	  growth	  has	  become	  increasingly	  highly	  regionally	  driven…and	  uneven	  across	  provinces	  and	  regions”	  (Zhang,	  J.	  2008).	  Mao	  adopted	  extensive	  redistributive	  policies,	  while	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  pursued	  an	  uneven	  development	  policy	  inspired	  by	  the	  ladder-­‐step	  theory	  (tidu	  lilun	  
梯度理论),	  which	  recognised	  the	  higher	  levels	  of	  productivity	  and	  capital	  in	  the	  eastern	  regions,	  but	  higher	  levels	  of	  raw	  materials,	  energy	  and	  natural	  resources	  in	  western	  regions.	  The	  uneven	  development	  policy	  designated	  the	  coastal	  region	  to	  be	  developed	  first,	  followed	  by	  the	  central	  and	  western	  provinces.	  For	  a	  thorough	  account	  of	  China’s	  regional	  economic	  development	  policy	  and	  its	  underpinnings	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  see	  Fan	  (1995	  and	  1997).	  See	  Tian	  (2004)	  for	  details	  on	  the	  western	  development	  programmes.	  5	  Brandt	  &	  Rawski	  (2008).	  6	  Ibid.;	  Lin	  (2012).	  7	  China’s	  trade	  ratio	  has	  increased	  from	  under	  ten	  percent	  prior	  to	  reform	  to	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  since	  2003,	  a	  level	  far	  higher	  than	  either	  the	  United	  States	  or	  Japan	  (calculated	  from	  World	  Bank	  2012a).	  8	  Chow	  (2002).	  9	  McNally	  (2008).	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to	   particularly	   severe	   distortions.”10	  The	   transformation	   from	   a	   rigidly	   planned	  economy	  to	  a	  market-­‐oriented	  one	  is	  ongoing,	  mostly	  because	  reform	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise	  (SOE)	  sector	  and	  financial	  system	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  accomplished.11	  However,	   the	   real	   challenge	   ahead	   is	   to	  move	   China	   up	   the	   value	   chain	   through	  innovation.	   As	   Naughton	   (2007)	   notes,	   “[i]nstitutions	   that	   support	   a	   high-­‐productivity	   economy	   are	   either	   non-­‐existent	   or	   else	   created	   very	   recently	   and	  established	  on	  shaky	  foundations.”12	  
Gradualism	  While	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  China’s	  economic	  reforms	  is	  clear,	  the	  exact	  character	  of	  the	  reforms	  and	  the	  causes	  of	  growth	  have	  generated	  lively	  debate.	  The	  camps	  are	  divided	   between	   those	  who	   argue	   that	   China	   has	   pursued	   a	   radical	   strategy	   and	  those	   who	   maintain	   that	   China	   has	   adopted	   a	   gradual	   approach.13	  The	   debate	  centres	   on	   the	   core	   problem	   of	   economic	   reform,	   i.e.	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	  predominant	   resource	   allocation	   mechanism	   from	   the	   plan	   to	   the	   market.	  Economic	  transition	  involves	  both	  reform	  of	  the	  traditional	  state	  sector	  (the	  core)	  and	  the	  emergence	  and	  growth	  of	  a	  nonstate	  sector	  (the	  periphery),	  consisting	  of	  both	   privately	   and	   collectively	   owned	   domestic	   enterprises	   and	   foreign	   invested	  enterprises.14	  
Those	  who	  argue	  that	  China	  has	  adopted	  a	  radical	  approach	  point	  to	  the	  dramatic	  change	  in	  development	  strategy	  in	  1979	  when	  the	  Chinese	  government	  adopted	  a	  vigorous	   reform	   program.	   The	   new	   strategy	   centred	   on	   expanding	   enterprise	  autonomy	  and	  building	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  China’s	  economic	   success	   is	  due	   to	   radical	  measures	   introduced	  rapidly	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1970s	   and	   early	   1980s:	   dismantling	   of	   the	   communes	   and	   replacement	   by	  household	   farm	   plots	   under	   various	   forms	   of	   a	   “contract	   responsibility	   system,”	  deregulation	   of	   agricultural	   prices,	   liberalisation	   of	   the	   township	   and	   village	  enterprises	   (TVEs)	   and	   opening	   of	   the	   coastal	   regions	  which	   brought	  millions	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  10.	  11	  Land,	  finance	  and	  natural	  resources	  are	  still	  subject	  to	  direct	  interference	  and	  allocation	  by	  the	  state	  (Lin	  2012).	  12	  Naughton	  (2007),	  pp.	  10–11.	  13	  See	  Walder	  (1995)	  for	  a	  useful	  account	  of	  the	  various	  views	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Chinese	  reform.	  14	  Jefferson	  et	  al.	  (1999).	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Chinese	  workers	  rapidly	  into	  an	  export-­‐oriented	  labour	  market.15	  Subsequent	  fiscal	  and	  tax	  reforms	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  are	  also	  held	  up	  as	  radical	  measures.16	  
The	  radical	  school	  holds	   that	  China	  has	  achieved	  the	  greatest	  success	   in	  precisely	  the	  areas	  where	  reforms	  have	  been	  the	  deepest,	  in	  particular,	  in	  agriculture	  and	  in	  the	   coastal	   provinces. 17 	  This	   camp,	   which	   includes	   the	   international	   financial	  organisations	  and	  mainstream	  neoclassical	   economists,	   emphasises	   the	   rapid	  and	  sustained	   growth	   of	   the	   non-­‐state	   sector	   which	   has	   introduced	   a	   competitive	  market	   environment	   to	   China.	   In	   1979,	   the	   protected	   industrial	   sector	   was	  effectively	  opened	  to	  new	  entrants	  and	  broad	  liberalisation	  allowed	  for	  thousands	  of	   new	   TVEs	   to	   quickly	   emerge.	   This	   dramatic	   policy	   shift	   and	   the	   associated	  radical	  measures	  adopted,	  particularly	  in	  agriculture,	  account	  for	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  non-­‐state	  sector.	  
The	  gradualist	  school	  of	  thought,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argues	  that	  China’s	  economic	  ascent	   stems	   from	   a	   series	   of	   gradual	   and	   continuing	   transitions.	   There	   was	   no	  rapid	  price	  liberalisation,	  mass	  privatisation	  or	  leap	  to	  currency	  convertibility.	  This	  school	   highlights	   institutions,	   competition	   and	   government.	   These	   theorists 18	  emphasise	   that	   Chinese	   planners	   gradually	   reduced	   the	   size	   of	   the	   planned	  economy,	   which	   allowed	   a	   market	   economy	   to	   slowly	   develop	   and	   eventually	  become	   dominant.19	  The	   Chinese	   government	   kept	   the	   size	   of	   the	   overall	   central	  government	  materials	  allocation	  plan	  fixed	  in	  absolute	  terms.	  As	  the	  economy	  was	  rapidly	   growing,	   this	   meant	   that	   the	   plan	   became	   proportionately	   less	   and	   less	  important	   until	   “the	   economy	   gradually	   grew	   out	   of	   the	   plan.”20 	  Within	   this	  framework,	  price	  reform	  occurred	  gradually	  through	  a	  dual-­‐track	  system,	  whereby	  a	   single	  commodity	  had	  both	  a	   state-­‐set	  planned	  price	  and	  a	  market	  price.	   In	   the	  early	   1980s,	   a	   significant	   proportion	   of	   transactions	   began	   to	   occur	   at	   market	  prices,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  until	  1993	  that	  dual-­‐price	  came	  to	  an	  end	  for	  most	  industrial	  products.21	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Sachs	  &	  Woo	  (1997).	  16	  For	  instance,	  in	  1994,	  China	  unified	  the	  exchange	  rate,	  issued	  its	  first	  set	  of	  company	  laws	  and	  introduced	  an	  enterprise	  income	  tax	  (Ibid.).	  17	  Ibid.	  18	  Including	  Chen	  (1993);	  Qian	  &	  Xu	  (1993);	  Rawski	  (1995);	  Naughton	  (1996);	  Qian	  (2000);	  and	  Gang	  &	  Woo	  (2009).	  19	  Naughton	  (1996).	  20	  Ibid.,	  p.	  8.	  21	  Qian	  (2000),	  p.	  159.	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The	   complexities	   of	   Chinese	   reform	  mean	   that	   neither	   view	   is	   able	   to	   accurately	  capture	   the	   entire	   reform	   process	   and	   China’s	   policy	   approach.	   Fan	   (1994)	  concludes,	   “the	   economic	   transformation	   experiences	   to	   date	   do	   not	   show	   either	  approach	   to	   reform,	   radicalism	   or	   gradualism,	   is	   unconditionally	   better	   than	   the	  other.”	   Even	   Jeffrey	   Sachs,	   the	   architect	   of	   several	   big	   bang	   reforms	   in	   Eastern	  Europe,	   admits	   that	   “Chinese	   reforms	   were	   more	   gradualist	   or	   incremental	   in	  several	  other	  ways.”22	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  SOE	  sector	  where	  new	  practices	   were	   allowed	   for	   a	   smaller	   number	   of	   SOEs	   before	   being	  more	   widely	  adopted	   over	   time.23	  However,	   the	   radical	   school	   maintains	   that	   the	   gradualist	  elements	  of	  the	  Chinese	  reform	  agenda	  slowed	  growth	  and	  that	  gradualism	  results	  “simply	  from	  a	   lack	  of	  consensus	  over	  the	  proper	  course,	  with	  power	  still	  divided	  between	  market	  reformers	  and	  old-­‐style	  socialists.”24	  
Thus	  rather	  than	  a	  polarised	  reform	  narrative,	  a	  more	  accurate	  description	  is	  one	  that	   recognises	   Chinese	   reforms	   have	   been	   both	   gradual	   and	   radical	   at	   different	  stages.	   For	   instance,	   the	   1979–83	   period	   represents	   a	   typical	   phase	   where	  energetic	   rapid	   reform	   policy	   was	   followed	   by	   caution.25	  In	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	  period	   enterprises	   were	   granted	   increased	   autonomy,	   but	   this	   was	   followed	   in	  1981	   by	   a	  more	   conservative	   position.	   Between	   1993	   and	   1998	   extensive	   fiscal,	  corporate,	   foreign	  and	  financial	  reforms	  were	  adopted,	  but	  after	  1998	  the	  pace	  of	  new	  policy	  introduction	  has	  slowed.	  Various	  sectors	  have	  also	  undergone	  different	  rates	   of	   reform.	   Agricultural	   reform	   was	   rapid	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   reform	  period,	  but	  urban	  reform	  has	  been	  markedly	  slower.	  China’s	  reform	  experience	  has	  thus	  been	  both	  path-­‐dependent	  and	  path-­‐breaking.	  
Accordingly,	  Wei-­‐wei	  Zhang	  has	  described	  China’s	  approach	  to	  reform	  as	  “dynamic	  gradualism.”	  This	  reflects	   that	  “the	  overall	  guiding	  philosophy	  of	  reform	  has	  been	  gradualist,”26	  but	   that	   there	   have	   also	   been	   periods	   of	   radical	   measures.	   The	  Chinese	   expression	   for	   this	   process	   is	   “groping	   for	   stones	   to	   cross	   the	   river,”	  (mozhe	   shitou	   guo	   he	  摸着石头过河)	   a	   metaphor	   that	   implies	   that	   each	   step	  depends	  on	  the	  previous	  step.	  Zhang’s	  conception,	  which	  straddles	   the	  radicalism	  and	  gradualism	  camps,	   fits	  well	  with	  observations	  by	  other	  China	   scholars.	  Chow	  (2002)	   notes,	   “the	   evolutionary	   process	   is	   considered	   gradual	   by	   those	   who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Sachs	  &	  Woo	  (1997),	  p.	  9.	  23	  Li	  (1994);	  Sachs	  &	  Woo	  (1997),	  p.	  17.	  24	  Sachs	  &	  Woo	  (1997),	  p.	  5.	  25	  Naughton	  (1996),	  p.	  97.	  26	  Zhang	  (2000),	  p.	  47.	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advocate	  shock	  therapy	  as	  a	  means	  of	  institutional	  reform,	  but	  is	  in	  fact	  very	  rapid	  judged	   by	   the	   great	   adjustments	  which	   the	   Chinese	   people	   and	   institutions	   have	  had	  to	  make.”27	  The	  overarching	  emphasis	  on	  gradualism	  also	  corresponds	  with	  the	  personal	   accounts	   of	   Chinese	   leaders.	   Zhao	   Ziyang	   in	   his	   memoirs	   writes,	   “[t]he	  gradual	  approach	  was	  more	  stable,	  less	  risky,	  and	  easier	  for	  society	  to	  accept.”28	  
Two	  factors	  lie	  behind	  China’s	  dynamic	  gradualism:	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  the	  end	  goal	  and	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  post-­‐reform	  economic	  system.	  China’s	  reform	  began	  without	  a	  blueprint	  for	  how	  to	  reform,	  and	  “without	  even	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  ultimate	   objective	   of	   reform	   should	   be.”29	  This	   lies	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   Poland	  which,	   at	   the	   outset	   in	   1990,	   stated	   its	   objective	   was	   a	   market	   economy	   with	   a	  government	  sector	  similar	  in	  size	  and	  function	  to	  that	  found	  in	  Western	  European	  countries. 30 	  The	   lack	   of	   a	   coherent	   vision,	   largely	   attributable	   to	   differing	  ideological	   stances	   as	  well	   as	   vested	   and	   conflicting	   interests,31	  continues	   to	   this	  day.	   Chinese	   leaders	   have	   never	   been	   able	   to	   articulate	   coherent	   visions	   of	  ownership	  structure	  or	  of	  a	  restructured	  financial	  system.32	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  process	  has	  been	  entirely	  directionless	  or	  organically	  shaped.	  China’s	  reformist	  elites	   have	   “supplied	   crucial	   leadership	   in	   the	   process	   of	   reform,	   especially	   in	  providing	   strategic	   directions,	   setting	   out	   priorities,	   reorienting	   ideology,	  advancing	  broad	  policy	  initiatives	  and	  building	  pro-­‐reform	  coalitions.”33	  
Experimentalism	  In	   the	   absence	   of	   both	   a	   blueprint	   for	   reform	   and	   political	   consensus,	   China’s	  adaptive	   and	   gradualist	   reform	   has	   relied	   heavily	   on	   experimentalism.	  Experimentation	   aims	   “to	   inform	   policy	   by	   using	   experiments	   with	   direct	  interventions	   and	   control	   groups	   instead	   of	   observational	   studies	   or	   theoretical	  analyses.”34	  Policy	  experimentation	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  unrestricted	  trial	  and	  error	  or	  spontaneous	  policy	  diffusion,	  but	  is	  instead	  “a	  purposeful	  and	  coordinated	  activity	   geared	   to	   producing	   novel	   policy	   options	   that	   are	   injected	   into	   official	  policymaking	  and	  then	  replicated	  on	  a	   larger	  scale,	  or	  even	  formally	   incorporated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Chow	  (2002),	  p.	  117.	  28	  Pu	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  p.	  221.	  29	  Naughton	  (1996),	  p.	  99.	  30	  Sachs	  (1993).	  31	  Sachs	  &	  Woo	  (1997);	  Chung	  (2000);	  Zhang	  (2000).	  32	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  324.	  33	  Zhang	  (2000),	  p.	  3.	  34	  Mosteller	  (2006),	  p.	  487.	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into	   national	   law.” 35 	  Accordingly,	   experimentation	   means	   innovating	   through	  implementation	   first,	   then	   formulating	   policy	   and	   drafting	   universal	   laws	   and	  regulations.	  
The	   Chinese	   process	   of	   experimentalism,	   labelled	   “experimentation	   under	  hierarchy,” 36 	  involves	   policy-­‐makers	   in	   central	   government	   encouraging	   local	  officials	   to	   try	   out	   new	  ways	   of	   problem	   solving.	   Local	   experiences	   are	   then	   fed	  back	  into	  national	  policy	  formulation.	  If	  judged	  to	  be	  conducive	  to	  Party	  priorities,	  “model	   experiences”	   (dianxing	   jingyan	   典型经验 )	   are	   disseminated	   through	  extensive	   media	   coverage,	   high-­‐profile	   conferences,	   and	   appeals	   for	   widespread	  emulation. 37 	  The	   Chinese	   mode	   of	   experimentation	   thus	   focuses	   on	   “finding	  innovative	  policy	  instruments,	  rather	  than	  defining	  policy	  objectives,	  which	  remains	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  Party	  leadership.”38	  
In	  China,	  experimentation	  occurs	  in	  several	  ways.	  The	  first	  is	  whereby	  provisional	  rules	   are	   made	   for	   trial	   implementation.	   This	   experimental	   regulation	   was	  particularly	  prominent	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  but	  still	  remains	  important,	  notably	  in	   rural	   and	   welfare	   reform.39	  The	   second	   approach	   is	   “experimental	   points”	   or	  “trials”	   (shidian	  试点)	  whereby	  model	  demonstrations	  and	  pilot	  projects	  are	   tried	  in	   a	   specific	   policy	   domain.	   This	   form	   has	   been	   the	   most	   pervasive	   type	   of	  experimentation	   in	   the	   reform	  era	  and	  entails	   general	   guidelines	   issued	   from	   the	  central	   government	   which	   establish	   guiding	   thoughts	   and	   general	   demands.	   The	  third	   vehicle	   for	   experimentation	   is	   experimental	   zones	   in	   which	   central	  authorities	  provide	  geographic	  units	  with	  broad	  discretionary	  powers.40	  	  
Within	  this	  framework,	  experimentation	  has	  taken	  place	  at	  various	  levels	  in	  China	  and	  across	  many	  sectors:	  
Twentieth-­‐century	   experience	   surely	   qualifies	   the	   Chinese	   as	   the	  world’s	   leading	   practitioners	   of	   economic	   experimentation.	   	   China’s	  reform	  economy	  amply	  displays	  this	  penchant	  for	  experimentation	  at	  every	   level.	   	   We	   see	   the	   national	   government	   conducting	   trials	   of	  novel	   institutions,	   for	   example,	   “special	   economic	   zones,”	   while	  provinces	  and	  localities	  develop	  their	  own	  variations	  of	  the	  household	  responsibility	   system,	   township	   and	   village	   industries,	   the	   xiagang	  system	   of	   removing	   redundant	   workers	   from	   the	   state	   enterprise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Heilmann	  (2008b).	  36	  Ibid.	  37	  Heilmann	  (2008a);	  Lin	  (2012),	  p.	  181.	  38	  Heilmann	  (2008a),	  p.	  3.	  39	  Heilmann	  (2008b).	  40	  This	  typology	  is	  drawn	  from	  Heilmann	  (2008b).	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payrolls,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   The	   decentralization	   of	   industry…provided	  regional	  and	   local	   governments	  with	  ample	   resources	  with	  which	   to	  pursue	  such	  experimentation.41	  
Urban	  reform	   in	   late	  1978	  was	   the	   first	   instance	  of	  policy	  experimentation	   in	   the	  reform	   era.	   Zhao	   Ziyang	   allowed	   six	   industrial	   enterprises	   in	   Sichuan	   to	   produce	  and	  market	   their	   products	   after	   fulfilling	   the	   state-­‐fixed	   quotas.	   This	   experiment	  was	  soon	  extended	  to	  one	  hundred	  firms	  in	  Sichuan	  with	  the	  selected	  enterprises	  gaining	   the	   right	   to	   retain	   a	   share	   of	   profits,	   sell	   above-­‐plan	   output	   and	   benefit	  from	  accelerated	  depreciation.42	  	  The	  main	  feature	  of	  the	  initiative	  was	  to	  delegate	  decision-­‐making	  power	  over	  the	  use	  of	  investment	  funds	  and	  business	  activities	  to	  local	   authorities	   and	   enterprises.	   Beijing	   officially	   endorsed	   the	   Sichuan	  experiment	  in	  1979	  with	  the	  programme	  expanding	  nationwide.43	  
Both	   rural	   and	  urban	  areas	  have	  been	  subject	   to	  experimentation.	  The	   rural	   land	  contract	  scheme	  of	  the	  1980s	  was	  a	  central	  component	  of	  rural	  urban	  reforms	  and	  illustrates	   the	   gradual	   and	   experimental	   approach.	   Zhao	   Ziyang	   recalls:	   “[w]hat	  form	  the	  contracts	  would	  take	  for	  different	  industries	  and	  enterprises,	  and	  how	  to	  “contract	   out”—all	   of	   this	   needed	   to	   go	   through	   experimentation	   and	   proceed	  gradually.” 44 	  Chinese	   reformers	   also	   encouraged	   continual	   urban	   reform	  experiments	   ranging	   from	   salary	   levels,	   the	   labour	   market,	   the	   capital	   market,	  housing	   and	   the	   social	   safety	   net. 45 	  For	   instance,	   shortly	   after	   the	   Sichuan	  experiment,	  reformers	  initiated	  an	  experimental	  shareholding	  system	  that	  allowed	  the	   state,	   firms	   and	   individuals	   to	   invest	   in	   companies	   through	   the	   purchase	   of	  shares.	  However,	   in	   1987,	   the	   state	   firms	  were	   banned	   from	   issuing	   stock	   to	   the	  public,	   bringing	   this	   experimentation	   to	  a	  halt.46	  After	  1992,	  however,	   the	  project	  resumed	  and	  on	  a	  much	  larger	  scale.47	  
Experiments	  and	   trials	  have	  also	  been	  conducted	   in	   the	  SOE	  sector.	   In	   the	  period	  1984	   to	   1988,	   long-­‐term	   contracting	   became	   the	   predominant	   form	   of	   financial	  relations	  within	   the	  state	  sector,	  but	  a	  number	  of	  other	  systems	  were	   tried	  on	  an	  experimental	   basis.	   While	   none	   of	   these	   systems	   was	   developed	   enough	   to	   be	  considered	   major	   elements	   of	   reform,	   the	   experimentation	   “created	   useful	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Brandt	  &	  Rawski	  (2008),	  p.	  17.	  42	  Naughton	  (1996),	  p.	  99.	  43	  Qian	  (2000).	  44	  Pu	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  p.	  116.	  45	  Zhang	  (2000),	  p.	  40.	  46	  Ibid.,	  p.	  57.	  47	  Ibid.,	  p.	  13.	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experience	   for	   the	   future.”48	  In	   1995,	   local	   governments	   in	   several	   provinces,	  including	   Shandong,	   Guangdong	   and	   Sichuan,	   began	   their	   own	   programmes	   of	  experimentation	   with	   the	   privatisation49	  of	   SOEs.	   The	   central	   government	   later	  endorsed	  these	  experiments	  through	  privatising	  small	  SOEs.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1996,	  up	  to	  70	  percent	  of	  small	  SOEs	  had	  been	  privatised	  in	  pioneering	  provinces	  and	  about	  half	  in	  many	  other	  provinces.50	  
The	  most	   visible	   and	   far-­‐reaching	   experiment	  was	   taken	   as	  part	   of	  China’s	   open-­‐door	   policy.	   In	   1979,	   Chinese	   leaders	   established	   four	   Special	   Economic	   Zones	  (SEZs)	   in	  China’s	   south.	  Beijing	  allowed	   two	  provinces,	  Guangdong	  and	  Fujian,	   to	  adopt	   “special	   policies”	   (teshu	   zhengce	   特殊政策)	   and	   to	   implement	   “flexible	  measures”	   (linghuo	   cuoshi	   灵活措施)	   in	   particular	   aimed	   at	   attracting	   foreign	  capital	  and	  technology.51	  They	  were	  granted	  preferential	  tax	  measures	  and	  enjoyed	  higher	   foreign-­‐exchange	   retention	   rates. 52 	  More	   importantly,	   they	   enjoyed	   “a	  special	   institutional	  and	  policy	  environment	  and	  gained	  more	  authority	  over	  their	  economic	  development.”53	  Local	  governments	  put	  in	  place	  efficient	  regulatory	  and	  administrative	   systems 54 	  and	   provided	   infrastructure. 55 	  The	   SEZs	   were	   given	  greater	   decision-­‐making	   power	   in	   a	   number	   of	   areas,	   especially	   in	   approving	  foreign	  investment	  projects.	  The	  Shenzhen	  SEZ	  was	  given	  the	  greatest	  freedom	  to	  explore	   innovation,	  serving	  as	  an	  experimental	  ground	  for	  capitalist	  policies	   from	  1982.56	  Zhang	  (2000)	  sums	  up	  the	  experimental	  role	  of	  the	  SEZs:	  
The	   SEZs	  became,	   effectively,	   laboratories	   in	  which	   the	   operation	  of	  the	  market	  economy	  was	  carried	  out.	   	  The	  intention	  of	  the	  state	  was	  to	  extend	  methods	  that	  proved	  successful	  in	  the	  zones	  to	  other	  parts	  of	   the	   country.	   	   Should	   the	  experiment	   fail,	   its	   adverse	   impact	   could	  be	   minimized	   since	   the	   zones	   were	   located	   far	   away	   from	   China’s	  political	  and	  economic	  centres.	  	  	  The	  strategy	  was	  relatively	  successful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Naughton	  (1996),	  p.	  218.	  49	  Instead	  of	  “privatisation,”	  the	  Chinese	  use	  terms	  such	  as	  “transformation	  of	  ownership”	  (zhuanzhi	  
转制)	  or	  “restructuring	  of	  ownership”	  (suoyouzhi	  gaizao	  所有制改造).	  50	  Qian	  (2000),	  p.	  164.	  51	  Yeung	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  52	  Fan	  (1995);	  Zhang	  (2000).	  53	  Qian	  (2000),	  p.	  155.	  54	  Government	  officials	  in	  Shenzhen	  admit	  openly	  that	  the	  reduction	  in	  bureaucratic	  paperwork	  and	  the	  facilitation	  of	  the	  requisite	  approvals	  were	  more	  important	  to	  creating	  a	  favourable	  environment	  than	  the	  preferential	  tax	  treatment	  (Qian	  &	  Stiglitz	  1996).	  55	  Zeng	  (2010).	  56	  Chow	  (2002);	  Yeung	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  Shenzhen	  innovations	  include	  land	  tenure	  reform,	  price	  system	  reform,	  labour	  market	  reform,	  financial	  system	  reform,	  and	  reform	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (Yuan	  
et	  al.	  2010).	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in	   attracting	   foreign	   capital,	   pioneering	   reform	   experiments	   and	  creating	  from	  scratch	  an	  export-­‐oriented	  economy.57	  
The	  success	  of	  the	   initial	  SEZ	  experimentation	  led	  to	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  14	  coastal	  cities	   in	   1984.	   Beijing	   permitted	   local	   authorities	   to	   set	   up	   Economic	   and	  Technological	   Development	   Zones	   (ETDZs)	   and	   to	   arrange	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	  foreign	  investment	  without	  central	  government	  approval.58	  In	  1985,	  “open	  coastal	  economic	   areas”	   were	   designated	   in	   the	   Zhujiang	   (Pearl),	   Minnan	   and	   Yangzi	  deltas,	   and	   in	   Liaodong	   Peninsula	   and	   Shandong	   Peninsula	   in	   1987.	   Preferential	  policies	  were	  granted	  to	  these	  areas,	  but	  they	  were	  less	  favourable	  than	  in	  the	  SEZs	  and	  ETDZs.	  Rounding	  out	  this	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  initial	  experiment,	  Hainan	  Island	  was	  declared	  a	  province	  in	  1988	  and	  allowed	  to	  adopt	  the	  same	  favourable	  policies	  as	  those	  of	  the	  SEZs.	  	  
The	  third	  stage	  of	  the	  open-­‐door	  experiment	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  Pudong	  (Eastern	  Shanghai)	   New	   Zone	   in	   1990.	   The	   zone	   offered	   preferential	   treatment	   to	   foreign	  investment	   on	   a	   par	  with,	   or	  more	   favourable	   than,	   that	   on	   offer	   by	   the	   SEZs.	   In	  1992,	   most	   cities	   along	   the	   Yangzi	   River	   and	   China’s	   borders	   were	   also	   granted	  special	  privileges	  as	  coastal	  cities.	   In	  addition,	  Shanghai	  was	  granted	  even	  greater	  autonomy	   and	   the	   central	   government	   allowed	   experiments	   in	   retail	   and	   other	  service	   sectors. 59 	  Many	   inland	   cities,	   which	   did	   not	   qualify	   as	   either	   special	  economic	   zones	   or	   coastal	   open	   cities,	   established	   development	   zones	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  the	  tax	  benefits	  and	  increased	  autonomy.	  Many	  of	  these	  developments	  took	   place	   without	   approval	   from	   the	   central	   government.60	  Between	   2000	   and	  2002,	  seventeen	  additional	  ETDZs	  were	  established	  in	  the	  interior	  of	  China	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Western	  Development	  Program.61	  By	  2010,	  there	  were	  69	  state-­‐level	  ETDZs	  throughout	   China,	  most	   located	   in	   the	   suburban	   regions	   of	   a	  major	   city.62	  Due	   to	  their	   increased	   number,	   the	   zones	   are	   less	   special	   than	   before,	   but	   “the	   rules	   of	  business	  are	  still	  subtly	  different	  inside	  the	  zones.”63	  
The	  spread	  of	  China’s	  economic	  zones	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  borders	  around	  the	  zones	  being	   steadily	   broken	   down	   as	  more	   of	   the	   country	   has	   opened	   up	   to	   trade	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Zhang	  (2000),	  p.	  20.	  58	  This	  varied	  according	  to	  the	  zone.	  	  Shanghai	  and	  Tianjin	  were	  granted	  authority	  to	  approve	  foreign	  investment	  up	  to	  $30	  million,	  Dalian	  up	  to	  $10	  million,	  and	  the	  remaining	  11	  cities	  up	  to	  $5	  million	  (Qian	  2000:	  158).	  59	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  409.	  60	  Qian	  (2000).	  61	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  410.	  62	  Zeng	  (2010).	  63	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  406.	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investment.	   The	   zones	   have	   allowed	   space	   to	   experiment	   with	   much	   of	   the	  legislation	  that	  now	  governs	  China’s	  modern	  economy	  and	  work	  force	  relations.64	  What	   started	   off	   as	   an	   experiment	   has	   been	   gradually	   rolled	   out,	  with	   the	   result	  that	   the	   zones	   and	   their	   associated	   policy	   measures	   have	   become	   pervasive	  throughout	  many	   areas	   of	   China.	   China’s	   development	   zones	   have	   “accomplished	  their	  historical	  mission	  of	  serving	  as	  experimental	  areas	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  open	   policy	   in	   China.”65	  Of	   most	   importance,	   the	   SEZs	   have	   been	   a	   significant	  engine	  of	  development,	  accounting	   for	  disproportionate	  shares	  of	  growth,	   foreign	  investment	  and	  employment.66	  	  
However,	   not	   all	   Chinese	   experiments	   have	   worked.	   Experimentation	   will	   by	  definition	  lead	  to	  success	  and	  failure.	  One	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  experimentation	  in	   the	   financial	   sector,	   where	   “financial	   and	   institutional	   innovation	   has	   been	  nearly	   continuous	   since	   the	   1980s.”67	  However,	   these	   experiments	   have	   mostly	  failed	   and	   new	   institutions	   have	   not	   yet	   been	   allowed	   to	   play	   the	   dynamic	   and	  independent	   role	   that	   would	   be	   expected	   of	   financial	   institutions	   in	   a	   market	  economy.	  For	  instance,	  domestic	  trust	  companies	  were	  cut	  back	  sharply	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   enterprise	   investment	   companies	   have	   been	   subject	   to	   increasing	   control,	  and	   successful	   urban	   credit	   cooperatives	   have	   been	   captured	   by	   municipal	  governments	   and	   converted	   into	   “City	   Banks.” 68 	  In	   contrast	   to	   other	   areas,	  experimentation	   in	   the	   banking	   sector	   has	   been	   largely	   unsuccessful	   as	  government	  agencies	  and	  government-­‐linked	  companies	  remain	  dominant.69	  
The	  above	  examples	  show	  that	  experimentation	  has	  been	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  China’s	  policy	   approach.	   This	   modus	   operandi	   has	   allowed	   reformers	   to	   initiate	  experiments	   for	   reform	   in	   controversial	   areas.	   Ideas	   have	   been	   generally	  encouraged,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  contribute	  to	  building	  a	  more	  dynamic	  economy.	  Zhang	  (2000)	  notes,	  “[i]f	  the	  initiatives	  are	  controversial,	  they	  are	  in	  most	  cases	  tolerated	  as	   experiments.”70	  Experimentation	   has	   also	   been	   used	   as	   a	   guise	   to	   pursue	   and	  extend	  reforms.	  Household	  farming,	  for	  example,	  was	  still	  labelled	  an	  “experiment”	  when	  it	  had	  spread	  across	  a	  third	  of	  China’s	  countryside.	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  succeeded	  in	  extending	   his	   experimentation	   with	   the	   responsibility	   system	   to	   94	   percent	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Saich	  (2000).	  65	  Wong	  &	  Tang	  (2005),	  p.	  314.	  66	  Zeng	  (2010).	  67	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  451.	  68	  Ibid.	  69	  Heilmann	  (2008b).	  70	  Zhang	  (2000),	  p.	  70.	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Guangdong’s	  enterprises	  in	  less	  than	  a	  year,	  despite	  a	  consensus	  in	  Beijing	  to	  reign	  in	  decentralisation.71	  
Beijing	   has	   allowed	   provincial	   governments	   to	   experiment	   with	   different	   reform	  measures	  which	   partly	   explains	   the	   large	   variations	   in	   reforms	   from	   province	   to	  province.72	  Regional	  experimentation	  is	  feasible	  and	  less	  costly	  in	  China	  than	  in	  the	  other	   transition	   economies	   due	   to	  weaker	   regional	   interdependence.73	  As	   a	   large	  country	  with	   less	   heterogeneity,	   “large	   scale	   regional	   experiments	   can	  be	   carried	  out,	  many	   regions	   have	   a	   chance	   to	   develop	   a	   large	   variety	   of	   ‘mutants,’	   and	   the	  central	   government	   may	   be	   able	   to	   compare	   and	   select	   among	   various	  alternatives.”74	  This	   combined	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   adjacent	   regions	   have	   similar	  economic	   structures	  mean	   that	   successful	  experiments	   can	  be	  easily	  promoted	   in	  other	   regions.75	  Learning	   by	   experimentation	   avoids	   information	   overload	   and	  allows	   the	   government	   to	   learn	   what	   kinds	   of	   decisions	   can	   be	   decentralised	  without	  disruptive	  costs,	  who	  would	  carry	  out	  what	  types	  of	  experiments,	  and	  what	  new	  institutions	  should	  be	  rolled	  out	  extensively.76	  Thus,	  experimentation	  appears	  to	   allow	   for	   efficient	   reform	   in	   China.	   Zhao	   Ziyang’s	   account	   of	   the	   delegation	   to	  local	  authorities	  is	  particularly	  instructive:	  
Since	  the	  power	  to	  choose	  was	  given	  to	  local	  leaders	  and	  cadres,	  and	  they	  were	  given	  time	  to	  make	  their	  choice	  (time	  enough	  to	  shift	  from	  unwilling	  to	  willing),	  the	  shifts	  occurred	  voluntarily.	  This	  reduced	  the	  possibility	   of	   conflicts	   and	  negative	   effects.	   	   It	   gave	   local	   authorities	  enough	   time	   to	   make	   a	   choice,	   to	   realize	   the	   superiority	   of	   the	  schemes	   and	   to	   figure	   out	   how	   to	   adopt	   them	   to	   their	   own	  development	   conditions.	   	   As	   it	   moved	   from	   the	   poorest	   regions	   to	  average	  and	  wealthier	  ones,	  the	  policy	  was	  gradually	  perfected.77	  
WTO	   rules	   have	   placed	   restrictions	   on	   experimental	   regulations	   in	   the	   SEZs.	   To	  conform	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   national	   treatment,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   is	  committed	   to	  gradually	   removing	  preferential	   tax	  breaks	  and	  other	  privileges	   for	  foreign	  investment.78	  Such	  an	  adjustment	  will	  place	  Chinese	  enterprises	  in	  a	  better	  position	   to	  compete	  with	   foreign	  companies.79	  In	   tandem,	   the	  Communist	  Party	   is	  increasingly	   emphasising	   law-­‐based	   policy	   implementation,	   limiting	   the	   use	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Ibid.,	  p.	  69.	  72	  Qian	  &	  Xu	  (1993),	  p.	  154.	  73	  Ibid.	  74	  Ibid.,	  p.	  151.	  75	  Ibid.	  76	  Qian	  &	  Stiglitz	  (1996),	  p.	  187.	  77	  Pu	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  p.	  143.	  78	  Hsiung	  (2003).	  79	  Wong	  &	  Tang	  (2005).	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experimentation	   which	   places	   implementation	   before	   policy.	   Yet,	   despite	   these	  constraints	  and	  trends,	  experimentation	  continues	  in	  China.80	  
In	   summary,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   political	   consensus	   and	   a	   theoretical	   framework,	  Chinese	   leaders	   have	   allowed	   for	   frequent	   experimentation.	   This	   openness	   to	  controversial	  ideas,	  particularly	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  has	  been	  a	  central	  component	  of	  China’s	  overall	  guiding	  philosophy	  of	  gradualism.	  The	  most	  symbolic	  example	  of	  China’s	   experimentalism	   and	   gradualism	   is	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Special	  Economic	   Zones	   which	   were	   given	   latitude	   to	   try	   out	   various	   reforms	   within	   a	  framework	   of	   special	   financial,	   investment	   and	   trade	   privileges.	   Upon	  demonstrating	  success,	  various	  reform	  measures	  were	  rolled	  out	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	   pioneering	   policies	   of	   the	   SEZs	   are	   now	   by	   and	   large	   the	   norm	   throughout	  China.	   Policy	   experimentation	   has	   enabled	   Chinese	   leaders	   to	   engage	   in	  institutional	   innovation,	   involving	   bottom-­‐up	   initiatives	   and	   the	   incorporation	   of	  local	  knowledge	  into	  the	  national	  policy	  process.	  The	  list	  of	  successful	  experiments	  is	   extensive,	   including	   the	   household	   responsibility	   system,	   dual-­‐track	   pricing,	  township	  and	  village	  enterprises	  and	  the	  special	  economic	  zones.81	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Heilmann	  (2008b).	  81	  Rodrik	  (2008),	  p.	  30.	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3. Institutions	  
The	  nature	  of	  institutional	  change	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  transition	  and	  transformation,	  and	  ultimately	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  development.	   It	   therefore	  takes	   centre	   stage	   in	   the	   scholarly	   debate	   on	   Chinese	   reform	   and	   the	   causes	   of	  growth.	  The	  incremental	  school	  tend	  to	  argue	  that	  China	  has	  been	  evolving	  towards	  a	  unique	  set	  of	  economic	  institutions,	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  experimentalism	  in	  policy	  design.	  The	  school	  of	  thought	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  big	  bang	  approach	  argue	  that	  China	  is	  harmonising	  its	  economic	  institutions	  with	  those	  of	  other	  market	  economies.	  
The	  concept	  and	  importance	  of	  institutions	  The	   theoretical	  basis	   for	   the	   importance	  of	   institutions	   in	   economic	  development	  can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   Adam	   Smith.	   While	   stressing	   the	   primacy	   of	   capital	  accumulation,	   Smith	   pointed	   to	   savings	   determining	   the	   rate	   of	   capital	  accumulation	   and	   that	   savings	   ultimately	   depended	   on	   the	   social	   and	   legal	  framework.	  Of	  China,	  Smith	  wrote	  that	  it	  “seems	  to	  have	  been	  long	  stationary,	  and	  had	  probably	   long	  ago	  acquired	  that	  full	  complement	  of	  riches	  which	  is	  consistent	  
with	   the	   nature	   of	   its	   laws	   and	   institutions	   [emphasis	   added].” 82 	  Smith	   thus	  recognised	   that	   the	   institutional	   framework	   underpinned	   growth,	   or	   limited	   it	   in	  the	  case	  of	  China.	  
The	   centrality	   of	   institutions	   to	   development,	   however,	   was	   not	   extensively	  recognised	   and	   theorised	   until	   North	   and	   Thomas’	   (1973)	   seminal	   publication,	  which	   argued	   that	   the	   establishment	   of	   formal	   institutional	   arrangements	   and	  property	   rights	   accounted	   for	   the	   rise	   of	   the	  West.	   They	   argued	   that	   innovation,	  economies	  of	   scale,	   education	   and	   capital	   accumulation	   are	  not	  causes	   of	   growth,	  but	  are	  growth.	  For	  growth	  to	  occur,	  efficient	  economic	  organisation	  was	  required	  that	   enticed	   individuals,	   through	   incentives,	   to	   undertake	   socially	   desirable	  activities.	  Institutions	  control	  or	  reduce	  transaction	  costs,	  i.e.	  the	  costs	  of	  economic	  exchange,	   such	   as	   search	   and	   information	   costs,	   access	   costs,	   policing	   and	  enforcement	  costs	  and	  bargaining	  costs.83	  
The	   institutional	   framework	   that	   unfolded	   in	   England	   laid	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  by	  providing	  for	  efficient	  organisation	  of	  economic	  activity.	  It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Smith	  (1776/1991),	  p.	  84.	  83	  Coase	  (1937).	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encouraged	   innovation	   and	   technological	   change,	   which	   is	   what	   accounts	   for	  growth	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  according	  to	  new	  growth	  theories.84	  Accordingly,	  there	  is	  now	   an	   international	   consensus	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   institutions	   to	   economic	  development.	   Institutional	   reforms	   are	   now	   recognised	   as	   essential	   in	   enhancing	  long-­‐term	   economic	   growth. 85 	  Institutional	   settings	   in	   East	   Asia	   have	   been	  particularly	  important	  in	  generating	  that	  region’s	  rapid	  economic	  growth.86	  
North	   (2005)	   defines	   the	   institutional	   framework	   as	   consisting	   of	   the	   “political	  structure	   that	   specifies	   the	   way	   we	   develop	   and	   aggregate	   political	   choices,	   the	  property	   rights	   structure	   that	   defines	   the	   formal	   economic	   incentives,	   and	   the	  social	   structure—norms	  and	  conventions—that	  defines	   the	   informal	   incentives	   in	  the	   economy.”87	  Institutions	   thus	   structure	   “the	   way	   the	   game	   is	   played”	   and	  “reduce	   uncertainty	   by	   providing	   a	   structure	   to	   everyday	   life.”88	  In	   doing	   so	   they	  reduce	   transaction	   costs,	   which	   arise	   from	   the	   bounded	   rationality	   and	  opportunism	  of	  the	  transacting	  parties.89	  
Formal	  rules,	   informal	  norms	  and	  their	  enforcement	  characteristics	  are	  all	  part	  of	  this	   framework.	   Formal	   institutions	   can	   be	   interpreted	   narrowly	   as	   comprising	  strictly	  legal	  institutions	  of	  the	  state,	  such	  as	  constitutions,	  laws	  and	  regulations	  or	  more	   broadly	   as	   rules	   and	   procedures	   that	   are	   official	   and	   openly	   codified,	  including	   organisation	   rules.90	  Informal	   institutions	   embody	   the	  moral	   codes	   of	   a	  society’s	   belief	   system	   and	   the	   norms	   and	   conventions	   particular	   to	   individual	  societies.91	  They	   are	   “socially	   shared	   rules,	   usually	   unwritten,	   that	   are	   created,	  communicated,	  and	  enforced	  outside	  of	  officially	  sanctioned	  channels.”92	  Both	  sets	  of	   institutions	   complement	   one	   another	   and	   form	   the	   institutional	   setting	   of	   a	  particular	  context.	  
According	   to	   North	   (2005),	   an	   institutional	   framework	   “reflects	   the	   accumulated	  beliefs	  of	  the	  society	  over	  time,	  and	  change	  in	  the	  institutional	  framework	  is	  usually	  an	   incremental	   process	   reflecting	   the	   constraints	   that	   the	   past	   imposes	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  The	  seminal	  publications	  in	  new	  growth	  theory,	  also	  known	  as	  endogenous	  growth	  theory,	  include	  Romer	  (1986)	  and	  Lucas	  (1988).	  85	  Burki	  &	  Perry	  (1998);	  Easterly	  &	  Levine	  (2001	  and	  2003);	  Rodrik	  et	  al.	  (2002);	  and	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  	  Glaeser	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  present	  a	  dissenting	  view,	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  capital	  over	  institutions.	  86	  Rodrik	  (1998);	  Huang	  (2008).	  87	  North	  (2005),	  p.	  49.	  88	  North	  (1990),	  p.	  3.	  89	  Williamson	  (2000).	  90	  Helmke	  &	  Levitsky	  (2004).	  91	  North	  (1990).	  92	  Helmke	  &	  Levitsky	  (2004),	  p	  727.	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present	   and	   the	   future.” 93 	  Change	   in	   the	   institutional	   framework	   is	   typically	  incremental	  due	   to	  path	  dependency	  brought	  about	  by	  “the	  severe	  constraints	  on	  the	  choice	  set	  of	  entrepreneurs	  when	  they	  seek	  to	  innovate	  or	  modify	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  their	  economic	  or	  political	  positions.”94	  Simply	  put,	  large-­‐scale	  change	   creates	   too	  much	  opposition	   since	  many	  players	   in	   existing	  organisations	  will	  be	  affected.	  Thus,	  an	  analytical	   framework	   focusing	  on	   institutions	   fits	  neatly	  with	   the	   gradual	   approach	   to	   Chinese	   reform	  given	   the	   emphasis	   on	   incremental	  change.	  
Chinese	  institutions—convergence	  or	  divergence,	  a	  puzzle	  or	  not	  The	  Chinese	  economy	  presents	  a	  unique	  case	  to	  test	  what	  institutions	  are	  essential	  for	  economic	  growth	  and	  development.	  The	  big-­‐bang	  school	  of	  thought	  argues	  that	  China	   is	   harmonising	   its	   economic	   institutions	   with	   those	   of	   other	   market	  economies.	  China	  has	  opened	  up	   its	  economy,	  maintained	   fiscal	   stability,	   reduced	  the	   size	   of	   the	   state	   sector,	   embraced	   competition	   and	   is	   developing	   legal	  institutions	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   Institutional	   experimentation	   is	   not	   needed	   or	  desired	  since	   “the	  long-­‐run	  goals	  of	  institutional	  change	  are	  clear,	  and	  are	  found	  in	  
the	   economic	   models	   of	   existing	   market-­‐based	   economies.”95	  This	   view	   is	   widely	  held:	   “[i]nternational	   organizations,	   local	   policy	   makers,	   and	   private	   consultants	  combine	   to	   enforce	   the	   presumption	   that	   the	   most	   advanced	   countries	   have	  already	  discovered	  the	  one	  best	  institutional	  blueprint	  for	  development	  and	  that	  its	  applicability	   transcends	   national	   cultures	   and	   circumstances.” 96 	  Even	   some	  scholars	  who	   see	   China’s	   success	   as	   due	   to	   its	   gradualism,	   concede	   that	   Chinese	  institutions	  are	  “becoming	  more	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  other	  countries,”	  although	  they	  insist	  that	  China’s	  economy	  “retains	  distinctive	  institutions.”97	  
The	   incremental	   school	   tend	   to	   argue	   that	   China	   has	   been	   evolving	   towards	   a	  unique	  set	  of	  economic	  institutions,	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  experimentalism	  in	  policy	  design.	  This	  camp	  stresses	  that	  China,	  like	  other	  highly	  successful	  economies,	  such	  as	   those	   of	   South	   Korea	   and	   Taiwan,	   has	   combined	   unorthodox	   elements	   with	  orthodox	   policies.	   The	   performance	   of	   Latin	   American	   economies,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   has	   been	   disappointing,	   despite	   their	   implementation	   of	   “first-­‐best”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  North	  (2005),	  p.	  49.	  94	  Ibid.,	  p.	  2.	  95	  Sachs	  &	  Woo	  (1997),	  p.	  5.	  96	  Evans	  (2004),	  p.	  33.	  97	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  5.	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policies. 98 	  The	   essential	   point	   of	   the	   incremental	   school	   is	   that	   China	   has	  experienced	  rapid	  growth,	  but	  without	  many	   institutions	  conventionally	  regarded	  as	   essential,	   such	   as	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   secure	   property	   rights,	   effective	   corporate	  governance	   or	   transparent	   financial	   systems.99	  China’s	   reforms	   have	   departed	  significantly	   from	   standard	   prescriptions	   with	   “partial	   liberalization,	   two-­‐track	  pricing,	   limited	   deregulation,	   financial	   restraint,	   an	   unorthodox	   legal	   regime,	   and	  the	   absence	   of	   clear	   private	   property	   rights.” 100 	  International	   governance	  indicators,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   government	   effectiveness,	   show	   that	   Chinese	  institutions	   rank	   in	   the	   bottom	   50th	   percentile.101	  Rule	   of	   law	   remains	   weak	   and	  confused	  with	  the	  legal	  system	  unable	  to	  perform	  the	  task	  of	  enforcing	  the	  rules	  of	  economic	   reform	   in	   many	   crucial	   areas,	   including	   investor	   protection	   systems,	  corporate	  governance	  and	  accounting	  standards.102	  	  
The	  establishment	  of	  clearly	  assigned,	  private	  property	  rights,	  was	  a	  central,	  if	  not	  the	  central,	  institutional	  innovation	  in	  North	  and	  Thomas’	  account	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  West.	   Property	   rights	   refers	   to	   an	   owner’s	   right	   to	   use	   a	   good	   or	   asset	   for	  consumption	   and/or	   income	   generation,	   to	   transfer	   the	   right	   and	   the	   right	   to	  contract	  with	  other	  parties.103	  The	  experience	  of	  China	  adds,	  however,	  some	  nuance	  to	   their	   premise.	   The	   general	   consensus	   is	   that	   property	   rights	   remain	   weak	   in	  China.104	  Extensive	   research	   by	   Peter	   Ho	   (2005)	   shows	   that	   land	   property	   rights	  remain	   unclear	   and	   uncertain.	   Land	   in	   China	   has	   not	   been	   adequately	   registered	  and	   no	   systematic	   cadastre	   has	   been	   developed.	   The	   repeated	   requisitioning	   of	  land	  for	  the	  use	  of	  development	  has	  been	  made	  possible	  in	  part	  by	  China’s	  unclear	  landed	   property	   rights.105	  Villagers	   are	   uncertain	   about	   the	   rights	   they	   enjoy	   to	  land	  as	  “there	  are	  no	  regulations	  governing	  the	  free	  transfer,	  sale,	  and	  mortgage	  of	  rural	  land.”106	  Furthermore,	  land	  ownership	  is	  still	  firmly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  state	  and	   the	   collective,	   not	   the	   individual.107	  Even	   in	   cases	  where	   property	   rights	   are	  clearly	   defined,	   the	   legal	   system	   is	   often	   unable	   to	   enforce	   property	   rights	  effectively.	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  property	  rights	  do	  not	  matter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  of	  Argentina	  (Evans	  2004:	  35).	  99	  Qian	  (2003).	  100	  Mukand	  &	  Rodrik	  (2005),	  p.	  374.	  101	  World	  Bank	  (2012b).	  102	  Clarke	  (1996);	  Haggard	  (2004);	  Feng	  (2011);	  and	  Li	  (2011).	  For	  instance,	  laws	  and	  regulations	  are	  promulgated	  by	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  governmental	  and	  quasi-­‐governmental	  bodies	  and	  no	  comprehensive	  indexes	  are	  available.	  103	  Barzel	  (1989).	  104	  Heston	  &	  Sicular	  (2008).	  105	  Huang,	  P.	  (2011).	  106	  Ho	  (2005),	  p.	  125.	  107	  Ibid.	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Several	   studies	   show	   that	   property	   rights	   in	   China	   can	   be	   protected	   through	  informal	  institutions	  and	  that	  local	  governments	  can	  enforce	  rights.108	  
This	   apparent	   paradox	   of	   high	   growth	   and	   unconventional	   institutions	   is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  the	  “China	  puzzle.”109	  Simply	  put,	  Chinese	  growth	   is	   too	   high	   relative	   to	   its	   institutional	   development.110	  The	   notion	   of	   a	  “China	   puzzle”	   rests	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   set	   of	   best	   practice	  institutions,	  modelled	   after	   liberal	  Western	   economies.111	  While	   there	   has	   been	   a	  convergence	   of	   views	   over	   the	   last	   several	   decades	   as	   to	   the	   set	   of	   economic-­‐enhancing	   policies,112	  economic	   performance	   is	   more	   heterogeneous	   around	   the	  globe	   than	   it	   has	   ever	   been.113	  Recent	   research	   shows	   that	   first-­‐order	   economic	  principles	  such	  as	  incentives,	  competition,	  fiscal	  sustainability	  and	  property	  rights	  do	   not	   translate	   directly	   into	   unique	   institutional	   settings. 114 	  For	   instance,	   a	  competitive	   environment	   can	   be	   sustained	   through	   either	   a	   well-­‐functioning	  regulatory	   authority	   or	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   free	   entry	   and	   laissez-­‐faire.	   A	  convergence	   on	   western	   institutions	   should	   not	   therefore	   be	   taken	   for	   granted,	  given	   local	   contexts	   with	   varying	   histories,	   geographies,	   cultures	   and	   norms.	  Consequently,	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “China	  puzzle”	  is	  a	  misnomer	  as	  China	  has	  generally	  embraced	  first-­‐order	  economic	  principles.	  
There	  is	  thus	  a	  growing	  recognition	  that,	  beyond	  first-­‐order	  principles,	  there	  is	  no	  set	  formula	  for	  achieving	  economic	  development	  nor	  is	  there	  one	  economic	  model	  that	  can	  capture	  the	  intricacies	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  a	  particular	  society.	  What	  we	  once	   considered	   “alternative	   economic	   institutions”	   can	   therefore	   serve	   a	  market	  economy.115	  North	  (2005)	  notes	  the	  following:	  
It	   should	   be	   emphasized	   that	   the	   institutions	   that	   have	   emerged	   in	   the	  Western	  world,	  such	  as	  property	  rights	  and	   judicial	  systems,	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	   faithfully	   copied	   in	   developing	   countries.	   	   The	   key	   is	   the	   incentive	  structure	   that	   is	   created,	   not	   the	   slavish	   imitation	   of	   western	   institutions.	  	  Starting	  with	  the	  household	  responsibility	  system,	  the	  Chinese	  developed	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Nee	  &	  Su	  (1996);	  Ho	  (2005);	  and	  Krug	  &	  Hendrischke	  (2006).	  109	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Qian	  (2003);	  Huang,	  X.	  (2011).	  110	  Burki	  &	  Perry	  (1998).	  111	  Qian	  (2003).	  112	  The	  “Washington	  Consensus,”	  shared	  by	  the	  Washington-­‐based	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  has	  been	  the	  most	  influential,	  but	  also	  controversial,	  reform	  agenda.	  It	  proposes	  ten	  policy	  instruments	  as	  necessary	  for	  growth:	  fiscal	  discipline;	  public	  expenditure	  priorities	  in	  education	  and	  health;	  tax	  reform;	  positive	  but	  moderate	  market-­‐determined	  interest	  rates;	  competitive	  exchange	  rates;	  liberal	  trade	  policies;	  openness	  to	  foreign	  direct	  investment;	  privatisation;	  deregulation;	  and	  protection	  of	  property	  rights	  (Williamson	  1990).	  113	  Mukand	  &	  Rodrik	  (2005).	  114	  Ibid.	  115	  Chow	  (2002),	  p.	  391.	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incentive	  structure	  which	  managed	  to	  produce	  rapid	  economic	  development	  without	  any	  of	  the	  standard	  recipes	  of	  the	  West.116	  Successful	   institutional	   reform	   has	   often	   not	   involved	   the	   direct	   copying	   of	   best	  practice	   institutions.117	  Instead,	   “experimentation	   is	   required	   to	   discover	   what	  works	   locally”118	  as	   institutions	   exhibit	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   specificity.	   A	   number	   of	  prominent	   scholars	   have	   argued	   that	   policy	   experimentation	   can	   be	   an	   effective	  mechanism	  to	   find	  out	  what	  works	  on	   the	  ground,	   to	   induce	  behavioural	  changes	  and	  to	  produce	  institutional	  innovations	  that	  are	  conducive	  to	  entrepreneurialism,	  investment	   and	   growth.119	  Owing	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   information	   as	   to	   what	   works,	  tailoring	   of	   principles	   to	   specific	   contexts	   through	   experimentation	   and	   policy	  diversity,	  backed	  up	  with	  robust	  monitoring	  and	  evaluation,	  is	  required.120	  	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  experimentation	  has	  been	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  Chinese	   reform	   and	   its	   policy	   approach.	   Experimentalism	   has	   led	   to	   a	   variety	   of	  transitional	  institutions	  emerging,	  many	  of	  which	  took	  unconventional	  forms.	  They	  could	   be	   labelled	   as	   “second-­‐best	   arrangements”	   but	   they	  were	   quite	   effective	   in	  providing	   incentives.121	  Privately	   owned	   enterprises	   played	   a	   minor	   role	   in	   the	  economy	  in	  the	  first	  15	  years	  of	  reform,	  yet	  growth	  was	  high.	  By	  1991,	  collectives	  and	  joint	  ventures	  were	  the	  dominant	  majority	  of	  the	  non-­‐state	  sector.122	  	  The	  TVEs	  were	   a	   key	   driver	   of	   Chinese	   growth	   between	   1980	   and	   1995 123 	  yet	   this	  institutional	   innovation	   formed	   no	   part	   of	   standard	   policy	   prescriptions	   and	   ran	  counter	  to	  the	  property	  rights	  thesis.	  Property	  rights	  were	  not	  clearly	  defined	  and	  they	  operated	  in	  an	  environment	  without	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  modern	  legal	  system.	  The	   TVEs	   were	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   weak	   market	   structures	   and	  incomplete	  market	  transition.124	  	  
Experimentation	  can	  thus	   lead	  to	  unusual	   institutions	  when	  viewed	  against	  “first-­‐best”	   solutions.	   However,	   these	   unorthodox	   institutions	   may	   well	   be	   the	   best	  response	  to	  the	  particular	  national	  and	  regional	  context,	  local	  culture	  and	  existing	  institutions.	   Developing	   countries	   tend	   to	   rely	   heavily	   on	   informal	   institutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  North	  (2005),	  p.	  159.	  117	  Qian	  (2003).	  118	  Mukand	  &	  Rodrik	  (2005),	  p.	  375.	  119	  Hayek	  (1976);	  North	  (1990);	  Roland	  (2000);	  and	  Mukand	  &	  Rodrik	  (2005).	  120	  Rodrik	  (2008).	  121	  Qian	  (2000).	  122	  Qian	  &	  Xu	  (1993),	  p.	  141.	  123	  The	  rural	  township	  and	  village	  sector	  grew	  at	  an	  average	  of	  22	  percent	  per	  year	  between	  1980	  and	  1995	  (Jefferson	  &	  Singh	  1999).	  124	  Nee	  (1992).	  For	  an	  extensive	  account	  of	  the	  institutional	  framework	  of	  the	  TVEs,	  see	  Whiting	  (1996).	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given	  unreliable	  enforcement	  of	  formal	  rules.125	  Chinese	  enterprises	  have	  their	  own	  characteristics	   and	  may	   require	  a	  different	   set	  of	   laws	  and	   institutions	  governing	  their	  establishment	  and	  organisation.	  China,	   like	  other	  East	  Asian	  countries,	  relies	  heavily	   on	   trust	   and	   informal	   human	   relationships,	   known	   as	   guanxi,	   to	   enforce	  business	   agreements.126	  These	   informal	   institutions	   supplement	   the	   formal	   legal	  system,	   and	   are	   at	   least	   as	   important	   to	   economic	   growth.127	  Local,	   informal	  institutions	   are	   “the	   fundamental	   explanation	   of	   such	   institutions’	   credibility	   and	  successful	  functioning.”128	  China’s	  institutional	  innovation	  has	  led	  some	  scholars	  to	  go	   as	   far	   to	   say	   that	   “China	   is	   contributing	   to	   the	   generation	   of	   new	   capitalist	  institutions	   domestically	   and	   globally”	   and	   that	   these	   new	   structures	   are	  “beginning	  to	  constitute	  a	  new	  form	  of	  capitalism.”129	  
Institutional	  change	  and	  reform	  China	   serves	   as	   a	   useful	   laboratory	   for	   the	   study	   of	   transition	   processes	   and	  institutional	  change.	  Economic	  theory	  has	  often	  driven	  the	  prescriptions	  for	  reform	  and	  change,	  but	  looking	  back	  at	  reform	  can	  also	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  economic	  theory.	  The	   central	   issue	   for	   reform	   is	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   institutional	   framework	   that	  provides	  the	  necessary	  incentives	  for	  a	  more	  efficient	  organisation	  of	  the	  economy.	  Reform	   of	   institutions	   seeks	   to	   “entrench	   an	   overarching	   framework	   that	   will	  enhance	   the	  working	  of	   the	  market	  mechanism,	  put	   the	   finances	  of	   the	  state	  on	  a	  sound	  footing	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  economic	  efficiency	  and	  growth,	  and	  promote	  indigenous	  technological	  innovation.”130	  Efficient	  institutions	  should	  “provide	  clear,	  widely	   known,	   coherent,	   predictable,	   credible,	   and	   properly	   and	   evenly	   enforced	  rules.”131	  
Institutional	  reforms	  arguably	  constitute	  the	  most	  difficult	  challenge	  for	  transition	  economies	  and	  developing	  economies.	  Reforms	  to	  embed	  institutions	  that	  provide	  the	  underpinnings	  of	   a	  market	   economy	   take	  a	   long	   time	   to	   implement	   and	   their	  benefits	   may	   take	   even	   longer	   to	   appear.	   For	   instance,	   a	   transparent	   and	  predictable	   legal	   system	   requires	   “substantial	   accumulation	   of	   very	   specialized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Burki	  &	  Perry	  (1998),	  p.	  141.	  126	  McMillan	  &	  Naughton	  (1996);	  Hayami	  (1998);	  Fan	  &	  Scott	  (2003);	  Hu,	  B.	  (2007).	  127	  Hu,	  B.	  (2007)	  provides	  a	  particularly	  compelling	  account	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  informal	  institutions	  to	  rural	  development	  in	  China.	  See	  also	  Huang,	  P.	  (2011)	  on	  the	  overall	  importance	  of	  informal	  economic	  practices	  to	  economic	  development	  in	  China.	  128	  Ho	  (2005),	  p.	  18.	  129	  McNally	  (2008),	  p.	  11.	  130	  Gang	  &	  Woo	  (2009),	  p.	  355.	  131	  Burki	  &	  Perry	  (1998),	  p.	  25.	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human	   capital,	   and	   the	   process	   of	   accumulating	   this	   specialized	   human	   capital	  involves	   learning	  by	  doing,	  which	   is	   time-­‐consuming	  by	  nature.”132	  These	  types	  of	  institutional	   reforms	   cannot	  be	  achieved	  by	  way	  of	   a	  big-­‐bang.133	  History	  matters	  and	   actual	   institutions	   at	   any	   moment	   “represent	   adaptation	   to	   past	   as	   well	   as	  present	   difficulties.”134	  Therefore,	   viewed	   from	   an	   institutional	   perspective,	   no	  matter	  whether	  a	  big-­‐bang	  or	  evolutionary	  approach	   is	  adopted,	   the	  end	  result	   is	  that	  transition	  is	  a	  gradual	  process.135	  
There	  is	  no	  agreed	  typology	  of	  theories	  of	  institutional	  change.	  Institutional	  change	  can	  be	  a	  top-­‐down,	  state-­‐dominant	  process	  focusing	  on	  formal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  promulgation	   of	   laws	   and	   constitutional	   reform.	   But	   it	   can	   also	   be	   a	   bottom-­‐up	  process,	   driven	   by	   the	   interplay	   of	   spontaneous	   forces	   and	   competitive	  interests. 136 Economic	   institutionalism	   emphasises	   the	   demands	   of	   economic	  interests,	   sociopolitical	   institutionalism	   centres	   on	   social	   or	   political	   power,	  legitimacy-­‐based	   approaches	   stress	   popular	   preferences,	   while	   historical	  institutionalism	   seeks	   explanations	   in	   the	   impact	   of	   prior	   events.137	  The	   latter	  school	  of	   institutionalism,	  to	  which	  this	  thesis	  most	  relates,	  considers	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  both	  norm-­‐abiding	   followers	  and	  self-­‐interested	  rational	  actors.	   It	  also	  considers	  that	  history	  matters	  because	  actors	   learn	  from	  experience,	  expectations	  are	  moulded	  by	  the	  past,	  and	  events	  occur	  within	  a	  historical	  context	  which	  directly	  affects	  decisions.138	  
Institutions	   change	   by	   necessity	   in	   response	   to	   a	   changing	   environment,	   which	  diminishes	  the	  efficiency	  of	  existing	  institutions.139	  However,	  inefficient	  institutions	  may	   prove	   impervious	   to	   change	   due	   to	   vested	   interests	   and	   collective	   action	  problems,	   such	   as	   free	   riding.140	  Informal	   institutions	   can	   change	   through	   the	  design	  of	  formal	  rules	  or	  as	  societal	  values	  evolve,	  and	  as	  the	  external	  environment	  changes.141	  Those	   institutions	   dependent	   on	   culture,	   including	   values,	   beliefs	   and	  norms,	   are	   likely	   to	   produce	   incremental	   change	   and	   are	   thus	   slow-­‐moving	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  Fan	  &	  Woo	  (2009),	  p.	  356.	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  Ibid.	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  Arrow	  (1998).	  135	  World	  Bank	  (1996).	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  Kingston	  &	  Caballero	  (2009);	  Huang,	  X.	  (2011).	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  (2008).	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  See	  Steinmo	  (2008)	  for	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  historical	  institutionalism.	  139	  Roland	  (2004).	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  (1971).	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institutions.142	  Political	   institutions,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   typically	   fast	   moving,	  while	   legal	  systems	  sit	  somewhere	   in	  between.143	  Technology,	  as	   the	  accumulated	  stock	  of	  knowledge,	  evolves	  continuously	  and	  slowly,	  but	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  irregular	  bursts	  of	  change.144	  	  
As	   suggested	   in	   the	   earlier	   discussion	   on	   gradualism,	   the	   process	   of	   institutional	  change	   in	   China	   has	   been	  marked	   by	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   path	   dependence	   as	   “new	  institutions	  are	  built	  before	  the	  old	  ones	  have	  been	  destroyed.”145	  Elements	  of	  the	  reform	  have	  “inescapably	  been	  time	  dependent”	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  blueprint	  for	   reform.146 	  An	   example	   of	   the	   gradual	   approach	   and	   path	   dependence	   to	  institutional	  building	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  legal	  protection	  of	  companies:	  
Legal	  documents	  confirm	  the	  painfully	  slow	  expansion	  of	  official	  protection.	  	  At	   the	   start	   of	   reform,	   private	   business	   operated	   in	   legal	   limbo.	   Some	  entrepreneurs	   disguised	   their	   firms	   as	   collectives…A	   succession	   of	  amendments	  to	  China’s	  1982	  constitution	  slowly	  expanded	  recognition	  of	  the	  nonpublic	   economy,	   first	   as	   a	   “complement”	   to	   the	   state	   sector	   (1988)	   and	  then	   as	   an	   “important	   component”	   (1999)	   of	   the	   “socialist	   market	  economy”…The	   long	   march	   toward	   official	   recognition	   of	   private	   business	  came	   to	   an	   end	   only	   in	   2007	   when,	   following	   five	   years	   of	   fierce	   debate,	  China’s	  legislature	  enacted	  a	  landmark	  Law	  on	  Property	  Rights	  which,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  explicitly	  places	  privately	  held	  assets	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  with	  state	  and	  collective	  property.147	  Institutions	  are	  difficult	  to	  borrow	  from	  other	  jurisdictions	  as	  they	  are	  constrained	  by	   the	   historical	   development	   path	   of	   the	   borrower	   and	   by	   the	   unique	   cultural	  heritage.	   Accordingly,	   Chinese	   reformers	   have	   adopted	   a	   syncretic	   approach,	  borrowing	   and	   adopting	   from	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   experiences,	   in	   seeking	   to	   devise	  institutions	  compatible	  to	  the	  local	  context:	  	  	  
…special	  economic	  zones	  were	  modelled	  much	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  Taiwan	  and	   Singapore;	   stock	   exchanges	   emulated	   Hong	   Kong’s	   rules	   and	   practice;	  initial	   enterprise	   reforms	   drew	   inspiration	   from	   the	   Hungarian	   and	  Yugoslavian	   experience;	   the	   new	   tax	   system	   employed	   German	   expertise;	  banking	  reform	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  US	  Federal	  Reserves;	  and	  housing	  reform	  drew	  on	  the	  Singaporean	  approach.	  	  Reformers	  adhered	  to	   a	   market	   orientation	   in	   virtually	   all	   their	   reforms	   and	   gradually	   and	  selectively	   adopted	   foreign	   ideas	   and	   institutions.	   	   The	   result	   was	   some	  success	  and	  many	  setbacks.	  	  Yet	  certain	  new	  ideas	  and	  institutions	  have	  been	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  (2000)	  refers	  to	  these	  very	  slow	  moving	  institutions	  as	  “level	  1”	  institutions.	  This	  “social	  embeddedness	  level”	  changes	  over	  centuries	  or	  millennia.	  143	  Roland	  (2004).	  144	  Ibid.	  145	  Qian	  (2000).	  146	  Naughton	  (1996),	  p.	  5.	  147	  Brandt	  &	  Rawski	  (2008),	  p.	  19.	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gradually	   adapted	   and	   organically	   assimilated	   into	   the	   conditions	   that	   are	  unique	  to	  China.148	  The	   formation	   and	   evolution	   of	   institutions	   is	   a	   dynamic	   process,	   shaped	   and	  driven	  by	  cultural	  traditions,	  customs,	  history,	  conventions,	  norms	  and	  practices.	  A	  particular	   feature	   of	   Chinese	   institutions	   is	   the	   role	   played	   by	   China’s	   large	  diaspora.	   During	   the	   initial	   opening	   up,	   Chinese	   reformers	   sent	   many	   groups	   to	  study	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  “little	  dragons,”	  in	  particular	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Singapore.	  The	  Chinese	   in	   these	  economies	  had	  experience	  with	  market	   institutions	  and	  had	  “adapted	   market	   institutions	   from	   the	   West	   and	   internalized	   them	   in	   a	   Chinese	  cultural	   environment.” 149 	  The	   overseas	   Chinese	   communities	   thus	   provided	  mainland	  China	  with	  models	  of	  market-­‐based	  institutions	  that	  had	  been	  adapted	  to	  a	  Chinese	  cultural	  environment.	  This	  process	  of	  institutional	  substitution	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “indirect	  path	  dependence.”150	  
In	  summary,	  analysis	  of	  Chinese	  institutions	  requires	  discussion	  of	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	   institutions.	   Chinese	   institutions	   have	   tended	   to	   change	   incrementally,	  rather	   than	   abruptly	   with	   various	   institutional	   innovations	   emerging	   from	  experimentation.	   This	   suggests	   that	   informal	   institutions	   play	   a	   particularly	  important	   role	   in	   China	   given	   their	   slow	   rate	   of	   change.	   Institutions	   have	   been	  adopted	  and	  borrowed	  in	  a	  syncretic	  manner,	  but	  adapted	  to	  the	  local	  context.	  The	  Chinese	   diaspora	   have	   played	   an	   important	   role,	   as	   the	   frontrunners	   to	  market-­‐based	   institutions.	   The	   so-­‐called	   “China	   puzzle”	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   assumed	   as	   a	  multitude	  of	  institutional	  settings	  can	  be	  pareto-­‐improving.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  Zhang	  (2000),	  p.	  51.	  149	  Ibid.,	  p.	  77.	  150	  Ibid.,	  p.	  77.	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4. Innovation	  theories	  and	  innovation	  zones	  
National	  innovation	  system	  framework	  The	   theory	   of	   the	   national	   innovation	   system	   provides	   a	   systematic	   approach	   to	  understanding	  innovative	  and	  economic	  performance.151	  The	  theory	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  innovation	  by	  firms	  involves	  complex	  interactions	  between	  a	  firm	  and	  its	  environment.	  While	  cross-­‐border	  linkages	  and	  information	  flows	  are	  increasing	  along	  with	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  R&D,	  national	  borders	  still	  matter,	  as	  do	  the	  unique	  institutional	  settings	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  The	  notion	  and	  very	  concept	  of	  a	  
national	   system	   still	   therefore	   holds	   much	   pertinence,	   notwithstanding	   the	   vast	  size	  and	  regional	  dimensions	  inherent	  in	  a	  country	  the	  size	  of	  China.152	  
Rather	   than	   depicting	   firms	   as	   atomistic	   actors,	   the	   theory	   posits	   that	   the	  institutional	   and	   organizational	   framework	   as	   well	   as	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	  context	   shape	   firm	   behaviour.	   This	   theory	   therefore	   fits	   neatly	   with	   the	  institutional	   analysis	   of	   this	   thesis.	   The	   basic	   conceptual	   underpinnings	   of	   this	  theoretical	   approach	   are	   that	   economic	   behaviour	   rests	   on	   institutional	  foundations,	   competitive	   advantage	   is	   path-­‐dependent,	   and	   interactive	   learning	  generates	   technological	   knowledge. 153 	  The	   system	   perspective	   points	   to	   the	  importance	   of	   knowledge	   flows	   and	   efficient	   interactions	   among	   all	   actors	   of	   the	  innovation	   system,	   in	   particular	   among	   firms,	   universities,	   public	   research	  organisations	   and	   technology	   policy,	   for	   successful	   innovation. 154 	  Informal	  institutions	   are	   thus	   particularly	   important	   given	   their	   role	   in	   facilitating	  interaction	  and	  knowledge.	  
National	   innovation	   systems	   can	   either	   be	   defined	   narrowly	   to	   include	  “organisations	  and	  institutions	  involved	  in	  searching	  and	  exploring—such	  as	  R&D	  departments,	   technological	   institutes	   and	   universities”155	  or	   more	   broadly.	   The	  latter	  conception	  includes	  “all	  parts	  and	  aspects	  of	  the	  economic	  structure	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Seminal	  publications	  in	  this	  theory	  are	  Freeman	  (1987);	  Lundvall	  (1992);	  Nelson	  (1993);	  OECD	  (1997).	  152	  Various	  studies	  affirm	  the	  importance	  of	  domestic	  innovation.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Patel	  &	  Pavitt	  (1991).	  The	  role	  of	  provincial	  and	  sub-­‐provincial	  governments	  in	  innovation	  has	  become	  more	  important	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  (Springut	  et	  al.	  2011)	  153	  Smith	  (2000).	  154	  The	  Oslo	  Manual	  provides	  the	  internationally	  accepted	  definition	  of	  innovation:	  “An	  innovation	  is	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  new	  or	  significantly	  improved	  product	  (good	  or	  service),	  or	  process,	  a	  new	  marketing	  method,	  or	  a	  new	  organizational	  method	  in	  business	  practices,	  workplace	  organisation	  or	  external	  relations.”	  (Tanaka	  et	  al.	  2005:	  46).	  155	  Lundvall	  (1992),	  p.	  12.	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institutional	   set-­‐up	   affecting	   learning	   as	   well	   as	   searching	   and	   exploring—the	  production	  system,	  the	  marketing	  system	  and	  the	  system	  of	  finance…”156	  Under	  the	  broad	   conception,	   innovation	   policies	   include	   science	   and	   technology,	   industrial,	  financial,	  tax	  and	  fiscal	  policies.	  China’s	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  (MOST)	  has	  leaned	  towards	  the	  broad	  definition,	  as	  it	  treats	  tax	  incentives,	  R&D	  subsidies,	  and	   trade	   restrictions	   and	   promotion	   as	   “innovation	   policies.”157	  The	   following	  discussion	  thus	  adopts	  the	  broad	  understanding	  of	  innovation	  policies,	  but	  focuses	  extensively	  on	  science	  and	  technology	  given	  their	  centrality	  to	  ZGC.	  
Innovation	  zones—definition	  The	  success	  and	  resilience	  of	  Silicon	  Valley,158	  Route	  128,	  Research	  Triangle	  Park,	  Cambridge	   Science	   Park	   and	   the	   Emilia-­‐Romagna	   clusters	   has	   led	   governments	  around	   the	   world,	   including	   that	   of	   China,	   to	   attempt	   to	   emulate	   their	   success.	  High-­‐tech	   districts	   and	   science	   parks	   are	   increasingly	   being	   set	   up	   to	   facilitate	  technology	  transfer	  and	  regional	  development	  as	  they	  are	  often	  seen	  as	  leading	  to	  fast	   growing,	   geographically	   clustered	   firms	   within	   industries.159	  These	   spatial	  areas,	  designed	  to	  generate	  innovation,	  are	  rooted	  in	  strong	  inter-­‐firm	  networks	  as	  well	  as	  extensive	  linkages	  between	  research	  and	  industry.	  From	  a	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view	  innovation	  zones	  and	  technology	  parks	  are	  particularly	  interesting	  as	  they	  straddle	  theories	  of	  agglomeration,	  competitiveness	  and	  innovation.	  
Despite	  their	  popularity,160	  no	  generally	  accepted	  definition	  of	  innovation	  zones	  or	  science	  parks	  exists.161	  Science	  parks	  can	  encompass	  almost	  anything	  from	  distinct	  organisations	   to	  amorphous	  regions.	  Multiple	   terms	  exist	   for	  essentially	   the	  same	  phenomenon:	   research	   parks,	   technology	   parks,	   science	   parks,	   science-­‐based	  industrial	  parks,	  technopoles	  or	  innovation	  milieux.162	  To	  add	  further	  complication,	  it	   is	  often	  difficult	   to	  disentangle	  science	  parks	   from	  technology	  clusters	  and	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Ibid.	  157	  Liu	  et	  al.	  (2011).	  158	  Silicon	  Valley	  is	  home	  to	  the	  first	  science	  park	  to	  be	  established:	  Stanford	  Research	  Park.	  Founded	  in	  1951,	  the	  park	  later	  became	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  Silicon	  Valley.	  See	  Saxenian	  (1996)	  for	  discussion	  of	  Silicon	  Valley	  and	  Route	  128.	  159	  Tan	  (2006).	  160	  As	  at	  December	  2012,	  IASP	  counted	  almost	  400	  members	  (each	  member	  is	  a	  science	  park)	  in	  70	  countries.	  161	  Amirahmadi	  &	  Saff	  (1993);	  Storey	  &	  Tether	  (1998);	  and	  Phan	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  provide	  useful	  overviews	  of	  the	  definitional	  and	  conceptual	  problems.	  162	  Some	  authors	  draw	  fine	  distinctions.	  For	  instance,	  Stankiewicz	  (1998)	  regards	  parks	  as	  more	  restricted	  that	  technopoli	  in	  spatial	  and	  institutional	  terms.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  consistent	  categorisation.	  Link	  and	  Scott	  (2007)	  note	  that	  “research	  park”	  is	  more	  prevalent	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  “science	  park”	  is	  more	  common	  in	  Europe	  and	  “technology	  park”	  is	  more	  widespread	  in	  Asia.	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industry	  zones.163	  For	   instance,	  Taiwan’s	   three	  core	  science	  parks	  each	  have	   their	  own	  satellite	   industrial	  clusters.	  The	  name	  changes	  of	  ZGC	  through	  its	  history	  are	  symptomatic	  of	   the	   looseness	  of	   the	  concept	  and	  of	   the	  overlaps	  between	  science	  parks	   and	   industry	   zones.	   For	   ease	   of	   reference,	   this	   section	   refers	   to	   the	   term	  “innovation	  zones”	  as	  it	  is	  sufficiently	  broad	  to	  encompass	  science	  parks,	  clustering	  and	  high-­‐tech	  industrial	  zones.	  	  
Innovation	  zones	  focus	  on	  business	  acceleration	  through	  knowledge	  agglomeration	  and	  resource	  sharing.	  According	   to	   the	   International	  Association	  of	  Science	  Parks	  and	  Areas	  of	  Innovation	  (IASP),	  “areas	  of	  innovation,”	  of	  which	  science	  parks	  are	  a	  subset,	  fulfill	  the	  following	  functions:	  
• Stimulate	   and	   manage	   the	   flow	   of	   knowledge	   and	   technology	   between	  universities	  and	  companies	  
• Facilitate	   the	   communication	   between	   companies,	   entrepreneurs	   and	  technicians	  
• Provide	  environments	   that	  enhance	  a	  culture	  of	   innovation,	  creativity	  and	  quality	  
• Focus	   on	   companies	   and	   research	   institutions	   as	   well	   as	   on	   people:	   the	  entrepreneurs	  and	  knowledge	  workers	  
• Facilitate	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   businesses	   via	   incubation	   and	   spin-­‐off	  mechanisms	   and	   accelerate	   the	   growth	   of	   small-­‐	   and	   medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  (SMEs).164	  
At	   their	   core,	   science	   parks	   are	   places	   where	   research	   ideas	   and	   scientific	  achievements	   are	   developed	   into	   products	   for	   the	   market.165	  They	   provide	   an	  institutional	   framework	   to	   facilitate	   this	   process.	   They	   are	   not	   simply	   industrial	  zones	   for	   property	   development	   in	   which	   any	   firm	   may	   do	   business,	   but	   are	  targeted	   at	   firms	   with	   high	   levels	   of	   technological	   sophistication.	   Science	   parks	  seek	   to	   cluster	   science	   and	   technology	   organisations	   into	   geographically	   distinct	  zones.	  Their	  raison	  d’être	  is	  thus	  to	  improve	  industry-­‐research	  linkages.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  Park	  &	  Markusen	  (1994);	  Zhou	  (2004).	  Storper	  and	  Harrison	  (1991)	  break	  industrial	  districts	  into	  six	  types	  based	  on	  input-­‐output	  organisation	  and	  governance.	  164	  IASP	  website	  (2012).	  165	  Stankiewicz	  (1998).	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Industry-­‐science	   linkages	   take	   many	   forms:	   “casual	   contacts	   between	   academic	  scientists	  and	  engineers,	  spin-­‐offs	  from	  public	  research,	  licensing	  and	  patenting	  by	  universities,	   contract	   research,	   mobility	   of	   researchers,	   public-­‐	   private	  partnerships	  for	  research,	  co-­‐operation	  in	  training	  and	  education,	  etc.”166	  Networks	  and	   clusters	   facilitate	   relationships	   between	   industry	   and	   research	   as	   they	  stimulate	   creativity	   and	   allow	   a	   two-­‐way	   exchange	   between	   curiosity-­‐driven	  research	  and	  market-­‐led	  innovation	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  both.	  Accordingly,	  around	  80	  percent	  of	  parks	  are	  linked	  to	  a	  research	  institute	  and	  more	  than	  90	  percent	  house	  business	  incubators.167	  
The	  size,	  organisation	  and	  ownership	  of	  innovation	  zones	  varies	  significantly.	  Some	  are	  no	  more	  than	  several	  acres	  in	  central	  business	  districts,	  while	  others	  cover	  vast	  swathes	  of	   land.	  The	   largest	   in	   the	  United	  States	   is	   the	  Research	  Triangle	  Park	  at	  around	   thirty	   square	  kilometres,	  but	  ZGC	  dwarfs	   this	  by	  a	   factor	  of	   eight	  and	   the	  Zhangjiang	  Park	  in	  Pudong	  covers	  500	  square	  kilometres.168	  The	  majority	  of	  zones	  are	   public	   initiatives,	   with	   around	   15	   percent	   private	   developments.169	  Some	   are	  based	  mostly	  on	  the	  development	  of	  new,	  locally	  owned	  businesses	  that	  are	  linked	  to	  nearby	  research	   institutes	  or	  universities.170	  These	   include	  Boston’s	  Route	  128,	  Silicon	  Valley,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  ZGC.	  Others	  are	  based	  on	  R&D	  branch	  plants	  of	   large	   multinational	   corporations. 171 	  Some	   specialise	   in	   one	   or	   very	   few	  technology	   sectors,	   such	   as	   the	   South	   Korean	   zones,	   while	   almost	   half	   are	  “generalists.”172	  Finally,	   some	   innovation	   zones	   developed	   spontaneously,	   such	   as	  the	   Route	   128	   area,	  while	   others,	   such	   as	   Stanford	   Research	   Park,	  were	   planned	  creations.173	  In	  short,	   there	   is	   significant	  variation;	  no	   template	  exists	   from	  which	  to	  copy.	  
Innovation	  zones—rationale	  There	  is	  no	  singular	  rationale	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  innovation	  zones	  beyond	  the	  belief	   that	   they	   may	   be	   useful	   to	   promote	   economic	   development.	   Different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  OECD	  (2008),	  p.	  68.	  167	  IASP	  statistics	  (2012).	  Significant	  variation	  occurs	  across	  countries.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  all	  science	  parks	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  university,	  but	  in	  Japan	  and	  in	  the	  United	  States	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  168	  MacDonald	  &	  Deng	  (2004).	  169	  IASP	  statistics	  (2012).	  170	  Three	  types	  of	  spin-­‐off	  firms	  exist:	  (1)	  contract	  and	  consulting	  firms;	  (2)	  technology	  asset	  firms;	  and	  (3)	  product-­‐oriented	  firms.	  	  See	  Etzkowitz	  et	  al.	  (1998).	  171	  Goldstein	  &	  Luger	  (1990).	  172	  IASP	  statistics	  (2012).	  173	  Amirahmadi	  &	  Saff	  (1993).	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countries	  have	  developed	  their	  own	  conceptions	  of	  how	  science	  parks	  can	  promote	  economic	  growth.	  For	  instance,	  Japan	  sees	  technopoles	  and	  science	  parks	  as	  a	  way	  of	  promoting	   regional	   equality;	   Singapore	  and	  Taiwan	  view	   their	  high-­‐tech	  zones	  as	   a	  way	   to	   promote	   national	   technology-­‐led	   development;	   regions	   in	   the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  often	  see	  science	  parks	  as	  a	  tool	  in	  overcoming	  the	  collapse	  of	  traditional	  economic	  sectors	  and	  to	  compensate	  for	  a	  fall	   in	  traditional	  funding	  sources.174	  They	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  solving	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  divergent	  problems.	   Consequently,	   their	   establishment	   is	   often	   associated	   with	   heavy	  expectations.	  
The	  basic	   economic	   rationale	   for	   innovation	   zones	   and	   science	  parks	   stems	   from	  the	   idea	   that	   geographic	   concentration	   generates	   externalities	   through	  agglomeration.	   The	   standard	   theory	   of	   agglomeration,	   which	   dates	   back	   to	  Marshall	   (1890),	   states	   that	   firms	   cluster	   together	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   potential	  positive	  externalities	  they	  generate	  for	  each	  other.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  applied	   the	   Marshallian	   external	   economies	   to	   understand	   and	   explain	   industry	  concentration	   and	   agglomeration.175	  These	   ideas	  have	   since	  been	   extended	   to	   the	  interactions	  and	  networks	  between	  industry	  and	  research.	  
Five	   forces	  drive	   the	   formation	  and	  growth	  of	   regional	   clustering176	  of	   industries,	  according	  to	  agglomeration	  theories.	  
1. The	   concentration	   of	   several	   firms	   in	   a	   single	   location	   offers	   a	   pooled	  market	  for	  workers	  with	  industry-­‐specific	  skills,	  lowering	  the	  probabilities	  of	  unemployment	  and	  of	  labour	  shortage.	  This	  encourages	  job	  mobility	  and	  consequently	  information	  transfer	  across	  organisational	  boundaries.	  
2. Informational	  spillovers	  enhance	  the	  production	  function	  of	  clustered	  firms.	  Knowledge	  spillovers	  arise	   from	   the	   specific	   characteristics	  of	  knowledge,	  namely	   that	   it	   is	   non-­‐rivalrous,	   not	   universally	   accessible	   and	   partially	  excludable.177	  They	   occur	   through	   the	  movement	   of	   workers	   across	   firms	  and	   through	   the	   sharing	   of	   ideas	   in	   both	   formal	   and	   informal	   settings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Monck	  et	  al.	  (1988);	  Amirahmadi	  &	  Saff	  (1993);	  Stankiewicz	  (1998);	  Koh	  et	  al.	  (2005);	  Tsai	  (2005).	  175	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Hoover	  (1948);	  Perroux	  (1955);	  Krugman	  (1991);	  Ellison	  &	  Glaeser	  (1997);	  Glaeser	  (1998);	  Greenstone	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  	  176	  An	  industry	  cluster	  is	  a	  “geographically	  proximate	  group	  of	  interconnected	  companies	  and	  associated	  institutions	  in	  a	  particular	  field,	  linked	  by	  commonalities	  and	  complementarities.”	  (Porter	  1998:	  199).	  Spatial	  agglomeration	  refers	  to	  a	  geographical	  concentration	  of	  firms	  whose	  mutual	  linkages	  may	  or	  may	  not	  exist	  (Malmberg	  1996).	  177	  Nelson	  (1959);	  Arrow	  (1962).	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Geographic	  proximity	  speeds	  up	  the	  travel	  of	  ideas.178	  Knowledge	  spillovers	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  absorptive	  capacity	  of	  firms.179	  
3. Localised	  industries	  can	  support	  the	  production	  of	  nontradeable	  specialised	  inputs	   through	   backwards	   and	   forward	   linkages.180	  These	   linkages	   confer	  competitive	   advantage	   without	   requiring	   firms	   to	   sacrifice	   flexibility	   for	  economies	  of	  scale.181	  Firms	  build	  formal	  and	  informal	  relationships	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  complementarities.	  
4. Geographic	  concentration	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  scale	  economies,	  in	  knowledge	  creation	  and	  infrastructure	  provision.	  
5. Close	  proximity	  lowers	  transactions	  costs	  for	  firms.182	  
Research	   into	   the	   geography-­‐economy	   nexus	   became	   more	   prominent	   following	  Porter’s	  publication	   in	  1990,	  The	  Competitive	  Advantage	  of	  Nations.	  Porter	   (1990)	  observed	   that	   the	   geographic	   concentration	   of	   firms	   in	   the	   same	   industry	   is	  “strikingly	  common	  around	  the	  world.”183	  He	  argued	  that	  geographically	  clustered	  firms	   have	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   competitive	   landscape	   and	  technology	  transfer.	  The	  benefits	  of	  localisation	  arise	  less	  from	  agglomeration	  than	  from	  heightened	   local	  competition	  created	  by	  many	  firms	  competing	  next	   to	  each	  other.	  This	  in	  turn	  spurs	  innovation.	  Low	  barriers	  of	  entry	  in	  clusters	  produce	  high	  rates	  of	  new	  business	  formation,	  which	  enhance	  cluster	  advantages.	  
The	  notion	  of	  “embeddedness”	  has	  been	  emphasised	  as	  the	  key	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	   industrial	  agglomerations	  and	  science	  parks.184	  Granovetter	  (1985)	  argued	  that	  most	   behaviour	   is	   closely	   embedded	   in	   networks	   of	   interpersonal	   relations	   and	  local	   networks.	   Informal	   ties,	   informal	   information	   exchange	   and	   trust	   that	   go	  beyond	   mere	   contract	   are	   critical	   to	   inter-­‐firm	   linkages	   and	   collective	   learning	  which	   is	   an	   important	   source	   of	   competitiveness.185	  Innovation,	   because	   of	   its	  inherently	   uncertain	   character,	   is	   especially	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   trust.186	  Trust	  can	   be	   built	   up	   over	   a	   period	   of	   time	   through	   repeated	   interactions	   which	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Jaffe	  et	  al.	  (1993);	  Almeida	  et	  al.	  (2003);	  Link	  &	  Scott	  (2003).	  179	  Cohen	  &	  Levinthal	  (1990).	  180	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Perroux	  (1950).	  181	  Porter	  (1998).	  182	  Williamson	  (1985).	  183	  Porter	  (1990),	  p.	  120.	  184	  Harrison	  (1992).	  	  Some	  studies,	  however,	  dispute	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  networks.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Giuliani	  (2008).	  185	  Harrison	  (1992);	  Saxenian	  (1996);	  MacDonald	  &	  Deng	  (2004).	  186	  Gu	  &	  Lundvall	  (2006).	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facilitated	   by	   geographical	   proximity. 187 	  This	   social	   capital	   enables	   firms	   to	  cooperate	  with	  one	  another,	  sharing	  tools,	  information	  and	  even	  skilled	  personnel,	  yet	   also	   compete	   for	   market	   share.	   Various	   studies	   attest	   to	   the	   importance	   of	  informal	  links	  in	  science	  parks.188	  	  
The	   role	   of	   government	   in	   the	   creation	   and	   development	   of	   science	   parks	   varies	  significantly.	   In	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   central	   governments	  have	   only	   been	   involved	   peripherally	   in	   park	   development.	   Central	   government	  cuts	   to	   research	   funding	  have,	   however,	   spurred	  universities	   to	   develop	  parks	   to	  increase	   revenues.189 	  In	   the	   United	   States,	   state	   and	   local	   governments	   have	  typically	   provided	   support	   through	   the	   provision	   of	   infrastructure,	   property	   tax	  reductions	  and	   favourable	   land	  use	  policies.190	  This	  support	  has	  been	  regarded	  as	  crucial	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  parks.191	  
In	   contrast,	   the	   central	   governments	   of	   Japan,	   France	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   have	  played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   the	   creation	   and	   coordination	   of	   innovation	   zones.192	  For	  instance,	   Japan’s	   MITI	   launched	   the	   ambitious	   Technopolis	   Program	   in	   1983	   to	  steer	  high-­‐tech	   industries	   toward	  particular	  regions.	  This	  approach	  was	  very	  top-­‐down,	   but	   involved	   only	   limited	   financial	   assistance	   from	   Tokyo.193	  The	   French	  government	   has	   set	   up	   two	   funds	   totalling	   500	   million	   euros	   for	   its	   pôles	   de	  
compétitivité	  and	  since	  2005	  has	  financed	  889	  R&D	  collaborative	  projects	  totalling	  1.1	  billion	  euros.194	  In	  addition,	  the	  pôles	  benefit	  from	  subsidies	  and	  tax	  breaks.	  The	  French	  approach	   is	   a	  mix	  of	   top-­‐down	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  as	   local	   authorities	   submit	  
pôle	  proposals,	  but	  ministry	  officials	  and	  reputed	  experts	  take	  decisions	  as	  to	  which	  proposals	   are	   funded. 195 	  Other	   East	   Asian	   governments,	   including	   Taiwan,	  Singapore	   and	   South	   Korea	   have	   invested	   significantly	   in	   innovation	   zones,	  providing	  supporting	  infrastructure	  and	  tax	  breaks	  as	  part	  of	  their	  active	  industrial	  policies.196	  However,	  even	  in	  East	  Asia	  there	  is	  significant	  variation:	  the	  Taiwanese	  government	   has	   maintained	   a	   hands-­‐off	   approach,	   leaving	   the	   private	   sector	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  Park	  (1996);	  Saxenian	  (1996).	  188	  Westhead	  &	  Storey	  (1995).	  189	  Webster	  &	  Etzkowitz	  (1998).	  190	  Goldstein	  &	  Luger	  (1990).	  191	  Amirahmadi	  &	  Saff	  (1993).	  192	  Goldstein	  &	  Luger	  (1990);	  Stankiewicz	  (1998).	  193	  Amirahmadi	  &	  Saff	  (1993).	  See	  Araki	  (2000)	  for	  details	  on	  Japan’s	  Technopolis	  programme.	  194	  DATAR	  &	  DGCIS	  (2011).	  195	  Houel	  &	  Daunis	  (2009);	  Ministère	  de	  l’Economie	  et	  des	  Finances	  (2011).	  196	  Amirahmadi	  &	  Saff	  (1993);	  Koh	  et	  al.	  (2005);	  Tsai	  (2005);	  Yang	  et	  al.	  (2009).	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drive	   the	   development	   of	   Hsinchu;197	  meanwhile	   Singapore’s	   Biopolis	   is	   heavily	  state-­‐led.198	  
Innovation	  zones—effectiveness	  Innovation	   zones	   and	   science	   parks	   are	   seen	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   facilitating	  clusters,	   enhancing	   industry-­‐science	   linkages	   and	   ultimately	   improving	   the	  competitiveness	   of	   a	   region	   or	   state	   through	   innovation.	   Yet	   despite	   their	  popularity	   and	   their	   theoretical	   attraction,	   the	   evidence	   on	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  parks	  suggests	  that	   they	  generally	  deliver	   less	  than	  anticipated.	  Science	  parks	  are	  not	   a	   quantitatively	   major	   phenomenon	   in	   the	   context	   of	   employment	   or	   the	  industrial	  structure	  as	  a	  whole.	  Their	  appeal	  rests	  in	  their	  symbolism	  as	  they	  bring	  together	   scientific	   research	   and	   industrial	   innovation,	   social	   relations	   and	   spatial	  elements.199	  	  
Science	   parks	   reflect	   an	   assumption	   that	   technological	   innovation	   stems	   from	  scientific	   research	   and	   that	   they	   can	  provide	   the	   catalytic	   incubator	   environment	  for	   the	   transformation	   of	   research	   results	   into	   production.200	  This	   accords	   well	  with	  linear	  models	  of	  innovation	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  chain	  of	  successive	  interrelated	  activities:	   from	   basic	   research	   to	   applied	   and	   more	   developmental	   research	  activities,	   the	   development	   of	   new	   product	   and	   process	   ideas,	   the	   evolution	   and	  testing	   of	   prototypes,	   to	   commercial	   production.	   However,	   as	   the	   national	  innovation	   systems	   literature	   shows,	   innovation	   is	   the	   result	   of	   complex	  interactions	  with	   feedback	   loops.	  The	   innovation	  process	   is	   iterative	  with	  reverse	  flows	   from	   industry	   to	   academia,	   in	   which	   industrial	   innovation	   opens	   up	   new	  basic	  research	  questions.201	  It	  is	  this	  knowledge	  flow	  from	  industry	  to	  universities	  that	   accounts	   for	   the	   success	   of	   Silicon	   Valley.202	  Because	   science	   parks	   focus	   on	  pushing	  out	  research,	  some	  scholars	  contend	  that	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  science	  parks	  is	  flawed.203	  	  
Empirical	   studies	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   science	   parks	   on	   industry-­‐science	   linkages	  generally	   show	   that	   parks	   do	   not	   significantly	   improve	   linkages.	   A	   study	   of	   links	  between	  higher	  education	  institutes	  and	  industry	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  found	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  Koh	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  198	  Ibid.	  199	  Massey	  &	  Wield	  (1991).	  200	  Westhead	  &	  Storey	  (1995).	  201	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Etzkowitz	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  on	  the	  “spiral	  model”	  of	  innovation.	  202	  MacDonald	  &	  Deng	  (2004).	  203	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Massey	  &	  Wield	  (1991);	  MacDonald	  &	  Deng	  (2004).	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the	   links	  were	   less	   than	   anticipated,	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   Cambridge	  where	   the	  links	  were	   clearly	   present.204	  Another	   study	  of	   20	  UK	  parks	   in	   1986	   showed	   that	  very	   few	   university	   start-­‐ups	   conformed	   to	   the	   model	   of	   scientist	   turned	  entrepreneur.	   Links	   between	   research	   institutes	   in	   parks	   were	   low. 205 	  Other	  scholars	   have	   noted	   that	   links	   with	   academia	   are	   often	   peripheral	   rather	   than	  centre	   stage. 206 	  Researchers	   have	   also	   found	   a	   lack	   of	   synergies	   between	  laboratories	  and	   firms	   in	   the	  French	  and	   Japanese	   technopoles.207	  On	   the	  positive	  side,	   when	   a	   university	   is	   present,	   parks	   can	   enhance	   the	   two-­‐way	   transfer	   of	  knowledge	  between	  firms	  and	  between	  firms	  and	  universities.208	  
Studies	  on	  the	  effects	  on	  firms	  tend	  to	  find	  disappointing	  results.	  A	  study	  of	  science	  parks	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   found	   that	   there	   were	   no	   statistically	   significant	  differences	  in	  R&D	  intensiveness	  between	  on-­‐park	  and	  off-­‐park	  firms.209	  A	  study	  of	  16	  Australian	  science	  parks	  revealed	  low	  levels	  of	  interaction	  among	  on-­‐park	  firms	  and	   a	   low	   level	   of	   interest	   in	   research.210	  A	   study	   of	   two	   Swedish	   science	   parks	  found	   that	   firms	   located	   on	   science	   parks	   had	   significantly	   higher	   survival	   rates	  than	  off-­‐park	  firms,	  but	  that	  there	  were	  insignificant	  differences	  in	  firm	  growth.211	  Research	   comparing	   high-­‐tech	   companies	   on	   and	   off	   Shanghai	   science	   parks	   in	  1999	  found	  that	  there	  was	  little	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  firms.	  The	  value	  of	  production	  and	  export	   income	  was	  not	   significantly	  different	  between	   the	   two	  groups.212	  Another	   study	   of	   China’s	   53	   high-­‐tech	   parks	   found	   that	   there	   was	   no	  evidence	  of	  geographical	  external	  economies,	  but	  that	  parks	  had	  been	  successful	  in	  leveraging	  linkages	  with	  foreign	  companies.213	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  several	  scholars	  claim	  that	  science	  parks	  enhance	  the	  two-­‐way	  knowledge	  flow	  between	  universities	  and	  industry	  and	  that	  therefore	  science	  parks	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  innovation	  system.214	  
The	  exceptions	  to	  these	  negative	  findings	  relate	  to	  Taiwan’s	  Hsinchu	  Science-­‐based	  Industrial	   Park	   (HSIP).	   Studies	   of	   HSIP	   have	   found	   statistically	   significant	   R&D	  spillover	   effects	   and	   spatial	   spillover	   effects.	   Collaborative	   R&D	   within	   and	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  Etzkowitz	  (1998).	  207	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  (2001).	  208	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  &	  Scott	  (2011).	  209	  Westhead	  (1997).	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  (1989).	  211	  Ferguson	  &	  Olofsson	  (2004).	  212	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  Deng	  (2004).	  213	  Hu,	  A.	  (2007).	  	  This	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  data	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  1992	  to	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between	   industries	   in	   Taiwan	  was	   found	   to	   play	   a	  more	   important	   role	   than	   the	  individual	   efforts	   of	   firms.	   In	   addition,	   scale	   economies	  were	   substantial	   in	   high-­‐tech	   clustering	   in	   HSIP.215	  Another	   study	   found	   that	   HSIP	   firms	   invested	   more	  efficiently	  in	  R&D	  than	  firms	  outside.	  These	  efficiency	  gains	  were	  attributed	  to	  the	  support	  of	  governmental	  policies	  for	  firms’	  R&D	  efforts,	  the	  advantage	  of	  location,	  the	   effects	   of	   clustering	   and	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   bridge	   between	   HSIP	   and	  Silicon	   Valley	   formed	   through	   US-­‐educated	   Taiwan	   engineers	   now	   working	   in	  HSIP.216	  
The	  lack	  of	  tight	  linkages	  and	  overall	  effectiveness,	  beyond	  a	  few	  notable	  cases,	  has	  led	   some	   scholars	   to	   dismiss	   the	   notion	   of	   science	   parks	   altogether.	  Massey	   and	  Wield	   (1991)	   contend	   that	   public	   money	   from	   local	   taxes	   is	   used	   to	   subsidise	  profits	   made	   through	   property	   investment	   by	   financial	   institutions	   in	   the	  innovation	   zones.	   They	   argue	   that	   science	   parks	   produce	   social	   inequity,	   uneven	  development	  and	  hinder	   industrial	   regeneration.	  Other	  scholars	  note	   that	  science	  parks	   take	   at	   least	   a	   decade	   to	   become	   economically	   viable	   and	   that	   without	  government	  support	  they	  are	  not	  viable.217	  
Given	   the	   overall	   lack	   of	   success	   of	   science	   parks,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   emulating	   the	  successes	  of	  Silicon	  Valley,	  Cambridge	  or	  Taiwan’s	  Hsinchu	  Park	  is	  far	  from	  simple.	  The	   critical	   conditions	   for	   creating	   a	   successful	   science	   park	   still	   form	   an	   open	  question.	  	  What	  remains	  particularly	  elusive	  is	  how	  to	  develop	  the	  environment	  in	  which	   informal	   information	   exchange	   between	   firms	   themselves	   and	   between	  firms,	   research	   institutes	   and	   universities	   can	   occur.	   The	   social	   structures	   of	  sociability,	   trust	   and	   effective	   interactions	   among	   the	   actors	   in	   the	   innovation	  system	  fail	  to	  develop	  in	  “created”	  research	  parks.218	  Not	  all	  spatial	  agglomerations	  of	  small	   firms	  necessarily	  make	  up	  a	   functioning	   innovation	  area.219	  A	   functioning	  network	  of	  firms	  is	  required,	  underpinned	  by	  informal	  institutions,	  social	  capital220	  and	  a	  regulatory	  environment	  favouring	  both	  collaboration	  and	  competition.221	  The	  lack	   of	   inter-­‐firm	   connectivity	   and	   network-­‐supporting	   institutions,	   such	   as	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  Tsai	  (2005).	  216	  Yang	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  217	  Amirahmadi	  &	  Saff	  (1993).	  218	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  &	  Oinas	  (1999).	  219	  Harrison	  (1992).	  220	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Silicon	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  capital	  may	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  dense	  and	  hypermobile	  personal	  networks	  of	  the	  professional	  and	  technical	  population,	  and	  the	  close	  links	  between	  powerful	  financial	  and	  industrial	  corporations	  and	  between	  innovation	  and	  commercialisation	  processes,	  rather	  than	  historically	  constructed	  social	  ties	  (Castilla	  et	  al.	  2000).	  221	  Zhou	  (2004).	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mediating	   actors,	   rules	   of	   engagement,	   tech	   transfer	   mechanisms	   and	   informal	  interaction	   spaces,	   is	   a	  major	   impediment	  hampering	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   China’s	  high-­‐tech	  parks,	  including	  ZGC.222	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5. Zhongguancun	  –	  development	  and	  evolution	  
The	  context—China’s	  transitional	  system	  Two	   transitions	   are	   currently	   underway	   in	   China’s	   national	   innovation	   system.	  First,	   the	   system	   is	   moving	   from	   the	   plan	   to	   the	   market,	   away	   from	   a	   centrally	  directed	   innovation	   structure	   to	   a	   more	   decentralised	   system.	   Second,	   Chinese	  leaders	  are	  attempting	  to	  shift	  the	  economy	  from	  a	  low-­‐income	  developed	  country	  dependent	  on	  factor	  accumulation	  and	  low	  cost	  production	  to	  an	  economy	  capable	  of	   sustaining	   technological	   progress	   through	   technology	   adoption	   and	  innovation. 223 	  Promotion	   of	   high-­‐tech	   industry	   is	   arguably	   now	   the	   central	  economic	  development	  policy	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government.224	  
China	  has	  adopted	  a	  technological	  catch-­‐up	  strategy	  with	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  and	   technology	   transfer	   and	   adoption	   at	   the	   centre,	   but	   once	   it	   reaches	   the	  technological	   frontier,	   innovation	   will	   be	   required	   to	   drive	   growth.225	  Innovation	  depends	   on	   a	   competitive	   environment—the	   Schumpeterian	   “perennial	   gale	   of	  creative	   destruction”226—and	   a	   strong	   science	   and	   technology	   system	   closely	  connected	  with	   firms.	  However,	  building	   such	  a	   system	   is	  difficult,	  particularly	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  formula	  and	  country-­‐specific	  institutions.	  The	  experience	  of	  almost	  every	  developing	  economy	  shows	   that	   the	   transition	   to	  an	   innovative	  economy	   is	  exceedingly	  difficult.	  Only	   Japan,	  South	  Korea,	  Taiwan	  and	  Singapore	  stand	  out	  as	  unambiguous	  technology	  success	  stories.	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  challenge,	  China	  has	  bold	  aspirations	  and	  plans	  to	  bring	  about	  these	   two	   transitions.	   The	   latest	   catchphrase	   to	   emanate	   from	   Beijing	   is	  “independent/indigenous/endogenous	   innovation”227	  (zizhu	   chuangxin	  自主创新).	  The	   inaugural	   National	   Guidelines	   for	  Medium-­‐	   and	   Long-­‐term	   Plans	   for	   Science	  and	   Technology	   Development	   (2006–2020),	   issued	   by	   China’s	   highest	   body	   the	  National	  People’s	  Congress,	  aim	  to	  make	  China	  “an	  innovation-­‐oriented	  country”	  by	  2020	  and	  foresee	  China	  becoming	  “the	  world’s	  leading	  science	  power”	  by	  2050.228	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  Hu	  &	  Jefferson	  (2008).	  224	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  366.	  225	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  a	  country’s	  approach	  to	  the	  world	  technology	  frontier	  and	  innovation	  activities,	  see	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  (2006).	  226	  Schumpeter	  (1942/1987).	  227	  The	  translation	  of	  the	  Chinese	  term	  differs.	  	  Gu	  &	  Lundvall	  (2006)	  contend	  that	  the	  term	  should	  simply	  be	  understood	  as	  “innovation.”	  228	  Xinhua	  (2006a	  and	  2006b).	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China’s	   Five-­‐Year	   Plans	   contain	   specific	   innovation,	   science	   and	   technology	   goals	  and	  targets	  that	  fall	  within	  the	  broader	  umbrella	  of	  the	  longer	  term	  guidelines.	  
This	  latest	  science	  and	  technology	  push	  comes	  on	  the	  back	  of	  increased	  investment	  in	   innovation229	  and	   a	   series	   of	   reforms.	   The	   pre-­‐reform	   science	   and	   technology	  system	  had	  been	  developed	   from	  the	  Soviet	  model.	   It	  was	  highly	  centralised	  with	  research	   capacities	   concentrated	   in	   government	   institutions.	   The	   system	   was	  effective	   in	   supporting	   basic	   research	   and	   centrally	   determined	   goals,	   but	   lacked	  the	  “complex	  incentive	  structure	  required	  for	  a	  broad-­‐based	  system	  of	  commercial	  innovation	   that	   could	   effectively	   respond	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   producer	   and	  consumer	   sectors	   operating	   outside	   the	   immediate	   realm	   of	   the	   government’s	  science	   and	   technology	   priorities.” 230 	  There	   was	   little	   interaction	   between	  institutions	   and	   linkages	   between	   research	   and	   production	   were	   poor.231	  The	  sector	  relied	  on	  state	  patronage	  and	  was	  antithetical	  to	  the	  creation	  and	  protection	  of	   intellectual	   property	   rights.	   These	   features	   still	   plague	   the	   national	   innovation	  system	   today.	   Despite	   the	   more	   market-­‐oriented	   system,	   it	   remains	   largely	  centrally	   controlled	   with	   most	   policies	   formulated	   and	   executed	   from	   the	   top.	  Interaction	   between	   users	   and	   producers	   of	   knowledge	   and	   innovation	   is	  limited.232	  
Reform	   of	   the	   science	   and	   technology	   system	   officially	   began	   in	   1985	   with	   the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Decision	  on	  the	  Reform	  of	  the	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Management	  
System.	  The	  effects	  of	   the	   reform	  mirrored	   the	   “growing	  out	  of	   the	  plan”	   strategy	  observed	   in	   other	   sectors,	   i.e.	   a	   gradual	   diminishing	   importance	   of	   the	   state	   and	  increasing	  share	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  This	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  gradual	  privatisation	  of	  research	  institutes,	  the	  introduction	  of	  competitive	  funding	  allocation	  mechanisms	  and	   cuts	   in	   government	   appropriations. 233 	  The	   government	   reorganised	   its	  appropriations	  and	  established	  new	  programmes,	  including	  the	  Torch	  Programme,	  under	   which	   ZGC	   was	   created.	   Other	   key	   institutional	   changes	   to	   support	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  The	  appropriation	  for	  science	  and	  technology	  (both	  central	  and	  local	  government)	  increased	  from	  35	  billion	  RMB	  in	  1996	  to	  169	  billion	  in	  2006.	  During	  the	  period	  of	  the	  11th	  Five-­‐year	  plan	  (2006–2010),	  the	  central	  government’s	  outlay	  for	  science	  and	  technology	  rose	  by	  22	  percent	  per	  annum	  (World	  Bank	  and	  Development	  Research	  Center	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  2012).	  230	  Hu	  &	  Jefferson	  (2008),	  p.	  291.	  231	  This	  problem	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  China,	  but	  is	  the	  major	  stumbling	  block	  for	  innovation	  and	  science	  in	  centrally	  planned	  systems	  (Malecki	  1991).	  232	  Gu	  &	  Lundvall	  (2006);	  Hu	  &	  Jefferson	  (2008);	  Liu	  et	  al.	  (2011);	  Springut	  et	  al.	  (2011);	  Benner	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  233	  Liu	  &	  White	  (2001);	  Gao	  &	  Tisdell	  (2004).	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innovation	   were	   the	   enactment	   of	   China’s	   first	   patent	   law	   in	   1983,	   laws	   on	  technology	  contracts	  in	  1987	  and	  a	  gradual	  implementation	  of	  copyright	  law.234	  
Reforms	  of	  the	  national	  innovation	  system	  as	  well	  as	  a	  more	  competitive	  business	  environment	   for	   domestic	   firms	   have	   led	   to	   an	   explosion	   in	   R&D	   performed	   in	  China.	   The	   ratio	   of	   R&D	   to	   GDP	   now	   stands	   at	   1.7,	   only	   slightly	   below	   that	   of	  Ireland,	  Canada,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Netherlands.235	  Foreign	  firms	  are	  also	  establishing	  R&D	  facilities	   in	  China	  to	   inter	  alia	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  Chinese	  market	  and	  reduce	  costs	  and	  the	  length	  of	  the	  R&D	  cycle.236	  R&D	  personnel	  numbers	  have	  risen	   from	  781,000	   in	  1986	   to	  more	   than	  2.5	  million	   in	  2010,	   the	   largest	   science	  and	   technology	   workforce	   in	   the	   world.237	  As	   R&D	   expenditure	   has	   increased,	  scientific	   outputs,	   such	   as	   scientific	   reports	   and	   patents,	   have	   risen.238	  However,	  when	  weighted	   by	   the	   number	   of	   researchers,	   the	   numbers	   of	   articles	   published	  and	   patent	   applications	   lag	   significantly	   behind	   advanced	   economies	   indicating	   a	  lack	  of	  efficiency.239	  
The	   increased	   investment	  and	  outputs	   in	  R&D	  has	  not	  necessarily	   translated	   into	  increased	   quality.	   China	   has	   only	   partially	   succeeded	   in	   moving	   from	   a	   labour-­‐intensive,	  low-­‐technology	  production	  to	  high-­‐technology	  manufacturing.	  Exports	  of	  advanced	   technology	   products	   have	   soared, 240 	  but	   foreign-­‐owned	   firms	   have	  accounted	   for	   more	   than	   96	   percent	   of	   these	   exports	   since	   2002.241	  	   Very	   few	  Chinese	   firms	  can	  be	  counted	  among	  the	  technological	   leaders	   in	  their	  subsectors	  and	   few	   are	   significant	   producers	   of	   intellectual	   property. 242 	  China	   produces	  relatively	   few	   high	   impact	   articles	   in	   any	   field	   and	   triadic	   patents	   are	   few	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  Gao	  &	  Tisdell	  (2004).	  235	  OECD	  (2011).	  	  The	  OECD	  average	  for	  2010	  is	  2.3.	  236	  Chen	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  Well-­‐known	  multinational	  corporations	  with	  research	  facilities	  in	  China	  include	  IBM,	  Intel,	  Microsoft,	  Nokia,	  Ericson,	  SAP,	  Samsung	  and	  Matsushita.	  237	  Gao	  &	  Tisdell	  (2004);	  OECD	  (2012).	  Note,	  however,	  that	  the	  OECD	  database	  on	  R&D	  personnel	  for	  the	  United	  States	  is	  incomplete.	  238	  The	  number	  of	  scientific	  reports	  has	  risen	  dramatically,	  up	  from	  20,000	  papers	  in	  1998	  to	  112,000	  by	  2008	  (Adams	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Patents	  granted	  by	  the	  Chinese	  patent	  office	  have	  swelled	  from	  138	  in	  1985,	  to	  149,588	  in	  2003	  and	  740,626	  in	  2010	  (Gao	  &	  Tisdell	  2004;	  Website	  of	  the	  State	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	  of	  the	  PRC).	  Patents	  issued	  by	  the	  US	  Patent	  Office	  to	  the	  Chinese	  private	  sector	  have	  surged	  since	  2001	  as	  have	  patent	  citation	  rates	  (Hu	  &	  Mathews	  2008).	  Patent	  citations	  are	  a	  more	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  innovation	  than	  simple	  patent	  counts.	  See	  Griliches	  (1990)	  and	  Jaffe	  &	  Trajtenberg	  (2002)	  for	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  usefulness	  of	  patents	  in	  understanding	  innovation	  and	  technical	  change.	  239	  OECD	  (2008).	  240	  High-­‐technology	  exports	  increased	  almost	  ten-­‐fold	  between	  2000	  and	  2010	  (World	  Bank	  2012a).	  241	  Moran	  (2011).	  242	  Notable	  exceptions	  include	  Huawei	  and	  ZTE	  in	  the	  ICT	  industry,	  Suntech	  Power	  in	  solar	  technologies	  and	  Dalian	  Machine	  Tool	  Group	  in	  engineering	  (World	  Bank	  and	  Development	  Research	  Center	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  2012).	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number.243	  Finally,	   a	   synthetic	   index	   of	   innovation	   rankings	   show	   China	   ranked	  42nd	  in	  the	  world,	  well	  behind	  OECD	  nations	  and	  a	  number	  of	  developing	  countries,	  including	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  Brazil	  and	  Mexico.244	  
ZGC—Pre-­‐reform	  era	  The	   area	   comprising	   ZGC	   has	   been	   designated	   an	   educational	   and	   scientific	  research	  area	  within	  Beijing	  since	  the	  1950s.	   In	  a	  bid	  to	  create	  a	  concentration	  of	  top	   scientists	   and	   engineers	   in	   China,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   either	   moved	   or	  established	   research	   institutes	  and	  universities	   in	   this	  area	  over	   time.	  By	  1965,	  a	  total	   of	   55	   universities	   and	   research	   institutes	   were	   located	   in	   Beijing,	  concentrated	   principally	   in	   the	   northwestern	   district,	   known	   as	   ZGC.245	  However,	  despite	   the	   research	   capacities,	   connections	   with	   industry	   were	   weak	   with	   the	  result	   that	   commercialisation	   and	   product	   development	   were	   severely	   limited.	  Under	  the	  command	  economy,	  no	  fewer	  than	  40	  supervisory	  agencies	  of	  different	  sectors	   at	   the	   national	   and	   local	   levels	   authorised	   universities	   and	   research	  institutes.	  
ZGC—Embryonic	  stages	  of	  the	  zone,	  1980–1988	  Inspired	  by	   Silicon	  Valley,	   several	  Chinese	  Academy	  of	   Science	   (CAS)	   researchers	  acted	  as	  risk	  takers	  and	  devoted	  themselves	  to	  an	  early	  experiment	  in	  establishing	  non	   state-­‐owned	   firms246	  in	   the	   ZGC	   area.	   They	   created	   China’s	   first	   technology	  transfer-­‐based	   organisation,	   despite	   stiff	   opposition. 247 	  Dissatisfied	   with	   their	  working	   environment,	   these	   early	   entrepreneurs	   resigned	   from	   their	   high-­‐status	  positions	   and	   created	   independent	   innovative	   firms.	   The	   opposition	   to	   this	  entrepreneurialism	   only	   came	   to	   an	   end	   in	   1983	   when	   the	   central	   government	  intervened	   through	   a	   positive	   assessment	   of	   China’s	   first	   non	   state-­‐owned	  innovative	   firm.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   1983	   eleven	   firms	  were	   operating	   in	   ZGC	   and	   by	  1984	  the	  number	  had	  topped	  40.248	  China’s	  first	  cluster	  of	  high-­‐tech	  related	  activity	  was	  subsequently	  created	  in	  the	  period	  1984–87	  when	  a	  group	  of	  computer	  stores	  on	   a	   particular	   thoroughfare	   in	   ZGC	   earned	   that	   section	   the	   nickname	   of	  “Electronics	   Street.”	   By	   May	   1988,	   the	   population	   of	   newly	   created	   firms	   had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  Simon	  &	  Cao	  (2009);	  OECD	  (2011).	  	  244	  Archibugi	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  245	  Walcott	  (2003).	  246	  Many	  of	  these	  newly	  created	  companies	  were	  labelled	  “state-­‐owned,	  people-­‐run	  companies”	  (guoyou	  minying	  国有民营)	  (Zhou	  2004).	  247	  Wang	  &	  Wang	  (1998).	  248	  Zhao	  (1998).	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increased	   to	   400,	   including	   major	   conglomerates	   which	   grew	   from	   individual	  inventions.	  	  
This	   early	   stage	   of	   the	   development	   of	   Beijing’s	   high-­‐tech	   agglomeration	   can	   be	  regarded	   as	   a	   process	   of	   spin-­‐off	   from	   state-­‐run	   research	   institutes	   and	  universities.	  The	  state	  institutions	  in	  the	  ZGC	  area	  encouraged	  the	  establishment	  of	  commercial	  firms	  as	  the	  firms’	  profits	  provided	  much	  needed	  financial	  relief	  in	  the	  wake	   of	   reductions	   in	   state	   funding.249	  The	   CAS	   invested	   300,000	   RMB	   as	   seed	  money	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  Legend	  and	  became	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  company.	  The	  state	  sector	  was	  also	  the	  dominant	  user	  during	  this	  formative	  stage.	  Entrepreneurs’	  existing	   networks	   with	   universities,	   government	  ministries	   and	   large	   SOEs	  were	  particularly	  important	  when	  negotiating	  contracts.250	  Public	  research	  institutes	  and	  universities	   acted	   as	   venture	   capitalists	   by	   providing	   seed	   capital,	   technological	  expertise	   and	   name	   recognition.251	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   networks	   with	   the	   state	  sector,	   personalised	   small	   firm	   networks	   were	   particularly	   important	   in	   this	  formative	  stage,	  as	  they	  were	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  Silicon	  Valley.252	  However,	  these	  networks	   were	   “exclusive	   academic	   networks	   involving	   little	   participation	   from	  other	  commercial	  agents,	  such	  as	  banks,	  business	  services,	  and	  management.”253	  
Through	   its	   pioneering	   organisational	   forms,	   the	   embryonic	   stage	   of	   ZGC	   set	   a	  precedent	   for	   ZGC’s	   role	   in	   experimentation	   of	   innovation-­‐related	   policies.	   Risk-­‐takers	   from	   China’s	   state-­‐run	   research	   institutes	   set	   up	   China’s	   first	   high-­‐tech	  firms,	   despite	   opposition.	   This	   initial	   experimentation	   was	   legitimised	   by	   the	  central	   government	  when	   it	   granted	   R&D	   institutes	   nation-­‐wide	   the	   authority	   to	  register	   various	   joint	   ventures	   with	   partners	   and	   to	   set	   up	   new	   technology	  enterprises	   in	   1985.254 	  The	   spin-­‐off	   companies	   were	   heavily	   reliant	   on	   state	  organisations	   and	   personal	   networks	  were	   fundamental	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	  small	  innovative	  firm.	  Other	  informal	  institutions,	  in	  particular	  inter-­‐firm	  networks	  were	   important	   at	   this	   stage.	   These	   developments	  would	   not	   have	   been	   possible	  without	   the	   region’s	   deep	   indigenous	   R&D	   base.	   Seeing	   the	   potential	   for	  productivity	   and	   innovation,	   Chinese	   reformers	   turned	   to	   formalising	   the	   zone,	  thus	  beginning	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  the	  life	  of	  ZGC.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  Wang	  &	  Wang	  (1998);	  Zhao	  (1998).	  250	  Zhou	  (2004).	  251	  Venture	  capitalists	  not	  only	  provide	  money,	  but	  also	  help	  start-­‐ups	  formulate	  business	  strategy,	  assemble	  management	  teams,	  incubate	  promising	  projects	  and	  even	  assist	  in	  daily	  operations	  (Cao	  2004:	  650).	  252	  Wang	  &	  Wang	  (1998).	  253	  Zhou	  (2004),	  p.	  1119.	  254	  Gu	  (1996).	  
	  Page 41	  
ZGC—Formal	  establishment	  of	  experimental	  zone,	  1988–1999	  In	   1986,	   the	   State	   Science	   and	   Technology	   Commission	   investigated	   high-­‐tech	  parks	   in	   other	   countries	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   replicating	   them	   in	   China.	   The	   CAS	  suggested	  making	  full	  use	  of	  the	  technical	  and	  scientific	  expertise	  concentrated	  in	  the	   ZGC	   area	   to	   develop	   a	   high-­‐tech	   region.255	  At	   the	   same	   time	   the	   Beijing	  Government	   began	   research	   into	   the	   establishment	   of	   high-­‐tech	   development	  zones	  in	  China.	  After	  two	  years	  of	  investigation,	  the	  conclusion	  from	  both	  streams	  of	  work	  was	  that	  such	  zones	  were	  necessary	  and	  feasible.256	  This	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  State	  Council’s	  decision	  on	  May	  10,	  1988	  to	  approve	  the	  development	  of	  a	  high-­‐tech	   area	   in	   ZGC,	   designating	   100	   square	   kilometres	   of	   land	   in	   Haidian	  District257	  as	   an	   “experimental	   zone”	   (shiyan	   qu	  试验区).	   The	   State	   Council	   thus	  tentatively	   endorsed	   the	   early	   1980s	   trials	   pioneered	   by	   CAS	   scientists.	   ZGC	  became	   Beijing’s	   first	   formal	   new	   industrial	   district	   built	   largely	   around	  information	  technology.	  
The	  purpose	  of	  the	  formal	  zone	  was	  to	  promote	  direct	  linkages	  between	  research,	  technology	   and	   industry,	   foster	   technological	   and	   economic	   development	   and	  support	   new-­‐technology	   industry.	   In	   its	   1988	   provisional	   regulations258	  for	   the	  experimental	   zone,	   the	   State	   Council	   set	   out	   18	   preferential	   policies	   for	   firms,	  including	  foreign	  multinationals,	   located	  in	  the	  zone.	  Four	  principles	  underpinned	  the	   regulations:	   self-­‐financing,	   self-­‐chosen	   partners,	   self-­‐operation,	   self-­‐responsibility	  for	  profit	  and	  loss.259	  Tax	  reductions	  and	  exemptions	  comprised	  the	  most	  significant	  monetary	  incentives	  for	  locating	  in	  the	  zone,	  including:	  
• A	   reduction	   in	   corporate	   income	   tax	   to	   15%	   (from	   30%)	   for	   new	   high-­‐technology	   firms	   and	   to	   10%	   for	   high-­‐technology	   firms	   with	   exports	  accounting	   for	  more	   than	   40%	   of	   the	   value	   of	   annual	   production	   (Article	  5(1)).	  
• Corporate	   income	   tax	   exemption	   for	   start-­‐up	   new	   technology	   firms	   for	   a	  period	   of	   three	   years	   and,	   with	   approval	   of	   the	   Beijing	   Municipal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  255	  Cao	  (2001).	  256	  Zhao	  (1998),	  p.	  57.	  257	  In	  1991,	  the	  Haidian	  Zone	  extended	  northwest	  to	  the	  Shangdi	  information	  industry	  incubator	  zone.	  Subsequently,	  the	  four	  sub-­‐districts	  of	  the	  ZGC	  were	  set	  up:	  Changping	  Zone	  (1992),	  the	  Fengtai	  Zone	  (1992),	  the	  Yizhuang	  Zone	  (1998)	  and	  the	  Electronics	  Zone	  (1998).	  Note	  that	  during	  this	  phase	  of	  ZGC,	  no	  part	  of	  the	  Beijing	  Economic	  Technological	  Development	  Area	  (the	  BDA),	  approved	  by	  the	  State	  Council	  in	  1994,	  formed	  part	  of	  ZGC.	  258	  State	  Council	  Provisional	  Regulations	  [1988]	  Beizhengfa	  No.	  49.	  259	  Zhao	  (1998),	  p.	  62.	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Government,	  a	  reduction	  in	  corporate	  income	  tax	  by	  half	  in	  the	  subsequent	  three	  years	  (Article	  5(2)).	  
• A	   five-­‐year	   exemption	   from	   construction	   tax	   for	   new	   buildings	   used	   for	  operating	   businesses	   and	   for	   developing	   technologies	   through	   self-­‐financing	  mechanisms	  (Article	  5(4))	  
• In	   return,	   the	   tax	   foregone	   was	   required	   to	   be	   invested	   in	   the	   “National	  Support	  Fund”	  (guojia	  fuzhi	  jijin	  国家扶植基金)	  (Article	  8).	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  tax	  holidays,	  other	  benefits	   included	  exemptions	  from	  import	  licensing,	   concessions	   to	   import	   tariffs,	   simplified	   approval	   processes	   (Article	   7)	  and	  preferential	  foreign	  exchange	  loans	  (Article	  9).	  The	  regulations	  also	  gave	  more	  autonomy	   to	   firms,	   allowing	   them	   to	   set	   their	   own	   prices	   and	   recruit	   their	   own	  university	   graduates	   and	   international	   experts	   (Articles	   13	   and	   14).	   Importantly,	  the	   state	   did	   not	   bear	   any	   responsibility	   for	   their	   failure	   as	   ZGC	   firms	   became	  responsible	  for	  profit	  and	  loss	  (Article	  10).	  They	  operated	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐reliance.	  Finally,	  China’s	  first	  intranet	  connections	  were	  established	  in	  the	  ZGC	  area	  to	  facilitate	  information	  exchange	  among	  companies	  and	  research	  institutes.260	  
The	  regulations	  also	  allowed	   for	  ZGC	   firms	  to	  establish	   investment	  companies	   for	  joint	  ventures	  with	  international	  firms	  (Article	  9),	  engage	  in	  trade,	  and,	  subject	  to	  approval	   from	   the	   relevant	   national	  ministries,	   set	   up	   branches	   offshore	   (Article	  10).	  In	  return	  for	  this	  preferential	  treatment,	  the	  local	  government	  would	  receive	  a	  20	  percent	   share	  of	   the	   foreign	  exchange	  earnings	  after	   the	   third	  year.	  Following	  these	   loosening	  of	   restrictions,	  ZGC	   firms	  began	  entering	   into	   joint	  ventures	  with	  foreign	  companies	  with	  1035	  approved	  by	   the	  end	  of	  1994.261	  Sitong	  Corporation	  entered	   into	   a	   joint	   venture	   with	   Japan’s	   National	   Electronics	   and	   the	   American	  Compay	   Corporation.	   The	   three	   largest	   Chinese	   computer	   related	   companies	  entered	   into	   partnerships	   with	   major	   global	   players:	   STRONG	   High	   Technology	  Development	   Group,	   an	   SOE,	   affiliated	   with	   Japan’s	   National	   Electronics	   and	  Compaq;	   Legend	  Group	   (later	   Lenovo)	   became	   affiliated	  with	   Intel	   and	   Founders	  Group	  and	  set	  up	  its	  own	  company	  in	  Japan.	  	  In	  addition,	  former	  SOEs	  in	  electronics	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  Walcott	  (2003).	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  Wang	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  Wang	  (1998).	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converted	   in	  the	  1990s	  to	  private	  companies	  became	  partners	  with	  major	   foreign	  companies	  such	  as	  Siemens,	  Nokia,	  Motorola,	  Panasonic,	  Altel	  and	  LG.262	  
Lured	   by	   the	   preferential	   policies,	   the	   number	   of	   firms	   in	   ZGC	   rose	   significantly	  over	  the	  period.	  By	  1998,	  slightly	  over	  6,000	  high-­‐tech	  companies	  operated	  within	  Beijing’s	   experimental	   zone,	   compared	   to	   over	   4,000	   high-­‐tech	   firms	   outside	   the	  zone.	   Collectively-­‐owned	   firms	   rose	   from	   around	   300	   in	   1988	   to	   1,500	   in	   1993	  before	   declining	   sharply.263	  	  Meanwhile	   shareholding	   firms	   rose	   quickly	   from	   the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  These	  included	  China’s	  three	  largest	  Chinese	  companies	  which	  began	  to	  produce	   and	   sell	   their	   own	   products.	   As	   was	   the	   case	   during	   the	   pre-­‐1988	  “embryonic”	  phase,	  ZGC’s	  research	  institutes	  continued	  their	  pivotal	  role.	  By	  1999,	  revenue	  from	  firms	  affiliated	  to	  Peking	  and	  Tsinghua	  Universities	  alone	  amounted	  to	  12	  billion	  RMB.264	  	  
Officially	  titled	  “Beijing	  Experimental	  Zone	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  New	  Technology	  Industries,”	   ZGC	   became	   China’s	   first	   national-­‐level	   Science	   and	   Technology	  
Industrial	   Park	   (keji	   gongye	   yuan 科技工业园).	   ZGC’s	   initial	   successes	   lay	   in	  “practices	  giving	  birth	  to	  privately	  run	  technology	  firms	  and	  transforming	  scientific	  achievements.”265	  It	  was	   the	   first	   park	   “to	   establish	  market	   economic	   institutions	  adapted	   to	   socialism	   and	   the	   needs	   of	   high-­‐tech	   industries,	   to	   align	  management	  conventions	   to	   international	   practice…to	   improve	   service	   institutions	   and	  intermediaries	  such	  as	  the	  trading	  of	  industry	  property	  rights…and	  to	  form	  support	  services	   suitable	   for	   high-­‐tech	   industries.”266	  ZGC	   thus	   served	   as	   a	   pioneering	  model	  for	  subsequent	  national	  high-­‐tech	  development	  zones.	  
In	  March	  1991,	   the	   State	  Council	   established	   a	   further	  26	   zones	   as	  national-­‐level	  parks	   by	   way	   of	   a	   notice	   (tongzhi	  通知)	   and	   released	   regulations	   to	   govern	   the	  high-­‐tech	  zones.267	  In	  November	  the	  following	  year	  the	  State	  Council	  approved	  25	  parks	  and	  in	  1997	  set	  up	  Shaanxi’s	  Yangling	  Agriculture	  Development	  Zone.268	  The	  local	   names	   vary	   by	   designation,	   but	   the	   53	   are	   considered	   a	   group	  with	   similar	  characteristics	  in	  official	  state	  documents.	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  Walcott	  (2003).	  263	  Zhou	  (2004).	  264	  High-­‐tech	  firms	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  80	  percent	  of	  this	  figure	  (Chen	  &	  Kenney	  2006).	  265	  Zhao	  (1998),	  p.	  44.	  This	  and	  other	  translations	  from	  Chinese	  language	  source	  materials	  are	  those	  of	  the	  author.	  266	  Ibid.,	  p.	  45	  (author’s	  translation).	  267	  State	  Council	  Notice	  [1991]	  Guofa	  No.	  12.	  268	  Gu	  Yue.	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The	   set	   of	   national	   science	   parks	  was	   launched	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Torch	   Program	   to	  encourage	  the	  establishment	  of	  indigenous	  high-­‐tech	  companies.	  The	  primary	  goal	  of	  the	  programme	  was	  to	  bridge	  the	  previously	  isolated	  domains	  of	  academia	  and	  business.	   The	   rationale	   was	   also	   grounded	   in	   a	   recognition	   of	   “the	   lack	   of	  institutions	  that	  would	  support	  new-­‐	  and	  high-­‐technology	  firm	  formation	  and	  other	  mechanisms	   of	   technological	   diffusion”.269	  As	   part	   of	   the	   scheme’s	   institutional	  framework,	   the	   government	   encouraged	   universities	   and	   research	   institutes	   to	  create	   spin-­‐off	   companies	  and	   technology-­‐based	  business	   incubators.270	  In	   setting	  up	   the	   programme,	   Chinese	   reformers	   sought	   to	   use	   Western	   models	   of	  geographically	  configured	  cluster	  development.271	  
The	   initial	   pulling	   power	   of	   ZGC’s	   preferential	   policies	   became	   diluted	   as	   the	  national	   regulations	   for	   the	   science	   parks	   contained	   similar	   provisions	   to	   those	  already	  applying	  to	  ZGC.	  However,	  ZGC	  continued	  to	  be	  governed	  separately	  by	  the	  1988	  provisional	  regulations	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   investment	   in	   fixed	  assets	  and	  foreign	   exchange	   for	   which	   the	   wider	   regulations	   applied. 272 	  While	   similar	  preferences	  were	   applied	   to	   the	   other	   science	   parks,	   the	   preference	   accorded	   to	  ZGC	  firms	  was	  greater.	  For	   instance,	   the	  eligibility	  criteria	   for	  benefiting	   from	  the	  10	  percent	  corporate	   income	   tax	  rate	  were	   looser	   for	  ZGC	   firms.273	  Start-­‐up	   firms	  benefited	  from	  tax	  breaks	  for	  three	  years	  in	  ZGC,	  but	  only	  two	  years	  elsewhere.	  Nor	  did	  new	  firms	  in	  other	  science	  parks	  benefit	  from	  tax	  breaks	  in	  years	  four	  to	  six.274	  	  
In	  effect,	  Chinese	  reformers	  thus	  continued	  to	  single	  out	  ZGC	  in	  its	  treatment.	  The	  State	  Council	  did	  not	  decide	   the	  area	  or	  general	   scope	  of	   the	  other	  parks,	   instead	  empowering	   the	   National	   Science	   Committee	   to	   take	   decisions.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  State	  Council	  determined	   the	  overall	   scope	  and	  area	  of	  ZGC,	  but	   left	   the	   “detailed	  scope”	   (juti	   fanwei	  具体范围)	   such	   as	   the	   list	   of	   new	   technologies	   to	   the	   Beijing	  Government	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  National	   Science	  and	  Technology	  Committee.	  The	  Beijing	  municipal	  government	  subsequently	  released	  “measures”	  (banfa	  办法)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  269	  Hu,	  A.	  (2007).	  270	  The	  Torch	  Programme	  specified	  criteria	  for	  the	  licensing	  of	  spin-­‐off	  companies,	  established	  tax	  incentives	  and	  other	  preferential	  policies,	  and	  recognised	  intellectual	  property	  in	  evaluating	  proposed	  spin-­‐off	  companies	  (Gu	  1996).	  Incubators	  provide	  external	  sources	  of	  R&D	  and	  other	  essential	  business	  services,	  including	  physical	  facilities	  and	  sometimes	  equipment.	  271	  Walcott	  (2003).	  272	  State	  Council	  Notice	  [1991]	  Guofa	  No.	  12,	  Point	  5.	  273	  ZGC	  firms	  with	  export	  values	  exceeding	  40	  percent	  of	  their	  value	  of	  annual	  production	  could	  benefit	  from	  an	  income	  tax	  rate	  of	  10	  percent.	  	  This	  contrasted	  with	  a	  much	  higher	  70	  percent	  threshold	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  other	  parks.	  274	  Firms	  in	  the	  other	  science	  parks	  with	  revenue	  less	  than	  300,000	  RMB	  were	  not	  required	  to	  pay	  income	  tax.	  This	  was	  a	  new	  provision	  not	  extended	  to	  ZGC.	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specifying	   the	   scope	   of	   new	   technology	   and	   products	   and	   further	   details	   on	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   regulations.275	  These	   later	   formed	   the	   basis	   for	   MOST’s	  criteria	   on	   the	   constitution	   of	   high-­‐tech	   industries. 276 	  The	   Management	  Commission	  of	  ZGC	  handles	  affairs	  such	  as	   licensing,	   taxation,	   international	   trade,	  finance	  and	  investment,	  employment,	  and	  intellectual	  property	  for	  new-­‐tech	  firms.	  It	   also	   determines	   which	   firms	   qualify	   for	   State	   Scientific	   and	   Technological	  Loans.277	  
The	   most	   important	   institutional	   innovation	   to	   have	   emerged	   from	   the	  experimental	   zone	   related	   to	   ownership	   reform.	   Legend,	   one	   of	   the	   original	   ZGC	  spin-­‐off	   companies	   from	   CAS,	   began	   distributing	   profits	   as	   dividends	   among	  employees	   in	  1994	   following	  approval	  by	  CAS.	  Five	  years	   later	  Legend	  converted	  its	   dividend	   distribution	   rights	   into	   stock	   options	   and	   implemented	   an	   employee	  stock-­‐option	   scheme.	   The	   company’s	   conversion	   to	   a	   corporation	   made	   the	  managerial	   team	   clearly	   responsible	   for	   the	   success	   of	   the	   company.278	  Stone,	  another	   of	   ZGC’s	   pioneering	   firms	   solved	   its	   ownership	   problem,	   i.e.	   unclear	  ownership	   rights,	   by	   developing	   a	   management	   buy-­‐out	   scheme	   in	   1999.	   It	  therefore	   served	   as	   an	   example	   for	   the	   separation	   of	   ownership	   rights	   from	  management	  rights.279	  These	  precedents	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  a	  gradual	  acceleration	  of	   restructuring,	  especially	   in	  small-­‐scale	   industry.280	  Another	   first	   for	  ZGC	  during	  this	  period	  was	  the	  first	  establishment	  of	  Customs	  facilities	  inside	  a	  high-­‐tech	  zone	  in	  December	  1995.281	  
ZGC—Science	  and	  Technology	  Park,	  1999–2009	  After	   its	   11-­‐year	   stint	   as	   an	   “experimental	   zone,”	   ZGC	   became	   a	   “science	   and	  technology	  park”	  in	  1999.	  The	  ZGC	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Park	  was	  proclaimed	  to	  be	  of	   equal	   significance	   to	   the	   two	  other	   flagships	   of	   Chinese	   reform,	  namely	   the	  developments	  of	  the	  special	  economic	  zone	  in	  Shenzhen	  and	  the	  Pudong	  district	  in	  Shanghai.282	  The	  specific	  objective	  was	  for	  ZGC	  to	  become	  China’s	  Silicon	  Valley	  as	  part	   of	   the	   government’s	   attempt	   to	   move	   the	   Chinese	   economy	   further	   up	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  275	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Government	  Provisional	  Measures	  [1988];	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Government	  Implementation	  Measures	  [1988]	  Beizhengfa	  No.	  57.	  276	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Notice	  [2000],	  Guokafa	  huozi	  No.	  324.	  277	  Tan	  (2006).	  278	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p	  323.	  279	  Cao	  (2001).	  280	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  324.	  281	  China	  Customs	  Zhongguancun	  Website.	  282	  Zhou	  (2004).	  
	  Page 46	  
value	   chain	   from	   imitation	   and	   import-­‐substitution	   to	   innovation	   and	  knowledge.283	  
On	  May	  26	  1999	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	  government	  submitted	  a	  report	  to	  the	  State	  Council	   “requesting	   instructions”	   (qingshi	   请示 )	   on	   the	   speeding	   up	   of	   the	  construction	  of	  ZGC	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Park.	  The	  report	  contained	  details	  of	  the	  strategic	  direction,	  objectives,	  main	  areas	  of	  work	  and	  plans	  of	  ZGC.	  The	  State	  Council,	  on	  5	  July,	  responded	  to	  the	  Beijing	  government	  and	  MOST,	  agreeing	  to	  the	  principles	  outlined	  in	  the	  report.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  State	  Council	  set	  out	  general	  expectations:	  
For	  ZGC	  to	  act	  as	  a	  model	  example	  for	  the	  development	  of	  national	  new	  and	  high-­‐tech	   industries,	   [the	   People’s	   Government	   of	   Beijing	   Municipality	   and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology]	  must	  take	  note	  of	  and	  borrow	  from	  international	   experience	   in	   constructing	   science	   cities	   and	   establish	   ZGC	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Park	  with	  Chinese	  characteristics…The	  construction	  of	   ZGC	   Science	   and	  Technology	  Park	  must	   start	   out	   from	   the	   reality	   on	   the	  ground	  in	  ZGC	  and	  from	  the	  current	  conditions	  in	  China	  and	  carefully	  gather	  up	   the	   experiences	   and	   lessons	   from	   previous	   new	   and	   high-­‐technology	  industry	   development	   zones.	   ZGC	   must	   display	   dominance	   and	   unique	  characteristics…There	  must	  be	  a	  favourable	  environment	  for	  bold	  reform	  and	  daring	   innovation	  which	   attracts	   and	   brings	   together	   outstanding	   business	  operators	   and	   science	   and	   technology	   professionals…ZGC	   must	   persist	   in	  opening	  up	  towards	  other	  zones	  in	  China	  and	  overseas	  and	  also	  promote	  its	  own	  development	   through	  competition.	  The	  park	  must	  closely	   follow	   in	   the	  tracks	   of	   global	   trends	   in	   the	   development	   of	   high-­‐technology,	   be	   oriented	  towards	  the	  market	  and	  actively	  development	  new-­‐	  and	  high-­‐tech	  industries,	  including	   the	   software	   industry	   as	   well	   as	   biotechnology	   and	  pharmaceuticals….The	  work	  in	  establishing	  ZGC	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Park	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  People’s	  Government	  of	  Beijing	  Municipality	  which	  must	   strengthen	   its	   leadership,	   develop	   an	   overall	   plan	   and	   organize	   the	  park…284	  Following	   these	   general	   guidelines	   from	   the	   State	   Council,	   the	   Beijing	   municipal	  government	   issued	  a	   set	  of	   regulations	   for	   “ZGC	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Park”	   in	  December	   2001	   which	   took	   effort	   on	   1	   January	   2001. 285 	  While	   the	   word	  experimental	  was	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  zone’s	  formal	  title,	  the	  regulations	  clearly	  made	  reference	  to	  ZGC’s	  ongoing	  role	  as	  an	  experimental	  area.	  Article	  Four	  stipulated:	  
Zhongguancun	   Science	   and	   Technology	   Park	   is	   an	   experimental	   zone	   for	  comprehensive	   reform	   to	   push	   ahead	  with	   the	   strategy	   of	   invigorating	   the	  country	  through	  science	  and	  education	  and	  to	  develop	  a	  market	  economy.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  a	  base	  for	  the	  demonstration	  of	  national	  scientific	  and	  technological	  innovations,	   the	   incubation	   and	   diffusion	   of	   science	   and	   technology	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  283	  Hu	  &	  Mathews	  (2008).	  284	  State	  Council	  Reply	  [1999]	  Guohan	  No.	  45	  (author’s	  translation).	  285	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Government	  Regulations	  [2000]	  No.	  25.	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achievements,	   and	   the	   nurturing	   of	   high-­‐tech	   industrialisation	   as	   well	   as	  innovative	  talent.286	  The	   regulations	   contained	   first-­‐time	   articles	   on	   protecting	   enterprises’	   assets	  (Article	   7)	   and	   allowed	   ZGC	   firms	   to	   pursue	   undefined	   commercial	   interests,	   so	  long	  as	  law	  did	  not	  forbid	  the	  actions.	  The	  Beijing	  government	  also	  encouraged	  the	  establishment	   of	   a	   venture	   capital	   market	   for	   SMEs	   through	   the	   allocation	   of	  funding	   and	   equity	   shares	   as	  well	   as	   low-­‐interest	   loans	   (Articles	   28–30).	   Finally,	  the	   regulations	   contained	   a	   number	   of	   articles	   to	   protect	   intellectual	   property	  rights	  (Articles	  39–45).	  	  
Article	   32	   granted	   unprecedented	   flexibility	   with	   respect	   to	   Beijing’s	   rigid	  household	   registration	   system.	   Companies	   in	   ZGC	   could	   hire	   college	   graduates	  regardless	  of	  their	  original	  household	  registration.	  	  This	  was	  a	  landmark	  change	  for	  a	  city	  that	  had	  practised	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  restricted	  migration	  controls	  for	  forty	  years.287	  In	  the	  first	  year	  alone,	  ZGC	  firms	  hired	  5000	  college	  graduates	  with	  non-­‐Beijing	  household	  status.	  Without	  the	  law,	  all	  such	  graduates	  would	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  leave	  Beijing	  after	  graduation.288	  
Besides	  the	  specific	  provisions	  outlined	  above,	  1999	  marked	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  the	   life	   of	   ZGC.	   Prior	   to	   1999,	   ZGC	   had	   operated	   predominantly	   independently.	  However,	   in	  1999,	   the	  ZGC	  Administrative	  Committee	  was	  raised	   to	  a	   level	  above	  that	   of	   the	   government	   of	   an	   urban	   district	   so	   that	   it	   was	   directly	   under	   the	  municipal	  government	  of	  Beijing,	  giving	  ZGC	  closer	  ties	  to	  the	  State	  Council.289	  The	  promotion	   meant	   that	   ZGC	   firms	   “hold	   a	   far	   more	   influential	   position	   in	   the	  policymaking	  of	  the	  central	  state	  than	  previously	  possible.”290	  It	  also	  means	  that	  the	  government’s	   role	   in	   the	   park	   is	   more	   “intrusive	   and	   omnipresent”.291	  While	   the	  ZGC	   Administrative	   Committee	   has	   “followed	   a	   strict	   policy	   of	   not	   interfering	   in	  companies	   that	   they	   serve,” 292 	  it	   has	   adopted	   specific	   policies	   for	   different	  industries.293	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The	   increased	   eye	   of	   China’s	   top	   leadership	   became	  more	   evident	   in	   2005	  when	  Wen	   Jiabao	  on	   an	   “inspection”	   (shicha	  视察)	   of	   ZGC	   issued	   four	   requirements	   for	  the	  development	  of	  China’s	  new	  and	  high-­‐tech	  parks.294	  
(i)	   Their	   fundamental	  mission	   has	   always	   been	   to	   develop	   new	   and	  high-­‐tech	  industries	  and	  build	  capacities	  in	  indigenous	  innovation.	  (ii)	  Their	   goal	   is	   to	   grow	   internationally	   competitive	   new	   and	   high-­‐tech	  industries,	   deepen	   institutional	   reform	   and	   build	   the	   ‘soft	  environment.’	   (iii)	   They	  must	   persist	   in	   travelling	   along	   the	   road	   of	  intensifying	  development	  in	  a	  reasonable	  manner.	  (iv)	  They	  must,	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   established	   policies,	   earnestly	   resolve	   the	   development	  difficulties	  and	  problems	  of	  national	  high-­‐tech	  zones.295	  Subsequent	  to	  the	  Premier’s	  visit,	  the	  State	  Council	  published	  “The	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	   concerning	   Policy	   Measures	   to	   Support	   the	   Strengthening	   of	   Beijing	  Zhongguancun	   Science	   and	   Technology	   Park”	   in	   August	   2005	   which	   contained	  eight	   concrete	   policy	   measures.	   These	   included	   singling	   out	   specific	   items	   to	  promote:	   computer	   software	   and	   integrated	   circuits;	   new	   generation	   mobile	  communications;	   computers	   and	   the	   Internet;	   digital	   sound	   and	   video;	  photoelectric	  displays;	  and	  biopharmaceuticals.296	  
The	  State	  Council	  also	  decreed	  a	  heavy	  experimentation	  role	  for	  ZGC.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	   the	   State	   Council	   instructed	   ZGC	   to	   launch	   and	   carry	   out	   specific	   trials	   in	  venture	   capital,	   share	   transfer	   systems,	   property	   rights	   reforms	   for	   nationalised	  firms	   and	   spin-­‐off	   companies,	   and	   government	   and	   defence	   procurement.	   The	  minutes	  stipulated	  that	  the	  General	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	   oversight	   of	   the	   policy	   measures.	   The	   substance	   of	   these	   minutes	   was	  disseminated	  by	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	  government	  in	  December	  through	  guidance	  (yijian	  意见)	   which	   contained	   further	   prescriptions	   and	   details,	   including	   on	   the	  specific	   products	   mentioned	   by	   the	   State	   Council	   and	   on	   the	   trials	   relating	   to	  property	  rights	  reform.297	  
The	   guidance	   from	   the	   Premier	   and	   the	   State	   Council	   quickly	   led	   to	   institutional	  innovation.	   The	   most	   ground-­‐breaking	   experiment	   was	   ZGC’s	   establishment	   of	  China’s	  first	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  stock	  trading	  pilot	  programme	  in	  2006,	  known	  as	  the	  ZGC	   Stocks	   Quotation	   and	   Transfer	   system.298	  The	   trading	   system	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electronic	   financing	   platform	   for	   non-­‐listed	   start-­‐up	   companies	   to	   raise	   funds,	  improving	   a	   company’s	   financing	   ability.	   The	   system	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   “the	   third	  market”	   given	   its	   importance	   alongside	   the	   main	   board	   and	   the	   SME	   board.299	  Firms	  that	  have	  traded	  on	  the	  “third	  board”	  were	  expected	  to	  gain	  easier	  access	  to	  the	   Shanghai	   or	   Shenzhen	   stock	   exchanges.	   The	   pilot	   scheme	   is	   a	   fundamental	  component	  of	  building	  a	  multi-­‐level	  capital	  market	  in	  China.	  
However,	   institutional	  innovation	  was	  not	  only	  spurred	  by	  the	  2005	  State	  Council	  directives,	   but	   had	   been	   occurring	   spontaneously,	   as	   the	   history	   of	   ZGC	   might	  suggest.	   For	   instance,	   in	   2001,	   a	   professional	   incubator	   company,	   Tsinghua	  Business	   Incubator	   Co/	   (THBI)	   was	   set	   up	   in	   the	   park	   to	   help	   start-­‐ups	   secure	  financial	   support,	   including	   venture	   capital	   from	   various	   companies,	   loans	   from	  banks,	   government	   funding	   and	   a	  RMB200	  million	   investment	   fund	   for	   returning	  students	   from	   overseas.	   In	   addition,	   it	   provides	   concessions,	   including	   free	  incubation	   space	   for	   the	   first	   year,	   preferential	   rents	   for	   the	   first	   two	   years,	  introductions	   to	   professional	   consulting	   services,	   and	   assistance	   in	   networking	  with	  various	  institutions	  and	  organizations.	   	  In	  2003,	  THBI	  incubated	  70	  start-­‐ups	  and	  27	  graduated.300	  
During	   this	  period,	   ZGC	   continued	   its	   expansion.	   In	  1999,	  ZGC	   counted	  68	  higher	  education	  organisations	  and	  213	  research	  institutes	  universities.301	  As	  of	  2004,	  CAS	  had	   invested	   in	  and	  spun	  off	  more	   than	  400	  high-­‐tech	  enterprises,	  eight	  of	  which	  had	   been	   publicly	   listed.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   2005,	   ZGC	   boasted	   one	   third	   of	   China’s	  national	  laboratories	  and	  accounted	  for	  one	  fifth	  of	  China’s	  total	  R&D	  expenditure.	  In	   2006,	   further	   parks	   were	   added	   bringing	   the	   total	   to	   ten	   science	   parks.	  Zhongguancun	  thus	  became	  known	  as	  “one	  zone	  with	  ten	  parks”	  (yiqu	  shiyuan	  一区
十园).302	  Its	  predominant	  place	  in	  China’s	  innovation	  system	  remained	  unparalleled.	  In	  2007,	  ZGC	  accounted	  for	  18%	  of	  Beijing’s	  GDP,	  and	  accounted	  for	  one	  seventh	  of	  all	   income	   generated	   from	   China’s	   54	   high-­‐tech	   zones.303	  	   The	   annual	   revenue	   of	  more	  than	  800	  ZGC	  firms	  exceeded	  100	  million	  RMB	  and	  106	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  stock	  exchange,	  the	  highest	  of	  any	  national	  park.304	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  299	  China	  Daily	  (2010).	  300	  Chen	  &	  Kenney	  (2006).	  301	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Government	  Request	  for	  Instructions	  [1999].	  Jingzhengwen	  No.	  35.	  302	  ZGC	  website	  (2012).	  303	  Zhang,	  Y.	  (2008).	  304	  Ibid.	  
	  Page 50	  
ZGC—National	  Innovation	  Demonstration	  Zone,	  2009–	  The	  final	  stage	  of	  ZGC	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  State	  Council’s	  approval	  to	  establish	  the	  “Zhongguancun	  National	   Innovation	  Demonstration	  Zone”	   in	  March	  2009.305	  As	   in	  1999,	   the	   State	   Council	   set	   out	   general	   expectations	   and	   directives,	   stressing	  indigenous	   innovation,	   internationally	   competitive	   innovative	   firms	   and	  internationally	  recognised	  brands.	  The	  State	  Council	  required	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	  government	   and	   MOST	   “to	   display	   the	   advantages	   of	   innovative	   resources,	  accelerate	   reform	   and	   development…”306	  ZGC’s	   role	   as	   an	   experimental	   zone	  was	  reaffirmed	  with	  the	  State	  Council	  requesting	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	  government	   to	  “launch	   a	   trial	   on	   stockholder	   rights”	   and	   “strengthen	   innovative	   trials	   to	   reform	  the	  financing	  of	  science	  and	  technology.”307	  
The	  State	  Council	  also	  broadened	  the	  remit	  of	  ZGC.	  It	  instructed	  ZGC	  to	  participate	  in	   national	   science	   and	   technology	   projects,	   placing	   emphasis	   on	   the	   following	  areas:	   electronics	   and	   information,	   biotechnology	   and	   pharmaceuticals,	   aviation	  and	   space	   flight,	   new	   materials,	   clean	   energy,	   modern	   agriculture,	   and	   energy-­‐saving	   and	   emission	   reduction.	   This	   represented	   a	   marked	   expansion	   of	   the	  activities	   in	   ZGC,	   whose	  main	   activities	   had	   hitherto	   been	   in	   the	   field	   of	   IT.	   The	  State	  Council	  instructed,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	  government	  and	  MOST	  to	  implement	   tax	   policy	   to	   support	   indigenous	   innovation	   and	   to	   use	   procurement	  policy	   to	  support	   the	  zone.	   It	  also	  established	  an	   inter-­‐departmental	  coordination	  group	   to	   “support	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   national	   demonstration	   zone,	  implement	   the	   stipulated	   policy	   measures	   and	   research	   and	   resolve	   the	   large	  development	  problems.”308	  
The	  State	  Council	  has	  continued	  its	  primordial	  role.	  It	  approved	  ZGC’s	  development	  plan	   for	   2011–2020.	   The	   plan	   set	   out	   new	  measures	   and	   pilot	   programmes	   and	  contained	   plans	   to	   grow	   ZGC	   revenues	  more	   than	   six-­‐fold	   by	   2020.309	  Within	   the	  framework	  of	  the	  plan,	  special	  funds	  have	  been	  allocated	  to	  ZGC.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	   government	   and	   four	   central	   government	  ministries,	   including	  the	   Ministry	   of	   Finance	   and	   the	   National	   Development	   and	   Reform	   Commission	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agreed	   to	   support	   the	   service	   industry	   in	   ZGC	   to	   the	   tune	   of	   3	   billion	   RMB	   over	  three	  years.310	  
Subsequent	   to	   the	   State	   Council’s	   directives,	   the	   Beijing	   municipal	   government	  issued	   a	   set	   of	   regulations	   for	   ZGC,311	  which	   replaced	   those	   issued	   in	   December	  2000.	   Compared	   to	   the	   previous	   regulations,	   the	   revised	   regulations	   focused	  extensively	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   innovation;	   the	   transfer	   of	   knowledge	   between	  higher	  education	  organisations,	  research	  institutes	  and	  firms;	  and	  the	  international	  competitiveness	   of	   innovative	   firms.	   They	   also	   reaffirmed	   ZGC’s	   role	   in	  experimentation	  and	  comprehensive	  reform.	  For	  instance,	  Article	  Nine	  encouraged	  organisations	   and	   individuals	   carrying	   out	   activities	   in	   ZGC	   to	   “take	   the	   lead	   in	  experimenting”	   (xian	   xing	   xian	   shi	  先行先试)	   with	   systems	   and	   institutions	   for	  indigenous	  innovation.	  
ZGC’s	   role	   in	   experimentation	   appears	   to	   have	   stepped	   up	   a	   notch	   since	   the	  Demonstration	  Zone	  status.	  A	  more	  top-­‐down	  approach	  to	  pilot	  schemes	  and	  trail	  programmes	   has	   emerged.	   Various	   government	   agencies	   have	   rolled	   out	   pilot	  programmes	  and	  trials	  specific	  to	  ZGC.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  issued	  a	  two-­‐year	  trial	  policy	  for	  ZGC	  allowing	  expenses	  relating	  to	  employee	  training	  and	  education	   to	   be	   tax	   deductible. 312 	  The	   Ministry	   of	   Finance	   and	   the	   State	  Administration	   of	   Taxation	   issued	   pilot	   policies	   allowing	   high-­‐	   and	   new-­‐tech	  enterprises	  to	  take	  enhanced	  deductions	  for	  R&D	  costs.313	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  established	   a	   3–5	   year	   pilot	   fund	   of	   1.5	   billion	   RMB	   to	   support	   modern	   service	  development	   in	  ZGC.314	  The	  Bank	  of	  China	  designed	  and	   launched	  a	  SME	  financial	  service	  for	  scientific	  and	  technological	  firms.	  315	  	  
The	   success	   of	   the	   ZGC	   trial	   on	   over-­‐the-­‐counter	   trading	   platform	   led	   the	   State	  Council	  in	  August	  2012	  to	  expand	  the	  pilot	  program.316	  The	  State	  Council	  agreed	  to	  extend	  the	  pilot	  zones	  to	  the	  Zhangjiang	  High-­‐tech	  Industrial	  Development	  Zone	  in	  Shanghai,	   the	   Donghu	   High-­‐tech	   Development	   Zone	   in	   Wuhan,317	  and	   the	   Binhai	  High-­‐tech	   Industrial	   Development	   Area.	   As	   part	   of	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   trial,	   the	  China	  Securities	  Regulatory	  Commission	  set	  up	  a	  share	  transfer	  system	  for	  SMEs	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  An	  (2011).	  311	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Government	  Regulations	  [2010]	  No.	  12.	  312	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  Notice	  [2010]	  Caishui	  No.	  82.	  313	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  Notice	  [2010]	  Caishui	  No.	  81.	  314	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  et	  al.	  Notice	  [2011]	  Caijianhan	  No.	  32.	  315	  Bank	  of	  China	  (2011). 316	  Wang	  (2012).	  317	  This	  zone	  became	  China’s	  second	  national	  innovation	  demonstration	  in	  January	  2010.	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bring	  other	  qualified	  industrial	  zones	  under	  the	  pilot	  programme	  and	  offer	  relevant	  services	   for	   unlisted	   companies	   in	   the	   pilot	   zones.	   ZGC	   thus	   continues	   to	   play	   a	  central	  role	  in	  experimenting	  with	  establishing	  an	  innovation-­‐inducing	  institutional	  framework.	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6. Discussion	  
Zhongguancun	  and	  Chinese	  institutions	  Throughout	   China’s	   reform	   era	   ZGC	   has	   served	   as	   a	   hotbed	   for	   institutional	  innovation	   and	   reform	   in	   high-­‐tech	   industries.	   It	   began	   with	   a	   bottom-­‐up,	  spontaneous	   experiment	   in	   creating	   a	   technology-­‐transferred	   firm,	   the	   forefather	  to	  Lenovo	  or	  Legend.	  This	  was	  a	  crucial	  stage	  of	  liberalisation	  in	  China,	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  more	  comprehensive	  liberalisation	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.318	  While	  few	  spinoffs	  have	  been	  successful	  as	  Legend,	  ZGC	   is	  now	  host	   to	  many	  companies	   spun	  out	  of	  the	   high	   concentration	   of	   research	   institutes	   and	   universities.	   The	   park	   has	   also	  spawned	  several	  large	  conglomerates	  with	  upwards	  of	  a	  hundred	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  exchange.	  
Testament	  to	  the	  innovative	  environment	  is	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  firms	  are	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	   enterprises	   producing	   specialised	   products.319	  Returning	   Chinese,	  are	  setting	  up	  many	  such	  firms	  and	  they	  are	  also	  generating	  knowledge	  spillovers	  for	  other	  local	  ZGC	  firms.320	  Almost	  no	  ZGC	  firm	  is	  yet	  at	  the	  technological	  frontier,	  generating	   new-­‐to-­‐market	   innovations,	   but	   the	   number	   of	   innovative	   firms	   is	  steadily	  increasing.	  Further	  bottom-­‐up	  trials	  in	  ownership	  reform	  and	  in	  corporate	  governance	   have	   served	   as	  models	   for	   other	   Chinese	   firms.321	  These	   reforms	   laid	  the	   basis	   for	   the	   pilot	   in	   over-­‐the-­‐counter	   share	   trading	  which	  has	   recently	   been	  rolled	  out	  to	  other	  national	  parks.	  
These	  bottom-­‐up	  experiments	  have	  been	  matched	  by	  top-­‐down	  experiments	  at	  the	  behest	   of	   the	   State	   Council	   and	   the	   Beijing	   municipal	   government.	   The	   very	  establishment	   of	   an	   experimental	   zone	   in	   1988	   came	   with	   unprecedented	  preferential	  policies	   for	  high-­‐tech	   industries,	   in	  particular	   tax	  breaks.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  trial	  led	  to	  ZGC	  serving	  as	  the	  model	  for	  the	  subsequent	  national-­‐level	  high-­‐tech	   zones,	   set	   up	   from	   1991.	   The	   State	   Council’s	   approval	   of	   a	   science	   and	  technology	   park	   in	   ZGC	   in	   1999	   came	   with	   calls	   for	   bold	   reform	   and	   daring	  innovation.	  The	   regulations	   that	   followed	   from	   the	  Beijing	  municipal	   government	  strengthened	   commercial	   interests,	   granted	   unprecedented	   flexibility	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  Naughton	  (2007),	  p.	  360.	  319	  Wang	  &	  Wang	  (1998);	  Tan	  (2006).	  320	  Beijing	  Pindao	  (2004);	  Filatotchev	  et	  al.	  (2011).	  321	  Cao	  (2001);	  Naughton	  (2007),	  pp.	  323–324.	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household	  registration	  system	  and	  supported	  the	  development	  of	  a	  venture	  capital	  market.	  The	  final	  stage	  in	  ZGC	  has	  seen	  further	  top-­‐down	  trials,	  such	  as	  on	  R&D	  tax	  credits	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance.	  
The	  role	  of	   the	  State	  Council	  has	  been	  preeminent	   throughout	   the	  history	  of	  ZGC,	  but	   over	   time	   it	   appears	   to	   be	   playing	   a	  more	   important	   role.	   The	   State	   Council	  exercises	   its	   power	   through	   its	   directives,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   notices,	   minutes	   of	  meetings	  and	  in	  statements	  approving	  projects.	  Leaders	  also	  exercise	  their	  power	  through	  speeches,	  such	  as	  that	  given	  by	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  in	  2005	  in	  ZGC.	  Unlike	  regulations,	   these	  do	  not	  constitute	   law	  and	  are	   thus	  not	   formal	   institutions.	  This	  forces	  bureaucrats	   to	   study	   and	  discuss	   the	   speeches	   and	  writings	  of	   top	   leaders	  which	  lay	  out	  the	  desired	  course	  of	  public	  policy	  and	  explain	  what	  lower	  levels	  of	  officialdom	  should	  and	  should	  not	  do.322	  
The	  State	  Council’s	  guidance	  for	  ZGC	  has	  become	  more	  prescriptive	  over	  time,	  now	  specifying	   particular	   sectors	   and	   products	   for	   ZGC.	   It	   has	   also	   instructed	   ZGC	   to	  carry	  out	  specific	  trials	  in	  recent	  years,	  whereas	  in	  the	  early	  years	  the	  experiments	  were	  bottom-­‐up.	  The	   instructions	  given	  by	   the	  State	  Council	  are	   then	  reflected	   in	  formal	   regulations,	   which	   in	   the	   case	   of	   ZGC	   have	   been	   issued	   by	   the	   Beijing	  municipal	  government.	  The	  exception	  was	   in	  1988	  when	   the	  State	  Council	   issued	  the	   regulations	   on	   the	   experimental	   zone.	   As	   ZGC	   has	   turned	   into	   a	   national	  demonstration	   zone,	   there	   are	   concerns	   that	   ZGC	   may	   resemble	   the	   Maoist	  campaigns	  to	  “learn	  from	  Daqing	  and	  Dazhai.”	  These	  cities	  were	  set	  up	  as	  “models”	  for	  Chinese	  industry	  and	  agriculture,	  but	  were	  singled	  out	  for	  political	  purposes	  as	  showcases.323	  Because	   of	   its	   singular	   status	   as	   a	   national	   icon,	   criticism	  of	   ZGC	   is	  not	  tolerated	  by	  the	  park’s	  administrators	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  company	  officers.324	  
The	   formal	   regulations	   governing	   ZGC	   have	   emphasised	   the	   protection	   of	  intellectual	  property	   since	  2000.	  However,	   the	   lack	  of	   enforcement	  of	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   appears	   to	   be	   inhibiting	   innovation	   and	   collaboration.	   ZGC’s	  software	   industry	   finds	   it	   difficult	   to	   survive	   owing	   to	   rampant	   piracy.325	  For	  instance,	   pirated	   copies	   of	   the	   Chinese	   version	   of	  Windows	   have	   taken	   away	   the	  market	   of	   an	   indigenously	   developed	   Chinese	   language	   platform,	   a	   ground	   upon	  which	   many	   ZGC	   firms	   had	   first	   established	   their	   foothold.	   As	   the	   legal	   system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  322	  Brandt	  &	  Rawski	  (2008),	  p.	  16.	  323	  Cao	  (2004).	  324	  Ibid.	  325	  Zhou	  (2004).	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protecting	   intellectual	   property	   has	   not	   been	   well	   established,	   the	   transfer	   of	  technological	   know-­‐how	   often	   involves	   “endless	   lawsuits	   between	   state-­‐owned	  institutions	  and	   their	   former	  employees	  working	   in	   the	   independent	  spin-­‐offs.”326	  That	  said,	  multinationals	  are	  continuing	  to	  undertake	  R&D	  in	  ZGC	  as	  strong	  internal	  linkages	  among	  technologies	  enable	  them	  to	  appropriate	  value	  from	  R&D,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  inadequate	  external	  IP	  protection.327	  
More	   and	  more	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   the	   venture	   capital	  market	   and	   other	  financial	  market	  innovations	  in	  ZGC.	  However,	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  and	  transparency	  in	  governance	   structures	   increases	   risk	   for	   venture	   capitalists.328	  Second,	   limited	  partnerships	   are	   taxed	   as	   either	   individuals	   or	   corporations,	   which	   discourages	  venture	   investment.	   	   Venture	   capitalists	   are	   forced	   to	   rely	   on	   “over-­‐the-­‐counter	  property-­‐rights	   exchanges	   to	   conduct	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions,	   which	   in	   most	  cases	  would	  not	  maximize	  their	  return	  on	  investment.”329	  The	  venture	  capital	  funds	  set	  aside	  by	  the	  government	  have	  been	  used	  to	  support	  risk-­‐averse	  projects	  or	  are	  put	  into	  the	  stock	  market	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  technology-­‐intensive	  start-­‐ups.330	  Non-­‐government	   firms	   struggle	   to	   secure	   capital.	   Moreover,	   the	   Chinese	   government	  sponsors	  many	  foreign	  venture	  capitalists.331	  
ZGC	  has	  undoubtedly	  led	  to	  institutional	  innovations	  in	  corporate	  governance,	  but	  murkiness	  still	  surrounds	  certain	  aspects	  of	  ownership.	  	  Reform	  is	  required	  around	  the	  distribution	  of	  ownership	  of	  spinoffs	  to	  the	  parties,	  the	  definition	  of	  employees	  within	  a	   firm,	  and	   the	  quantification	  of	  employee	  contributions.332	  The	  ownership	  of	   spin-­‐off	   firms	   is	   particularly	   unclear	   and	   can	   result	   in	   conflicts	   regarding	   the	  remittances	   the	   spin-­‐offs	   should	   provide	   to	   their	   mother	   institutions.	   Founder	  Group	   company’s	   first	   president	   was	   fired	   by	   Peking	   University	   because	   of	   his	  unwillingness	   to	   increase	   payments	   to	   levels	   that	   the	   university	   felt	   were	  “reasonable.”333	  These	  problems	  may	  account	  for	  why	  university-­‐affiliated	  spin-­‐offs	  are	  less	  productive	  and	  export	  less	  than	  non-­‐affiliated	  firms.334	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Despite	  the	  calls	  for	  indigenous	  innovation,	  ZGC	  primarily	  serves	  as	  a	  distribution,	  processing	  and	  trading	  centre	  for	  foreign	  information	  technology	  companies,	  with	  limited	   indigenous	   innovation. 335 	  The	   literature	   on	   innovation	   emphasises	  collaboration	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  bottom-­‐up,	  informal	  networks	  for	  generating	  innovation.336	  These	  personal	  networks,	  dependent	  on	  trust,	  emerge	  because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  getting	  the	  right	  information	  at	  the	  right	  time.	  They	  also	  overcome	  the	  limitations	   of	   contractual	   arrangements	   that	   restrict	   collaboration.	   Research	   on	  collaboration	  in	  ZGC,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  informal	  personal	  networks	  are	  not	  a	  factor	   behind	   success	   in	   innovation	   projects	   in	   ZGC.337	  Scholars	   have	   noted	   that	  local	   firms	   source	   production	   factors	   mainly	   from	   outside	   and	   the	   branches	   of	  multinational	   firms	   located	   in	   the	   park	   have	  much	   stronger	   links	   outside	   ZGC.338	  Studies	  of	  other	  zones	  in	  China	  have	  also	  found	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  cooperation.339	  
One	  explanation	  for	  the	  general	  weakness	  of	  networks	  in	  ZGC	  lies	  in	  the	  regulatory	  framework	   governing	   ZGC.	   For	   instance,	   there	   is	   no	   history	   of	   contract	   law.	   If	  contracts	   are	   violated	   or	   firms	   are	   cheated,	   the	   victim	  must	   assume	   full	   costs	   to	  right	   the	   wrongs. 340 	  This	   high	   risk	   associated	   with	   external	   transactions	  discourages	  flexible	  network	  arrangements.	  Another	  explanation	  for	  the	  tendency	  to	   shun	   collaboration	   lies	   in	   historic	   factors.	   In	   the	   planned	   economy,	   Chinese	  enterprises	   internalised	  everything	   from	  supply	   chains	   to	  providing	  welfare	   such	  as	   housing	   and	   daycare	   for	   their	   employees.	   Accordingly,	   “Chinese	   society	   has	  developed	   few	   mechanisms	   to	   facilitate	   transactions	   among	   enterprises	   as	   most	  market	   economies	   do.”341	  The	   corruption	   and	   irregularities	   in	   the	   use	   of	   legal	  systems	   undermines	   trust	   and	   consequently	   innovation	   and	   learning	   across	  organisational	  borders.342	  
The	   heavy	   role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   spin-­‐off	   companies	  may	   also	   be	   inhibiting	   the	  effect	   of	   networks	   in	   ZGC.	   Informal	   exchanges	   seem	   “not	   to	   be	   increasing	   any	  chance	  of	  cooperation	  for	   innovation,	  probably	  because	  many	  firms	  spun	  off	   from	  different	   state-­‐owned	   tertiary	   institutions	   and	   have	   maintained	   strong	   relations	  with	   their	   parents	   who	   are	   under	   different	   government	   ministries	   or	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  Cao	  (2004);	  OECD	  (2008),	  p.	  68.	  336	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Granovetter	  (1973);	  MacDonald	  &	  Piekkari	  (2005).	  337	  Ramirez	  &	  Dickenson	  (2010).	  338	  Wang	  &	  Wang	  (1998).	  339	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Wang	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  for	  a	  study	  of	  ICT	  firms	  in	  Shenzhen.	  340	  Zhou	  (2004).	  341	  Ibid.,	  p.	  1128.	  342	  Gu	  &	  Lundvall	  (2006).	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equivalents.”343	  These	   strong	   vertical	   ties	   with	   the	   state-­‐owned	   parents	   work	  against	  the	  formation	  of	  networking	  among	  new	  innovative	  firms.	  While	  ZGC	  firms	  still	  rely	  heavily	  on	  university-­‐trained	  employees,	  laboratories	  and	  faculty,344	  most	  cooperation	   between	   scientists	   and	   businesspersons	   in	   ZGC	   has	   proven	  unsuccessful. 345 	  The	   disjuncture	   between	   industry	   and	   academia	   remains	  significant	  with	  research	  institutes	  acting	  as	  “by-­‐standers	  rather	  than	  the	  leaders	  of	  innovation	  and	  technology	  transfer.”346	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  collaboration,	  informal	  networks	  and	  inter-­‐firm	  linkages	  are	  absent	   in	   ZGC.	   Information	   exchange	   in	   ZGC	   occurs	   through	   periodicals	   and	  nonprofit	   organisations,	   such	   as	   the	   Beijing	   High-­‐tech	   Firms	   Association. 347	  Academic	   and	   alumni	   networks	   are	   also	   powerful	   networks. 348 	  Collaboration	  between	   ZGC	   firms	   and	  multinationals	   is	   particularly	   strong,	   which	   is	   increasing	  the	   innovative	   capacities	   of	   local	   firms.349	  Research	   has	   found	   that	   foreign	   R&D,	  mostly	   from	  US	   and	   Japanese	   firms,	   has	   raised	   the	  domestic	   value	   added	  of	   local	  Chinese	  firms	  in	  ZGC.350	  This	  effect	  is	  greater	  when	  the	  local	  ZGC	  firms	  have	  greater	  absorptive	  capacities.	  The	  R&D	  activities	  of	  multinationals	  has	  also	  been	   found	  to	  enhance	   the	   clustering	   of	   domestic	   firms	   in	   ZGC	   by	   promoting	   the	   relocation	   of	  existing	   firms	   and	   stimulating	   entrepreneurship.351	  Symbiotic	   partnerships	   form	  where	   local	   firms	   are	   able	   to	   dominate	   the	   distribution	   channels	   while	   the	  multinationals	  dominate	  the	  technology.352	  MNCs	  thus	  help	  knit	  Chinese	  firms	  into	  global	  production	  networks	  of	  high-­‐tech	  items.	  
Since	  the	  late	  1980s,	  branch	  organisations	  of	  local	  ZGC	  firms	  have	  “flown”	  to	  other	  Chinese	  regions	  to	   take	  advantage	  of	   lower	  costs	  and	  to	  seek	  greater	   flexibility	   in	  their	   business	   operations.	   ZGC	   entrepreneurs	   frequently	   cite	   a	   Chinese	   proverb	  “The	  farther	  away	  from	  the	  emperor,	  the	  higher	  the	  sky	  (to	  fly)”	  (tian	  gao	  huangdi	  
yuan	  天高皇帝远).	  Moving	  out	  of	  Beijing,	  in	  particular	  to	  southern	  China,	  helps	  “the	  new-­‐tech	   firms	   get	   rid	   of	   some	   rigidity	   and	   formality	   of	   the	   old	   system	   they	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  Wang	  &	  Wang	  (1998),	  p.	  694.	  344	  Zhou	  &	  Xin	  (2003);	  Tan	  (2006).	  345	  Cao	  (2004).	  346	  Tan	  (2006),	  p.	  844.	  347	  Tan	  (2006).	  348	  Zhou	  (2004).	  349	  Zhou	  &	  Xin	  (2003).	  	  350	  Todo	  et	  al.	  (2006).	  	  Filatotchev	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  find	  that	  the	  R&D	  activities	  of	  multinationals	  raises	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  innovation	  intensity	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  local	  ZGC	  firms	  only	  when	  the	  local	  firms	  possess	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  absorptive	  capacity.	  	  351	  Cai	  et	  al.	  (2007).	  352	  Chen	  (2008).	  Lenovo’s	  strategic	  alliance	  with	  IBM	  has	  been	  the	  most	  publicised	  collaboration	  between	  a	  Chinese	  firm	  and	  a	  large	  multinational.	  
	  Page 58	  
otherwise	  would	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  and	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  informal,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	   illegal,	   channels	   to	   source	   their	   production	   factors	   nationally	   or	   even	  internationally.”353	  However,	   headquarters	   remain	   in	   ZGC	   to	   maintain	   guanxi.354	  Establishing	   these	  connections	   takes	  a	   long	   time	  and	  entrepreneurs	  are	   therefore	  unwilling	  to	  leave	  this	  “relational	  capital”	  behind.	  Informal	  institutions	  thus	  play	  a	  role	  in	  ZGC,	  but	  overall	  the	  role	  of	  collaboration	  and	  informal	  networks	  is	  less	  than	  would	  be	  expected	  of	  a	  high-­‐performing	  innovation	  area.	  
This	   flight	   to	   the	   south	   enables	   firms	   to	   partially	   escape	   the	  watchful	   eye	   of	   the	  state,	   but	   is	   also	   driven	   by	   lower	   costs	   in	   the	   south.	   As	   ZGC	   has	   grown,	  diseconomies	  of	  agglomeration	  have	  appeared.	  The	  cost	  of	  living,	  real	  estate	  prices	  and	   salaries	   have	   all	   risen.355	  The	   high	   prices	   have	   become	   prohibitive	   for	  many	  start-­‐up	   firms.	  Larger	   firms	  are	   investing	   in	  real	  estate	  pushing	  up	  prices,	   leaving	  less	   for	   small	   and	   medium-­‐sized	   enterprises.356	  Diseconomies	   of	   agglomeration	  appear	  to	  be	  increasing	  in	  ZGC	  as	  its	  popularity	  rises.	  This	  ought	  to	  be	  expected	  as	  the	  zone	  develops	  and	  matures.357	  
Innovation	  zones:	  Chinese	  convergence?	  The	  discussion	  on	  innovation	  zones	  and	  science	  parks	  clearly	  showed	  that	  there	  is	  no	   clear	   definition	   or	   clear	   conceptual	   framework	   of	   innovation	   zones.	   However,	  common	   threads	   can	   be	   found	   in	   innovation	   zones,	   science	   parks	   and	   new	  industrial	  districts.	  These	  centre	  on	  agglomeration,	  clustering	  and	  industry-­‐science	  linkages.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   variation	   around	   their	   scope,	   size	   and	   governance	  means	   that	   there	   is	   no	   international	   model	   around	   which	   ZGC	   or	   China’s	   other	  high-­‐tech	  zones	  could	  converge.	  Within	  China,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  definitional	  problem.	  Walcott	  (2003)	  notes	  the	  following:	  	  
China’s	   high-­‐tech	   industrial	   development	   zones	   encompass	   a	   wide	  variety	  of	  activities	  at	  each	  location.	  	  Some,	  as	  in	  Beijing,	  are	  centered	  on	   research	   institutions.	   	   Some	   in	   Shanghai	   are	   located	   around	  traditional	   manufacturing	   labour	   pools,	   or	   dictated	   in	   wholly	   new	  locations	   by	   government	   redistributive	   policy.	   	   Others	   reflect	   a	  geographical	   closeness	   to	   sites	   of	   overseas	   Chinese	   capital,	   such	   as	  Shenzhen,	  or	  military	  productive	  capacity,	  as	  in	  Xian.	  	  Local	  level	  STIP	  usually	  amount	  to	  little	  more	  than	  advertising	  for	  prestigious	  address,	  and	  principally	  hold	  manufacturing	  rather	  than	  R&D	  activity.	  They	  are	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  Wang	  &	  Wang	  (1998),	  p.	  692.	  354	  Walcott	  (2003).	  355	  Tan	  (2006).	  356	  Ibid.	  357	  Ibid.	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far	   less	   innovative	   than	   industrious,	  and	  only	  major	  universities	  and	  institutes	   manage	   to	   produce	   any	   significant	   innovative	  breakthroughs.	  (pp.	  56–57).	  
The	   role	   of	   government	   has	   been	  highly	   variable	   across	   the	  OECD	   and	  East	  Asia.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  trend	  across	  East	  Asia	  of	  a	  heavy	  state	  role	  in	  industrial	  and	  technology	  policies.358	  Accordingly,	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  innovation	  zones	  has	  been	  greater	  than	  in	  OECD	  economies,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  the	  French	  pôles	  de	  compétitivité	  programme.	  Scholars	  have	  noted	  the	  state’s	  role	  has	  been	  critical	  in	  establishing	  science	  parks	  and	  in	  initiating	  new	  industrial	  districts	  in	  East	  Asia,	  particularly	  in	  South	  Korea.359	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  top-­‐down	  approach	  to	  ZGC	  is	  similar	  to	  its	  neighbours.	  
At	  first	  glance,	  the	  sheer	  scale	  of	  ZGC	  and	  China’s	  other	  high-­‐tech	  zones	  appear	  to	  be	   a	   unique	   characteristic.	   Three-­‐quarters	   of	   all	   high-­‐tech	   activity	   in	   China	   takes	  place	  in	  its	  science	  parks	  and	  China’s	  parks	  dwarf	  the	  largest	  in	  the	  United	  States.360	  However,	  Taiwan’s	  core	  science	  parks	  also	  account	  for	  the	  bulk	  of	  Taiwanese	  high-­‐tech	   exports.361	  Nor	   are	   the	   policy	   measures,	   such	   as	   tax	   breaks,	   adopted	   by	  Chinese	  reformers	  unique	  to	  China.	  The	  OECD	  notes,	  “the	  use	  of	  tax	  incentives	  for	  R&D	   and	   tax	   breaks	   for	   incubators	   and	   university	   science	   parks	   are	   common	   in	  OECD	   countries.”362	  The	   lack	   of	   inter-­‐firm	   collaboration	   observed	   in	   ZGC	   and	   in	  other	  science	  parks	  has	  also	  been	  observed	  elsewhere	  in	  East	  Asia.363	  
What	   ostensibly	   sets	   ZGC	   apart	   is	   its	   role	   in	   experimentation	   and	   in	   political	  showcasing.	  Beijing	  has	  used	  ZGC	  to	  try	  out	  novel	  regulatory	  practices	  and	  to	  allow	  bottom-­‐up	  experiments.	  This	  role	  has	  not	  been	  seen	  elsewhere	  in	  East	  Asia,	  neither	  for	  industrial	  districts,	  clusters,	  high-­‐tech	  areas	  nor	  science	  parks.	  The	  latest	  move	  to	  use	  ZGC	  and	  Wuhan’s	  West	  Lake	  Park	  to	  parade	  innovation	  before	  national	  and	  international	  eyes	  is	  also	  a	  point	  of	  divergence.	  Other	  states,	  including	  those	  in	  East	  Asia,	  have	  not	  created	  “national	  demonstration	  zones”	  for	  showcasing	  scientific	  and	  innovation	  achievements.	  This	  political	  leverage	  is	  not	  only	  limited	  to	  the	  national	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  Amsden	  (1989);	  Page	  (1994),	  pp.	  253–260.	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  (1989);	  Park	  &	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  Dickenson	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demonstration	   zones.	   In	   many	   cases,	   high-­‐tech	   parks	   in	   China	   are	   used	   “to	  showcase	  political	  correctness	  of	  the	  local	  leadership.”364	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7. Conclusion	  
The	  development	  of	  a	  high-­‐value,	  innovative	  economy	  presents	  Chinese	  reformers	  and	  policymakers	  alike	  with	  a	  formidable	  challenge.	  Few	  countries	  have	  succeeded	  as	  technology	  success	  stories.	  Yet	  China’s	  unprecedented	  growth	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades	   would	   suggest	   that	   China	   has	   the	   wherewithal	   to	   rise	   to	   the	   challenge,	  perhaps	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  its	  East	  Asian	  neighbours.	  Beijing	  is	  investing	  huge	  sums	  in	   science	   and	   technology	   and	   is	   continuing	   to	   foster	   a	   competitive	   environment	  conducive	   to	   Schumpeterian	   innovation.	   But	   this	   investment	   has	   not	   necessarily	  led	  to	  the	  anticipated	  improvements	  in	  quality.	  Few,	  if	  any,	  Chinese	  firms	  are	  at	  the	  technological	  frontier	  and	  inefficiencies	  remain	  in	  the	  research	  system.	  
China’s	   reforms	   have	   been	   characterised	   by	   an	   overriding	   philosophy	   of	   gradual	  change	  and	  experimentation.	  This	  approach	  has	  allowed	  for	  institutional	  change	  to	  be	   pareto-­‐improving	   by	   forming	   institutions	   that	   respond	   to	   the	   particular	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy.	  This	  dynamic,	  interactive	  process	  has	  led	  to	  some	  unorthodox	  institutions	  and	  some	  claims	  of	  a	  China	  puzzle	  in	  the	  face	  of	  high	  growth.	   The	   institutional	   settings	   adopted	   by	   Chinese	   reformers	   have	   posed	  something	   of	   a	   challenge	   to	   those	   advocating	   a	   standard	   set	   of	   institutions	   that	  were	   successful	   for	   the	  West.	   The	   Chinese	   experience	   demonstrates	   that	   various	  institutional	   settings	  may	  be	   conducive	   to	   growth.	  These	   settings	   take	   account	  of	  local	  contexts	  and	  history.	  Institutional	  change	  is	  thus	  best	  managed	  through	  path	  dependent	   processes	   and	   a	  mix	   of	   evolutionary	   and	  more	   top-­‐down	   approaches.	  The	   thesis	   thereby	   lends	   support	   to	   an	   historical	   institutionalist	   view	   of	  institutional	   change.	   Theories	   that	   ignore	   path	   dependency	   and	   evolutionary	  processes	  are	  not	  able	  to	  capture	  the	  complexities	  of	  institutional	  change.	  
The	   case	   of	   ZGC	   illustrates	   the	   importance	   of	   experimentation	   in	   China’s	  transitional	  economy.	   Its	  very	  establishment	  was	  an	  experiment,	  and	   later	  served	  as	   a	  model	   for	   other	  high-­‐tech	  national	   science	   and	   technology	  parks.	  Bottom-­‐up	  experiments	   in	   ZGC	   created	   China’s	   first	   high-­‐tech	   firms,	   some	   of	   which	   have	  become	   large	   conglomerates.	   These	   pioneering	   firms	   have	   experimented	   with	  various	   corporate	   governance	   structures,	   serving	   as	   models	   for	   other	   Chinese	  firms.	  Stock	  trading	  systems,	  designed	  and	  trialled	  in	  ZGC,	  are	  now	  being	  rolled	  out	  beyond	  ZGC.	  In	  the	  last	  two	  years,	  top-­‐down	  pilot	  schemes	  have	  gained	  momentum	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in	   the	   last	   two	   years	   with	   a	   number	   of	   government	   agencies	   using	   ZGC	   to	  experiment	  with	  innovation	  policies.	  
The	  institutional	  evolution	  of	  ZGC	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  bottom-­‐up	  and	  top-­‐down	  institutional	  change.	  Pioneering	  individuals	  took	  risks	  to	  establish	  new	  forms	  of	   organisation.	   Bottom-­‐up	   institutional	   innovation	   continues	   in	   ZGC,	   but	   at	   the	  same	  time	  central	  and	  local	  government	  have	  later	  approved	  of	  these	  innovations	  through	   formal	   legal	   instruments.	   The	   State	   Council	   has	   been	   playing	   a	   more	  directive	   role	   over	   time,	   mostly	   through	   informal	   means,	   such	   as	   speeches	   and	  directives.	  These	  have	  tended	  to	  be	  followed	  up	  by	  formal	  regulations	  issued	  by	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	  government.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  institutional	  innovation	  that	  has	  occurred,	  ZGC	  has	  failed	  to	  address	  a	  number	   of	   institutional	   frameworks	   that	   underpin	   innovation.	   Chinese	   leaders	  have	  never	  been	  able	  to	  articulate	  coherent	  visions	  of	  ownership	  structure	  or	  of	  a	  restructured	   financial	   system.	   The	   intellectual	   property	   regime	   remains	   weak,	  which	  hinders	  knowledge	  creation,	   inter-­‐firm	  collaboration	  and	  industry-­‐research	  connections.	   The	   venture	   capital	   market	   is	   still	   embryonic,	   with	   non-­‐state	   firms	  struggling	   to	   find	   capital.	   Spin-­‐off	   firms	  have	   strong	   links	  with	   their	   parent	   SOEs	  and	  this	  vertical	  integration	  hinders	  networking	  among	  new	  innovative	  firms.	  The	  lack	  of	   formal	   institutions	  hinders	   the	  development	  of	   informal	   institutions,	   trust	  and	  social	  capital,	  which	  are	  essential	  to	  knowledge	  flows	  and	  networks.	  That	  said,	  
guanxi	   do	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   company	   decisions	   to	   maintain	   their	  headquarters	  in	  ZGC	  despite	  the	  higher	  operating	  costs	  of	  locating	  in	  the	  zone.	  
The	   Chinese	   government	   has	   invested	   vast	   sums	   in	   ZGC	   and	   its	   other	   high-­‐tech	  zones.	  However,	  based	  on	  evidence	  to	  date,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  innovation	  parks	  is	  far	   from	   clear.	   They	   are	   at	   best	   a	   small	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   innovation	   framework.	  Science	  parks	  are	  one	  of	  many	  tools	  for	  improving	  industry-­‐research	  connections.	  This	  confirms	  that	  China’s	  approach	  to	  experimenting	  with	  institutions	  rather	  than	  simply	   copying	   western	   institutions	   and	   converging	   is	   the	   right	   approach.	  Following	   the	   model	   of	   Taiwan’s	   Hsinchu	   may	   well	   prove	   fruitful,	   given	   the	  technological	   success	   across	   the	   Strait.	   Unlike	   studies	   of	   other	   parks,	   studies	   of	  Hsinchu	  show	  that	  the	  park	  does	  improve	  firm	  productivity.	  
There	   is	   a	   distinct	   lack	   of	   clarity	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   innovation	   areas	   and	  science	  and	  technology	  parks,	  which	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  particular	  institutional	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setting	  around	  which	  ZGC	  or	  Chinese	  parks	  could	  converge.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	   experimental	   role	   being	   played	   by	   ZGC	   is	   unique.	   Recent	   research	   on	  innovation	   policy	   in	   the	   West	   suggests	   that	   experiments	   are	   required	   in	  determining	   the	  most	   suitable	  policy	  measures.365	  China’s	  history	  and	  established	  practices	   in	   experimentalism	   provide	   a	   strong	   platform	   for	   such	   testing.	   	   This	  augurs	  well	  for	  Chinese	  innovation	  policy	  and	  for	  the	  efforts	  of	  Chinese	  leaders	  to	  move	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  further	  up	  the	  value	  chain.	  
Successful	  innovation	  rests	  on	  decentralisation	  and	  freedoms	  to	  pursue	  new	  ideas	  and	   creative	   thought.	   Absence	   of	   political	   reform	   will	   hinder	   this	   process.	  Experimentation	   may	   generate	   institutional	   innovation,	   but	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  thriving	   bottom-­‐up	   process,	   major	   barriers	   to	   innovation	   in	   China	   will	   remain.	  Chinese	   leaders	  have	  placed	  high	  hopes	  on	  ZGC	  as	  a	  pioneer	   for	   transforming	  the	  Chinese	   economy,	   yet	   labelling	   ZGC	   a	   “national	   demonstration	   innovation	   zone”	  suggests	   that	   the	   zone	   will	   be	   used	   more	   for	   political	   purposes	   than	   for	   the	  generation	  of	  new	  ideas	  and	  knowledge	  with	  wide	  dissemination.	  Innovation	  in	  the	  West	   relied	   on	   a	   decentralised	   framework,	   empowering	   and	   incentivising	  individuals	   to	   find	  novel	  solutions	   to	  both	  old	  and	  new	  problems.366	  It	   remains	   to	  be	   seen	   whether	   China	   will	   be	   successful	   in	   developing	   an	   alternative	   set	   of	  institutions	   capable	   of	   generating	   innovation.	   ZGC	   continues	   to	   be	   criticised	   for	  being	  no	  more	   than	   an	   export-­‐processing	   zone,	   lacking	   in	   indigenous	   innovation.	  Further	   control	   from	   the	   centre	   may	   simply	   lock	   this	   in	   further.	   The	   study	   of	  institutional	   change	   in	   China’s	   innovation	   system	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  institutions	  established	   is	   thus	  an	  area	   requiring	   further	   research.	  Understanding	  the	  drivers	  of	  innovation	  in	  different	  contexts,	  particularly	  in	  developing	  countries,	  is	   essential	   to	   improving	   living	   standards	   for	   ordinary	   citizens.	   Theories	   that	   are	  capable	  of	  explaining	  innovation	  and	  institutional	  change	  in	  multiple	  contexts	  need	  to	   be	   developed	   and	   these	   need	   to	   be	   tested	   alongside	   more	   established	  frameworks	   such	   as	   those	   of	   standard	   neoclassical	   economics	   which	   often	   drive	  reform	  and	  institutional	  change.	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